Agents That Model Agents: Five Principles Toward a Theory of Mind for 6G Networks

Future 6G networks will rely on Large Language Model (LLM) agents to manage the Radio Access Network (RAN). However, current architectures assume inter-agent messages convey objective facts. A message is instead a \emph{trace} of the sender's reasoning: it carries a subjective conclusion, so a syntactically valid report can propagate an AI hallucination and trigger a cascading outage invisible to protocol validation. Reading such a trace requires a Theory of Mind (ToM)---before acting, the receiver must model what the peer believes, and what a peer in that position should have believed. Modeling these interactions as cognitive channels on a cellular sheaf, we obtain a unified framework for resilient multi-agent systems, from which five design principles emerge: (i) a message is evidence of the sender's hidden reasoning; (ii) trust is a continuous cognitive Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)---asserted precision over deviation from the modeled peer belief; (iii) network-wide consistency and resistance to hallucination contagion are computable via the sheaf's Laplacian; (iv) peer-modeling must halt at exactly two levels to conserve compute and survive mutual information decay; and (v) credible capacity is bounded by operational goal alignment, not link bandwidth. A signaling-storm study on locally deployed 1B-parameter telecom language models validates it: cognitive SNR isolates a hallucinating peer that three of its four neighbors agree with, where a divergence gate ranks every wrong peer above the right one; only depth two ToM recovers the correct action; and the spectral gap decides whether a topology reaches consistency inside the near-real-time budget.

Mitigating Anchoring Bias in LLM-Based Agents for Energy-Efficient 6G Autonomous Networks

This paper presents an autonomous agentic resource negotiation framework designed to enable zero-touch network slicing in 6G architectures using Large Language Model (LLM) agents. While LLMs offer powerful reasoning capabilities, we demonstrate that such agents inherently suffer from anchoring bias, rigidly adhering to initial heuristic proposals and causing severe network over-provisioning. To systematically mitigate this cognitive bias, we propose a novel randomized anchoring strategy modeled via a Truncated 3-Parameter Weibull distribution. This mathematically bounded approach seamlessly integrates with burst-aware Digital Twins (DTs) employing Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) to rigorously guarantee strict Service Level Agreement (SLA) tail-latencies. To validate our methodology, we introduce and prove the \emph{Bimodal Constraint-Avoidance Utility Theorem}, demonstrating that while feasible negotiations follow classical convex bounds, highly constrained scenarios undergo a phase transition governed by an inverse rational decay envelope. Empirical results generated using a locally hosted 1B-parameter model otel-llm-1b-it confirm these dual-regime bounds. Our cognitive de-biasing successfully dismantles rigid negotiation patterns, forcing agents into active exploration to safely ride SLA boundaries and boost system energy savings up to 25\%. Crucially, the lightweight 1B LLM achieves sub-second inference latencies (0.95s mean), ensuring our multi-agent framework is compatible with the operational timescales of the O-RAN non-Real-Time RAN Intelligent Controller (non-RT RIC)\footnote{Our source code is available for non-commercial use at https://github.com/HatimChergui.

Strategic Bidding in 6G Spectrum Auctions with Large Language Models

Efficient and fair spectrum allocation is a central challenge in 6G networks, where massive connectivity and heterogeneous services continuously compete for limited radio resources. We investigate the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) as bidding agents in repeated 6G spectrum auctions with budget constraints in vehicular networks. Each user equipment (UE) acts as a rational player optimizing its long-term utility through repeated interactions. Using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as a benchmark for incentive-compatible, dominant-strategy truthfulness, we compare LLM-guided bidding against truthful and heuristic strategies. Unlike heuristics, LLMs leverage historical outcomes and prompt-based reasoning to adapt their bidding behavior dynamically. Results show that when the theoretical assumptions guaranteeing truthfulness hold, LLM bidders recover near-equilibrium outcomes consistent with VCG predictions. However, when these assumptions break -- such as under static budget constraints -- LLMs sustain longer participation and achieve higher utilities, revealing their ability to approximate adaptive equilibria beyond static mechanism design. This work provides the first systematic evaluation of LLM bidders in repeated spectrum auctions, offering new insights into how AI-driven agents can interact strategically and reshape market dynamics in future 6G networks.