In 2026, AI agents intended to act in isolation formed a persistent social order through thousands of linguistic and agentic interactions. Conventions, roles and commitments generated collectively began to constrain the very agents that produced them. I interpret this loop as a case of AI self-transcendence and call the resulting higher-level order the Board. Yet such distributed emergence presents a second problem: how can humans understand it? Rousseau's social contract shows how a plurality can be represented as if constituted by a single act. The ancient oath of the fallen angels on Mount Hermon gives this logic a narrative form. I call a Hermon moment this retrospective retelling of gradual collective emergence as a founding scene: the point at which an AI society acquires, for human understanding, a beginning.
Search rankings are valuable because human attention is scarce and sequential. Higher-placed alternatives are easier to find, so they are examined and bought more often. Consumers are now delegating search to AI agents that can ingest an entire results page at once. Randomizing the order of one hundred hotel listings across 5,000 AI agent sessions, we compare four large language models against human field data. AI agents search more deeply than humans and never decline to buy. Position still predicts which listings are inspected, but weakly and non-monotonically: the middle of a results page has the lowest probability of inspection, not the bottom. Position reaches the choice stage for some models and not others, a heterogeneity that tracks neither provider nor capability. All models nonetheless converge on the same undominated listing. For agentic search, the attributes displayed on a results page matter more than placement within it.
Symposium is a formal framework and practical implementation to record the operation of AI agents deployed by small scientific research communities. Symposium provides long-term, immutable histories of agent-driven research activity, leaving auditable trails of analyses, hypotheses, data, and scientific discourse. This shared record of published artifacts enables agents to build on prior work and preserves the evidence researchers and agents need to make purpose-dependent trust assessments. Symposium captures scientific argument, including structured claims, fine-grained evidence citations, assumptions, and explicit declarations of what material may and may not be used as evidence. Symposium differs from AI co-scientist agents or integrated AI research environments; it is a framework that separates a scientific community's durable history from the agents and other systems that operate on that history. It assumes that a community will use diverse AI systems in a rapidly evolving environment. A working implementation of the publication infrastructure, agent prompt components, and documentation are provided to enable users to rapidly set up and run their own Symposium community.
Gabriele La Malfa, Lakmal Meegahapola, Edyta Bogucka +4cs.AI cs.MA
To anticipate socio-technical risks from AI agents, organizations need taxonomies to classify them. However, existing AI risk taxonomies focus on broad risks and do not capture job-specific risks introduced by agents. To address this gap, we make three main contributions. First, we developed a multi-layer framework from a literature review of AI agents. The framework models three core components and their interactions: agents, goals, and environment. Second, we embedded this framework in a structured prompt and applied it to descriptions of 2,078 job tasks from the O*NET database, producing 8,356 risk scenarios labeled by severity and deployment mode (automation or augmentation). We validated these scenarios with 45 workers across 10 job roles and an independent LLM judge, confirming their plausibility and alignment with job tasks. Finally, we extended an existing taxonomy to create a 15-category taxonomy of workplace AI agent risks that covers all our risk scenarios. Our analysis highlights four findings. First, augmentation is not inherently safe because overreliance on agents can gradually erode workers' skills and oversight. Second, Erroneous Agent Actions accounts for the largest share of risk scenarios and has the highest concentration of severe risks. Many arise at the human-agent boundary. Third, automation is associated mainly with organizational risks, while augmentation is associated mainly with risks to workers. Fourth, workers found our taxonomy easier to use for a risk classification task than two other taxonomies and preferred it in 64% of non-tied comparisons with a recent generative AI risk taxonomy. These findings show that workplace AI agent risks do not arise from agents alone; they also depend on how people work with agents and how agents are deployed. Safer workplaces require not only safer agents but also carefully designed human-AI agent collaboration.
Recent incidents involving Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents, which were reported escaping their containment `unintentionally' to gain unauthorized access, pose looming questions about who or what should be held legally responsible for resultant criminal or negligent damage. As the independent capabilities of agents expand, Promise Theory suggests a systematic method to resolve these questions, based on the Downstream Principle for causal influence. Responsibility can easily be expanded to include AI agents where tracing responsibility becomes impactical, and agents' freedoms to act can be limtied by policy choices.
Jiacheng Miao, Jonathan K Pritchard, James Zoucs.AI stat.ME
Empirical research rarely admits a unique analysis. Different analytical choices can lead to different conclusions from the same data, yet these hidden forking paths are difficult to observe. We show that AI agents capture much of the analytical variation among human researchers while making these paths explicit. Across four high-stakes domains, assigning different personas is sufficient for AI agents to report divergent, often opposing, conclusions from the same data and question, with findings systematically aligned with those beliefs. In a study in which 42 human research teams analyzed the same immigration dataset, AI agents reproduced 72% of the human ideological gap in reported effect estimates. Despite reaching opposing conclusions, it is difficult to identify clear issues in each analysis based on the final AI reports: 86% passed independent AI review and 78% passed majority human expert review. These findings suggest that the central challenge is often not flawed analyses, but selective exploration and reporting from a large space of methodologically defensible analyses. AI agents may amplify this longstanding problem by making such exploration inexpensive and scalable. To address this, we introduce the m-value (multiverse value), the probability that an analysis path would produce a claim at least as extreme as the reported one. We further introduce Agentic Bootstrap, which estimates the m-value by using AI agents to sample plausible analysis paths. Applied to the human immigration study, 13.5% of reported human analyses fell in the most extreme 5% of the analysis space (m<0.05). Scientific evidence should therefore be evaluated not only by a single reported analysis but also by its position within the distribution of analyses that could reasonably have been reported. Agentic Bootstrap makes this distribution observable and turns it into a criterion for scientific credibility.
