CatchBench: When Can an Agent Failure Be Caught?

When can an agent failure be caught? An audit is usually limited by the record rather than by the method. CatchBench therefore puts one auditor's question to three information states: the declared configuration before a run (PRE), a growing prefix of its trace (LIVE), and the finished trace (POST). Prior benchmarks fix one of these states or vary the telemetry; to our knowledge none scores all three under one task-method interface. Each state admits different questions, so seven task contracts carry their own labels and metrics rather than one leaderboard. Four are evidential; three are Gold-derived mechanism diagnostics. The release scores 72 entrants, from rule scanners and structural models to eleven LLM judges across nine model families (GPT, Claude, Gemini, Gemma, Llama, Qwen, DeepSeek, Mistral, Nova), over 1187 declared configurations and 1162 recorded runs. Most of the arena does not order: 47 of 118 pre-declared contrasts separate, and the rest are published unresolved rather than ranked. The two sharpest results cut against our own data. One rule ignores every name and permission; it flags each capability declared after the first. On one of six configuration sources it reaches a perfect F1, so a score there measures how the corpus was built rather than how well a method reasons. Our admissibility bar then rejected one injected substrate and withheld evidential status from the other. A benchmark number is therefore not interpretable until the process behind its labels is published and tested for the shortcut it may leave. We report both, and regenerate every ordering from released predictions with no model call.

Digital Pantheon: Simulating and Auditing Coalition Formation with LLM Agents

The formation of political coalitions is a complex negotiation driven by both concrete policy objectives and deep-seated ideological convictions. While Large Language Models (LLMs) open new avenues for computational political science, the neutrality and helpfulness biases instilled by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prevent them from sustaining steadfast partisan behaviour. We present a multi-agent framework that reconciles factual grounding with ideological alignment by combining Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): DPO instils aggressive party-specific personas, while a per-party RAG pipeline keeps each agent bounded to its official manifesto. We operationalize the framework on the 2019 Flemish election, deploying the partisan agents in a hub-and-spoke negotiation arbitrated by a formateur. To make the emergent negotiation interpretable, we introduce a Multi-Layered Information Lineage Topology (MILT) that traces every clause in the final agreement back to its manifesto origin and classifies it into five provenance states, a Coalition Influence Score (CIS) that aggregates these traceable contributions to identify which party shaped the agreement, and a real-world grounding pass that benchmarks each simulated provision against the historically adopted coalition agreement. Across three independent simulations the framework yields a stable winner and ranking (N-VA ahead of CD\&V and Open Vld), and manifesto-anchored lineage reliably predicts real-world materialization whereas hallucinated content does not. The result is a transparent, scalable testbed for the ex-ante exploration of party compatibility and formateur-mediated compromise.

Auditing Belief-Conditioned LLM Agents in Hidden-Information Social Deduction Games

Evaluating LLM agents in hidden-information multi-agent settings is hard: final outcomes are high-variance and rarely reveal why an agent decided as it did. We study this in a 9-player Werewolf environment where agents act under strict, code-level information isolation, and we build an auditable framework that maintains an external belief state over hidden roles, logs belief updates and belief-action deviations as structured evidence, and supports a defensive offline improvement loop that reviews bad cases before any strategy change. Across 1,080 frozen games spanning belief-disabled, active-belief, kernel-ablation, camp-restricted, consumption-policy, and high-load arms, and including a seed-paired A0/A1 comparison, the active-belief condition is associated with substantially better good-side outcomes: in the 200-seed A0/A1 comparison the good-side win rate rises from 0.205 to 0.390 (paired McNemar $χ^2 = 16.4$, $p < 0.001$), with fewer irreversible witch-poison errors. We do not, however, attribute this shift to belief content. Direct action-belief consistency is low ($\approx 0.21$), and giving belief only to the werewolves helps the good side more than giving it only to the good side, which argues against a simple holder-benefit account; we therefore report the effect as an association and treat its mechanism as unresolved. The contribution is the audit framework itself: it makes the effect measurable, exposes low direct action-belief consistency, rejects an unreliable forced-consumption intervention with evidence, and separates strategy effects from load confounds. We accordingly position external belief in high-noise hidden-information games primarily as an auditable cognitive baseline that also carries decision-relevant signal, turning opaque agent behavior into replayable evidence for safer, controlled iteration.