Agent skills, structured artifacts distilled from interaction trajectories and dynamically reused from skill banks, have become a central mechanism for enabling large language model (LLM)-based self-evolving agents to learn from past experience. Yet existing work has largely focused on the operational aspects of skills, such as acquisition, evolution, and retrieval, while leaving a more fundamental reliability question unresolved: Do accumulated skills in an agent's skill bank actually make positive mechanistic contributions? We investigate this question through systematic skill-bank audits across alternative bank compositions and deployment domains, measuring the resulting changes in agent behavior. These audits reveal two recurring reliability failures: coalition pollution, where bank-level gains conceal negative coalition-level skill contributions, and cross-domain utility reversal, where source-beneficial skills reverse their effects after transfer. These findings motivate two reliability interventions: coalition-aware skill selection during skill accumulation and label-free skill masking after transfer. Coalition-Aware Skill Selection (CASS) selects more reliable candidate skills for the current bank using sampled Shapley marginals. Unsupervised Skill-Masked Coalition Optimizer (u-SMCO) masks transferred skills whose exclusion improves retrieval quality on unlabeled target-domain data. Agentic experiments on LoCoMo, LongMemEval, HotpotQA, and ALFWorld show that CASS and u-SMCO consistently improve task performance and cross-domain generalization over strong skill-based self-evolving agent baselines. Beyond accuracy, coalition-conditioned reliability modeling reduces sensitivity to noisy outcome-reward fluctuations during reinforcement learning and exposes the limits of isolation-based skill evaluation.
Modern agentic AI systems combine multiple large language model agents with heterogeneous skills, yet most architectures either fix communication in advance or allow full broadcast. Both can be inefficient because token cost, latency, redundancy, and error propagation increase with the number of active agents and communication links. We model agent selection and communication as a cooperative game with task-conditioned net utility $U(C\mid x)=V(C\mid x)-\sum_{i\in C}c_i$, separating coalition-level costs from agent activation costs. We propose a marginal-value activation rule and greedy router, extend the model to optimize communication edges with per-edge costs, and use estimated Shapley values to predict which agents are worth contacting before and during execution. We connect the problem to submodular maximization and prove two limited guarantees: a curvature-refined bound for a monotone, cardinality-constrained special case, and a tight $1/2$-approximation, with a correction for signed objectives, for an unconstrained non-monotone case via double greedy. Neither guarantee applies directly to the main router, which remains a heuristic. We also prove a Shapley-submodularity sandwich bound linking the error of marginal-value routing to a per-agent diminishing-returns quantity. In synthetic experiments, greedy routing achieves $99.5%$ of brute-force-optimal utility while activating $1.96$ of $8$ agents on average, compared with $38.8%$ for full broadcast. Performance is robust to activation cost and redundancy weight but falls to $66%$ under strong violations of submodularity or noisy value estimates. We distinguish the framework from Shapley pricing, hedonic coalition formation, and communication-graph pruning, and propose evaluation on real multi-agent LLM benchmarks.
When an LLM agent fails -- issues a refund it should not have, calls the wrong tool, leaks data -- existing tooling answers what happened (observability) or whether it passed (evaluation), but not which step caused the failure. The obvious heuristics are wrong: the step that executes the harmful action is usually not the step that decided on it, and LLM-judge attribution is correlational and unreliable (state-of-the-art step-level accuracy on the Who&When benchmark is about 14%). We present Causal Agent Replay (CAR), which answers the question by intervention: it models an agent run as a structural causal model, applies a do-operation to a step, and re-executes the trajectory forward under the same stochastic policy, measuring the shift in the outcome distribution. We define an intervention algebra over agent steps, a single-step contrastive estimator whose point-of-commitment rule resolves a confound specific to stochastic run-forward, and a budget-bounded Monte-Carlo Shapley estimator that splits credit across interacting steps. Every effect is reported with confidence intervals. We validate against synthetic structural causal models with planted ground truth: the contrastive estimator recovers the pivotal step, and Shapley recovers a two-step interaction (0.44, 0.45, ~0; efficiency sum 0.909 versus the analytic 0.91). CAR is open source and runs on hosted or free local models.