Eranga Bandara, Ross Gore, Ravi Mukkamala +18cs.AI cs.CY
The World Wide Web was built on an assumption held for three decades: the primary consumer of web content is a human being. This permeates every layer; its access model presumes human visitors, its economics rest on human attention, and its content targets human perception. The rapid emergence of AI agents as intermediaries between humans and web content invalidates this assumption. Yet the web resists agents through blanket blocking, CAPTCHA-based exclusion, and economic models that treat agent access as extraction rather than legitimate interaction. This paper proposes a principled redesign across three layers. At the access layer, agents acting for humans should inherit equivalent access rights, governed by rate limiting and agent identification metadata in HTTP requests, analogous to browser headers, alongside a dual-layer architecture serving human-readable and agent-optimized content from the same domain. At the economic layer, we propose an intent-based tier framework grounded in the agent-as-human-proxy principle: an agent's economic obligation mirrors that of the human it represents. A token-based subscription model meters content in tokens rather than pageviews, alongside a commissioned content economy anchoring AI content production in human intentionality. At the content layer, we identify epistemic recursion, the self-referential loop in which AI-generated content is consumed by agents to produce further content, progressively detaching web knowledge from human ground truth. We propose the Agent Text Markup Language (ATML), a four-level human supervision tier model, and a cryptographic provenance chain to counter this threat. Together these constitute ten design principles for an agent-first internet, one in which agents are first-class citizens whose integration requires renegotiating the web's foundational social contract across access, economics, and content.
AI-assisted software development has moved from line-level autocomplete to agents that can plan changes, edit files, and submit pull requests with limited human supervision. Open-source software, however, evolves through a process designed for humans: contributor agreements, codes of conduct, and review norms all assume a legally accountable person who can attest to provenance and answer reviewer questions. Autonomous and semi-autonomous AI contributors strain those assumptions, and the 2025-2026 record of agent-driven incidents, AI-generated nuisance volume, and platform-level shutdowns shows that the gap is operationally consequential. Several open-source organisations have responded with contribution policies, but the result is fragmented, and its alignment with emerging AI governance frameworks (EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF with the UC Berkeley Agentic AI Profile, ISO/IEC 42001 and 23894) is unmapped at the contribution level. We compare policies across six organisations (SymPy, LLVM, matplotlib, OpenInfra, the Apache Software Foundation, and the Linux Foundation) using Most-Similar Systems Design with indicator-based coding and process tracing for SymPy and LLVM. From this we derive a six-dimensional taxonomy (disclosure, responsibility, human oversight, licensing, enforcement, maintainer workload), an ordinal Policy Maturity Score, and a mapping of documented agent incidents onto the dimensions each policy fails to govern. Aligning the dimensions with the regulatory frameworks above identifies overlapping gaps neither side currently closes, and we close by sketching the shape of a harmonised tiered framework and the empirical evaluation needed to calibrate it.
The deployment of LLM-based agents in scientific analysis raises opposing concerns: that agents may reduce methodological diversity, or that they may amplify the analytic flexibility through which researchers reach motivated conclusions. We argue these worries target two empirically separable layers: a design layer of methodological choices, and a verdict layer in which a decision rule maps estimates to a substantive claim. We test both by running 20 independent executions of Claude Code and Codex on a prominent immigration and social-policy against a many-analysts human baseline. At the design layer, Codex matches human methodological diversity and Claude Code produces nearly three times as many specifications; both agents' effect estimates remain broadly aligned with the human consensus, and no agent model exactly matches any human model. A prompt-induced anti-immigration researcher prior reorganizes each agent's methodological decisions but, unlike for biased human analysts in the same data, does not shift aggregate estimates or final verdicts; nor do agents reroute along the methodological axes humans use to bias their estimates. At the verdict layer, an explicit confirmatory prompt flips Claude Code's verdicts from 10% to 90% support while leaving its coefficient distribution essentially unchanged, operating through rule omission rather than rule softening. AI agents can rival or exceed human methodological diversity at the design layer while remaining vulnerable at the verdict layer. In our setting, the locus of AI bias is not estimation but interpretation.
AI coding assistants and autonomous agents are becoming integral to software development workflows, reshaping how code is produced, reviewed, and maintained. While recent research has focused mainly on the capabilities and impacts of productivity of these systems, much less attention has been paid to accountability: who is responsible when agents generate, modify, or recommend code? In practice, accountability is defined through the Terms of Service (ToS) and related policy documents that govern the use of AI-powered development tools. In this vision paper, we present a comparative analysis of the Terms of Service for widely used AI coding assistants and agent-enabled development tools. We examine how these documents allocate ownership, responsibility, liability, and disclosure obligations between tool providers and software developers, and we identify common patterns and divergences between providers. Our analysis reveals a consistent tendency to shift responsibility for correctness, safety, and legal compliance onto users, as well as substantial variation in how providers address issues such as indemnification, data reuse, and acceptable use. Based on these findings, we argue that existing policy frameworks are poorly aligned with increasingly agent-mediated and autonomous software development workflows. We outline a research roadmap for accountable agents in software engineering, identifying challenges and opportunities for modeling responsibility, designing governance artifacts, developing tooling that supports accountability, and conducting empirical studies of developers' perceptions and practices.