Training LLM-based multi-agent systems with multi-agent reinforcement learning is rapidly gaining traction, and a parallel line of work argues that such systems should be judged by their behavior, not only their reward. We take up both threads in spatial cooperative games, where small frozen LLMs prompted with low-level actions fail outright, earning zero reward. Guided by the options/semi-MDP framework---and, because option execution is asynchronous across agents, its multi-agent extension in macro-action Dec-POMDPs---we equip each game with a library of symbolic \emph{options}: typed, state-feasible, short-horizon behaviors executed by a symbolic planner. Each library is drafted by a frontier coding model from the game's source code; the feasibility guards that filter each menu are then synthesized mechanically from cheap random-policy burn-in rollouts---a guard is adopted only if it explains repeated execution failures while hiding no logged success---so no guard is authored, selected, or reward-tuned by hand. Each agent's LLM acts as its policy over options, with a private per-agent LoRA adapter trained by a per-agent variant of multi-agent GRPO (PA-MAGRPO); this lifts frozen bases from zero reward to competent play across three games and four small backbones. Behavioral audits then reveal that reward and cooperation decouple: a rising reward curve may simply mean that one agent has learned to run the entire task alone while its partner idles---cooperation emerges only when the task makes it necessary. Reward alone is thus an unreliable readout of cooperation; behavioral evaluation must sit alongside it.
LLM agents will increasingly act in socially structured settings where role, audience, and relational context can shape what is advantageous or costly to say. We study whether such social structure, without any explicit objective in the prompt, changes what an agent expresses publicly relative to an off-the-record (OTR) channel elicited under the same condition. We introduce a dual-channel debate framework in which agents produce public utterances that enter the shared history alongside OTR responses that are recorded but never shown to the other participant. Across 10 models, 3 scenarios, and 5 variations within each scenario, alignment-inducing settings produce systematic public-OTR divergence in the targeted agent, with its decision divergence rising from a $\sim$3% baseline to roughly 40%. The effect is consistent across four aggregate analyses: stance, semantic similarity, natural language inference, and survey responses. In some cases, the OTR response explicitly attributes public accommodation to relational pressures, such as career risk or sponsorship obligation. The findings suggest that agent evaluation should extend beyond explicit goals and detect emergent objectives. We present a dual-channel evaluation framework and complementary behavioral measures that operationalize this assessment.