L-MAD: A Systematic Evaluation of Multi-Agent Debate Structures in Legal Reasoning

While multi-agent debate (MAD) frameworks have shown significant potential in general reasoning, their effectiveness in highly structured, knowledge-heavy legal domains remains under-explored. In this work, we introduce the Legal Multi-Agent Debate (L-MAD) framework to systematically evaluate different debate structures and aggregation methods within Legal Textual Entailment. By assigning distinct expert personas to multiple agents, L-MAD improves upon strong single-agent baselines by up to 8\%. Furthermore, analyzing how debate scales reveals a clear trade-off: increasing the agent population reduces inconsistency and improves accuracy, whereas extending discussion rounds induces a detrimental \textit{over-deliberation drift} where agents reinforce each other's mistakes. Ultimately, our findings outline the practical boundaries and safety margins of deploying collaborative multi-agent systems in high-stakes legal reasoning environments.

Investigating Multi-Agent Deliberation in Law

Artificial Intelligence is increasingly applied to the field of law, and has the potential to increase access to justice. One particular movement that is gaining traction is that of agentic AI, wherein AI agents, based on Large Language Models (LLMs) can take autonomous actions. In particular, multi-agent approaches in the legal domain remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we investigate multi-agent deliberation methods for legal reasoning tasks using LLMs. We explore multi-agent deliberation (MAD) and introduce two novel multi-agent frameworks inspired by courtroom procedures and legal argumentation. Our experiments on both legal and non-legal benchmarks reveal that multi-agent frameworks achieve comparable overall performance to baseline large language models, but produce significantly distinct answers. Notably, these approaches can successfully solve cases that the baseline fails to address, and vice versa. We conduct a qualitative evaluation and highlight scenarios where multi-agent frameworks outperform monolithic approaches. For example, multi-agent approaches appear better suited for answering questions that require critical thinking from multiple perspectives. Our work positions multi-agent systems as a promising direction for AI in the legal domain, while demonstrating the potential of law-inspired multi-agent approaches for deliberation.

Civil Court Simulation with Large Language Models

Court simulation bridges legal education and judicial practice, yet human-based simulations are costly and difficult to scale. Large language models (LLMs) offer a scalable alternative, but existing court-simulation research mainly focuses on criminal cases. Civil litigation is more common in practice and harder to simulate because its claims, liability, and remedies are more flexible. We present a multi-agent court simulation framework for Chinese civil cases. The framework organizes role-based interaction through a five-stage civil trial procedure and integrates memory module and statute retrieval to support long-process adjudication. Experiments show that the framework produces reliable civil judgments, with clear strengths in liability allocation and multi-item adjudication. Further experiments show that memory quality substantially affects downstream simulation quality. Through a five-layer factor framework, we analyze how legal grounding, information conditions, judicial capability and role orientation, organizational pressure, and social context affect the framework's reliability and behavior. These results support the effectiveness of the proposed framework for civil court simulation. The dataset and code are available at: https://github.com/foggpoy/Civil-Court.

GARL: Game-Theoretic Reinforcement Learning for Multi-Agent Strategic Prioritisation

LLM-based multi-agent systems are increasingly used for strategic decision-making tasks. In such settings, performance depends not only on individual model capabilities, but also on the policies by which agents interact and adapt. Multi-agent reinforcement learning can optimise these interaction policies, but its reward design often remains task-specific and weakly grounded in interaction structure. To address this gap, we propose GARL, a GAme-theoretic Reinforcement Learning framework for multi-agent strategic prioritisation. GARL formalises strategic prioritisation as a two-stage game: competing agents first allocate strategic resources over a shared candidate set, and a higher-level arbiter then produces the final ranking. The resulting game-theoretic utilities are converted into role-specific reinforcement signals, allowing policy optimisation to be guided by structured interaction. We instantiate GARL on issues-in-dispute ranking, where the goal is to prioritise core issues in legal proceedings. Experiments show that GARL improves ranking performance, enables small open-source LLMs to become competitive with a strong closed-source LLM under the same candidate-ranking setting, and yields gains in legal-domain competence and broader strategic decision-making. Overall, GARL demonstrates how game-theoretic interaction structure can be turned into reinforcement-learning objectives, providing a principled approach to policy optimisation in multi-agent strategic prioritisation.