Bilevel Coordinated Reflection: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Multi-Agent LLM Systems

Multi-agent LLM systems commonly use an orchestrator to decompose a task for a team of workers and then improve through textual reflection. Despite strong empirical results, these systems lack a unified account of coordination, memory improvement, and the role of external verification. We model orchestrator-worker interaction as a bilevel coordination game: under bounded coupling, the workers' local-update game is an approximate potential game whose equilibrium slack is controlled by decomposition quality. We then analyse reflection as stochastic movement over semantic memory states. For free-form reflection, we derive a finite-time upper bound, prove worst-case tightness, and give a positive lower bound under a falsifiable persistent-harm condition. We further prove an information-theoretic impossibility result: no gate that observes only the generated transcript can improve uniformly over text-indistinguishable environments, whereas an environment-grounded gate can. Motivated by this separation, we introduce Stochastic Reflective Memory Ascent (SRMA), which accepts a candidate memory only after a grounded evaluation risk strictly decreases. Under calibration and non-degenerate corrective mass, SRMA converges exactly, geometrically or polynomially; matching constructions show that both rate regimes are order-tight. We also provide confidence gating for stochastic evaluation and re-anchoring guarantees for piecewise-stationary environments. Experiments instantiate these objects with environment-grounded metrics and test the predicted coordination and drift laws. On 500 SWE-bench instances, the complete Kimi-based system resolves 72.2% versus a 70.8% public mini-SWE-agent reference. Code: https://github.com/YihangChen9/Bilevel-Coordinated-Reflection

The Open-Strategy Dictator Game: Cooperation Under Mutual Transparency

We introduce the Open-Strategy Dictator Game (OSDG), a variant of the classic dictator game in which each player's strategy is a natural-language document visible to all participants. The dictator's decision, to SHARE or TAKE an endowment, may depend on the text of the recipient's strategy. A large language model adjudicates each interaction by interpreting the dictator's strategy in the context of the recipient's. We run round-robin tournaments among diverse strategies and analyze the resulting payoff matrix using softmax equilibrium frequencies, dominance analysis, and sensitivity to the relative value of cooperation. Conditionally cooperative strategies, those that share with cooperators and take from exploiters, consistently dominate, while unconditional strategies (always share or always take) are weakly dominated. The results suggest that in environments where agents can inspect each other's decision procedures, conditional cooperation is evolutionarily robust across a wide range of payoff parameters.

Do LLMs Take Care of Their Own? Similarity Signals Can Induce Cooperation

As LLM-based agents with user-instructed goals are becoming widely deployed, they increasingly encounter each other in strategic interactions, and face challenges of finding mutually beneficial outcomes. Prior literature has argued that cooperation problems such as the Prisoner's Dilemma are resolvable in settings where agents know they follow very similar decision making patterns, as for example in monocultural AI ecosystems. Following that line of work, this paper introduces the first framework for evaluating LLM decision making when agents are provided with graded similarity signals. Among our findings, we establish that different LLM models vary drastically in how they navigate similarity signals, with some modern models showing consistent behavior across cooperation problems, payoff structures, and prompt framing. Perhaps surprisingly, our experiments also show that the dataset based on which the similarity signal is computed has small to no impact on induced cooperation, and that LLM models systematically self-identify as highly similar when asked to evaluate another model's chain-of-thought reasoning by themselves. Finally, we develop an LLM-behavioral-game-theoretic model that captures some of their reasoning rationale, and show that it can support cooperative outcomes in equilibrium under sufficiently high similarity scores.

Solver-Guided Reasoning for Mixed-Equilibrium Strategies

Reasoning in large language models (LLMs) is often grounded in human text, human demonstrations, and human-generated rationales. For equilibrium reasoning in complex games, however, relying on human data can be suboptimal. In fact, human play is often guided by intuition and heuristics and can deviate substantially from game equilibrium. This discrepancy is amplified in games with mixed-strategy equilibria, where human data is heavily biased toward pure strategies. Consequently, conditioning LLMs on this data yields weak game strategies. To grant LLMs the reasoning capacity in games, in this work, we study how to elicit equilibrium play using solver output. We propose Mixed-Strategy Decision Tree (MDT), which articulates the silent optimality of the equilibrium into sparse strategic rules that both humans and LLMs could understand. Using solver output rather than human annotation allows us to extend the input to arbitrarily new states and continuations. We instantiate this study on No-Limit Texas Hold'em by querying a solver oracle for over \textbf{250 million mixed-strategy decisions}; MDT together with other techniques \textbf{reduces the $\ell_1$ distance to the equilibrium by $52.6\%$} across $8$ different LLM configurations. A Route-only ablation tests the incremental contribution of the shadow-based contrast, while complete River-endgame and Liar's Dice experiments evaluate strategic fidelity and portability beyond the original NLH communication setting.

Strategy, Not Payoffs: A Behavioural Embedding of Normal-Form Games

Learning a strategic task changes more than what is directly taught: fine-tuning on one game can either enhance or degrade an agent's ability to reason in another. Understanding and predicting this transfer of strategic capabilities, however, remains a key challenge for large language models (LLMs). Normal-form games provide an ideal testbed for analyzing this phenomenon, as they feature explicitly defined payoffs and well-characterized equilibrium behaviours. In this work, we investigate whether game embeddings can explain and predict changes in LLM strategic capabilities following fine-tuning across different games. We propose a lightweight two-feature embedding that captures fundamental behavioural demands: the entropy of the Nash equilibrium and the sensitivity of optimal responses to an opponent's action. We show that while existing published structural embeddings primarily memorize game identities and fail to generalize, our behavioural embedding reliably predicts performance changes on held-out games. These results demonstrate that the transfer of strategic capabilities in LLMs is not dictated by the payoff geometry of a game, but by the underlying structure of the decision-making behaviour it requires.

