Two instruments of EU digital law place inference at their centre and mean different things by it. Article 3(1) of the AI Act uses the capability to infer constitutively: it is the central feature separating the regulated category from conventional software. The GDPR never defines inference, yet governs it protectively: the consequences follow from the processing of personal data and from what the inference says about, or does to, a person, whether or not the technology that produced it qualifies as an AI system. The two perimeters are not concentric. Their non-coincidence remained invisible in single-shot systems; agentic architectures make it operationally acute. The thesis: inferential capability does not determine legal scope, and its absence does not create immunity. The framework is two-level. Inference performs two legal functions, constitutive and protective; the protective function operates through three pathways - identificatory, attributive and decisional. Composition is not a fourth pathway but a cross-cutting architectural dimension which, with reach, persistence and reviewability, is what agentic architectures modify. Three concepts support it: the inferential threshold, the inferential reach and the inferential chain, mapped onto the chain of imputation. Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 left the constitutive criterion untouched and inserted a provision contemplating outputs that influence the inputs of future operations, without supplying any rule of aggregation. The article proposes an interpretive rule, a compositional-effects test identifying the decision unit under Article 22 GDPR together with the allocation of the burden of establishing it, and documentation duties calibrated to inference chains.
Benjamin Fresz, Elena Dubovitskaya, Marco F. Hubercs.AI cs.CY cs.LG
When algorithms make or influence consequential decisions---about loan eligibility, hiring, or healthcare---EU law grants affected individuals a Right to Explanation. Yet whether (and how) Explainable AI (XAI) can satisfy this right in practice remains poorly understood, with direct implications for individuals' ability to contest automated decisions that affect their lives. This paper presents a systematic literature review of XAI in the context of the EU Right to Explanation, with particular focus on Art. 15(1)(h) GDPR, Art. 86 AI Act (AIA), and related instruments. We consider papers published from 2024 onwards, as the final version of the AIA was published in July 2024---with Art. 86 being added late. From 2643 initial records identified by a deliberately broad search, we review 57 full texts, of which only 19 papers demonstrate substantive integration of both legal and technical perspectives, showing gaps in the interdisciplinary synthesis of the current regulatory framework. We document three problematic patterns across the corpus: Most misidentify the GDPR legal basis; few engage with the CJEU's Dun & Bradstreet judgment (likely due to publication timing); and the distinction between explanation form (governed by addressee) and content (governed by legal purpose) is often conflated. We conceptualize this as the Addressee/Purpose Framework, propose a four-phase blueprint for operationalization, and identify six concrete open research questions. Without further progress, the Right to Explanation risks remaining a formal obligation without a technically realizable path to compliance.
Anna Gatzioura, Vrettos Moulos, Nina Baranowskacs.AI
According to the recent European legislation, high-risk AI systems will have to adapt in order to comply with requirements related to specific areas, like risk management, data quality and governance, logging and traceability, technical documentation, transparency, human oversight, and accuracy, as outlined in the European Artificial Intelligence (AI) Act. As the standardisation process for AI is expected to remain iterative and, so far, there are no European standards on AI fully covering the challenges of algorithmic hiring, we propose specific standardisation-oriented recommendations related to the relevant AI areas specified by the European Commission. For each of these areas, we set the context by describing the requirements that AI systems in high-risk domains, and especially in recruitment, should fulfil, as well as the activities that should be carried out to ensure their appropriate use and desired performance, in line with the requirements deriving from the AI Act. Unlike existing horizontal approaches to AI governance and standardisation, this paper contributes a vertical, domain-specific framework for algorithmic hiring, and especially ranking-based recruitment systems, by mapping the requirements of the AI Act to concrete standardisation recommendations, focusing on lifecycle discrimination risks, fairness-aware data governance, explainability, human oversight, and post-deployment monitoring in recruitment systems. Even though our recommendations were informed by the outcomes of the European project FINDHR, they are not tied to the project's technical artefacts and could be implemented using alternative methods, tools, or governance mechanisms.
Javier Irigoyen, Roberto Daza, Aythami Morales +5cs.CY cs.AI cs.CR
The society and emerging risk-based regulatory frameworks for AI underscore the need for rigorous risk assessment to ensure safe and reliable AI systems. In response to this imperative, this paper presents an overview of AI risk assessment (identification and analysis) and management methodologies. It begins by reviewing the worldwide regulatory landscape that drives the need for systematic AI risk assessment. Then we characterize the spectrum of AI-related risks identified in the literature, from technical failures to ethical and social impacts. Subsequently, it reviews key risk assessment methodologies proposed for AI systems, focusing on general frameworks. The paper highlights best practices and illuminates methodological gaps, highlighting areas for further research on AI risk assessment.
The European AI Act is the first comprehensive regulation of artificial intelligence (AI), setting out extensive obligations, particularly for so-called high-risk and general-purpose AI systems. A key distinguishing feature of AI systems under the AI Act is the capability to infer. Since the AI Act does not clearly define what inference is, there is a gray area for certain data-driven systems. A specific example is credit scoring systems, which are listed by Annex III of the AI Act. At the same time, however, these are often implemented using statistical models for which it is unclear whether they have the capability to infer and thus fall under the AI definition of the AI Act at all. Motivated by statistical learning theory, this work develops a framework for grading different levels of the capability to infer. Based on the AI Act and the Commission Guidelines on the definition of an artificial intelligence system, we analyze which levels constitute sufficient capability to infer within the meaning of the AI Act and where further regulatory clarity is needed. We illustrate the framework by creating two realistic credit scoring workflows and show whether and where inference occurs in them. Our analysis illustrates that not only individual models but the entire data processing workflow must be considered. It also shows that the involvement of human experts during development can have significant influence on the capability to infer. Code can be found at https://github.com/fraunhofer-iais/inference-framework-creditscorecards.