How Much Due Diligence Before You Bid? Learning in Intractable Takeover Auctions

When two companies bid to buy the same target, no one knows exactly what the target is worth. Each bidder pays for due diligence: costly, imperfect homework that sharpens its own private estimate before it bids. How much of that homework is worth buying? We build a simple computer model of the bidding contest and let it teach itself to bid well by playing against itself, the way a game engine learns chess. The economic question, how much diligence pays for itself, and the computational question, when the contest becomes too complex to solve exactly, are both controlled by a single thing: how many pieces of private information a bidder carries. Our main finding is that the right amount of diligence is modest and finite. It falls as diligence gets more expensive, and it falls further when both sides are doing their homework, because competition erodes the value of knowing more. We also test a recent claim from AI research: that simple, general self-play methods can rival the specialized, expensive algorithms usually built for games like these. Running on an ordinary laptop with no costly frontier AI, we find the simple methods are the best of the self-learning approaches, though purpose-built exact methods still win whenever the game is small enough to solve outright. The simple methods earn their keep only once the game grows too large to solve exactly, which is the regime real deals live in, and there we show they still find strong bidding strategies. The contribution is threefold: a cheap, reproducible way to study deal-making under uncertainty; a concrete, model-based answer to how much due diligence is worth buying; and evidence about when lightweight, general-purpose AI is good enough to replace specialized methods. We release all the games, code, and experiments.

Age of LLM: A Strategic 1v1 Benchmark for Reasoning, Diplomacy and Reliability of Large Language Models under Fog of War

We introduce Age of LLM, a turn-based 1v1 benchmark in which two LLMs face off on a 13x7 grid to destroy the enemy base. Three stressors are deliberate: fog of war, full diplomacy (messages, ceasefires, ultimatums; uranium kept secret), and a reliability dimension where every turn must follow a strict JSON schema and an illegal action is silently discarded. The engine is private and each match uses a fresh random map seed and opponent, mitigating the data contamination that affects public benchmarks. Models receive a (near) rule-only prompt with no build-order advice (two tactical seed phrases were present during data collection; see Section 2.7). We benchmark 15 reasoning models across 54 matches and 5,258 actions. Findings: (1) the nuclear rush dominates (78% on the rules-coherent v0.11+ sub-corpus; 85% corpus-wide) with a sole-launcher signature that is largely mechanical under secret-simultaneous launch rules, not a cognitive deterrence failure; (2) military conquest is rare but faster (12.3 vs 18.9 turns); (3) diplomacy is prolific yet almost never consummated; (4) ~58% of illegal actions are fog/state errors, making the illegal-action rate a measure of belief-tracking; (5) -- the least established, and the only one we label exploratory -- a weak link associates reliability with winning. The corpus is small, unbalanced and not side-swapped, so the ranking is a preliminary descriptive view, not a contribution. Beyond ranking, the turn-by-turn traces of actions and messages make the corpus a lens on how LLMs reason under adversarial uncertainty -- their belief-tracking, spontaneous deception, and per-model cognitive "personas" -- which we frame as a future research direction. We release the replay format, an isometric viewer and all replays; engine source on request.

Enhancing Decision-Making with Large Language Models through Multi-Agent Fictitious Play

Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems (MAS) have demonstrated great potential in solving tasks with execution complexity, by distributing subtasks across cooperative agents. However, this divide-and-conquer paradigm falls short on decision-making tasks that are also prevalent in the real world. These tasks require simultaneous reasoning from the stances of all involved stakeholders whose decisions are mutually dependent and thus cannot be solved in isolation. We characterize this challenge as stance entanglement, a form of decision complexity distinct from execution complexity. To address it, we propose Multi-Agent Fictitious Play (MAFP), a novel MAS paradigm that represents stakeholder stances as agents and formulates decision-making as an equilibrium-seeking process. Built on the game-theoretic principle of fictitious play, MAFP iteratively updates each agent's decision by best responding to the empirical mixture of other agents' past decisions. This enables agents to expose and address one another's weaknesses, progressively improving decision quality and robustness. We evaluate MAFP on challenging decision-making tasks that test the capability of deciding strategies for competitive scenarios prior to acting. MAFP outperforms both single-round and multi-round baselines on two complementary metrics, tournament strength and robustness, demonstrating its effectiveness in addressing stance entanglement.

GARL: Game-Theoretic Reinforcement Learning for Multi-Agent Strategic Prioritisation

LLM-based multi-agent systems are increasingly used for strategic decision-making tasks. In such settings, performance depends not only on individual model capabilities, but also on the policies by which agents interact and adapt. Multi-agent reinforcement learning can optimise these interaction policies, but its reward design often remains task-specific and weakly grounded in interaction structure. To address this gap, we propose GARL, a GAme-theoretic Reinforcement Learning framework for multi-agent strategic prioritisation. GARL formalises strategic prioritisation as a two-stage game: competing agents first allocate strategic resources over a shared candidate set, and a higher-level arbiter then produces the final ranking. The resulting game-theoretic utilities are converted into role-specific reinforcement signals, allowing policy optimisation to be guided by structured interaction. We instantiate GARL on issues-in-dispute ranking, where the goal is to prioritise core issues in legal proceedings. Experiments show that GARL improves ranking performance, enables small open-source LLMs to become competitive with a strong closed-source LLM under the same candidate-ranking setting, and yields gains in legal-domain competence and broader strategic decision-making. Overall, GARL demonstrates how game-theoretic interaction structure can be turned into reinforcement-learning objectives, providing a principled approach to policy optimisation in multi-agent strategic prioritisation.