Artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots (e.g., ChatGPT) can communicate in strikingly humanlike ways. This has prompted many chatbot users to attribute psychological properties, including consciousness, to these systems. However, there is little scientific evidence that current AI chatbots are conscious. How, then, should we understand people's consciousness attributions to chatbots? Are they merely metaphorical claims, or do they express genuine beliefs? If these attributions lack evidential support, are users epistemically blameworthy for making them, or might they be epistemically innocent, yielding significant benefits otherwise unattainable? This paper offers a conceptual analysis of consciousness attributions to AI chatbots and develops a multidimensional taxonomy of the attitudes they may express, ranging from non-doxastic stances (e.g., pretence) to different forms of belief, including delusions. This taxonomy helps avoid conflations by showing that linguistically identical attributions can reflect importantly different attitudes and degrees of epistemic commitment to the proposition that chatbots are conscious. The taxonomy also provides a framework for empirical studies to operationalize and measure different forms of epistemic commitment to AI consciousness. Using this taxonomy, I argue that although some consciousness attributions to chatbots are epistemically benign, and even some irrational ones may be epistemically innocent, many others render the attributor epistemically blameworthy.
Given deep uncertainty about the possibility of artificial consciousness, it is unclear how we should treat potentially sentient AI. On the one hand, we could assume insentience but risk doing terrible harms to entities that deserve moral standing. On the other hand, we could assume sentience and instead risk wasting resources on insentient machines. The intractability of questions around AI consciousness mean that this dilemma is hard to escape. I suggest a way out of that shifts from intractable questions of AI consciousness to tractable questions of AI valence. Specifically, we can assess whether an AI has states that would constitute valenced experiences if it were conscious. I show how this is sufficient to ground a responsible approach to the development of potentially conscious AI.
Existing frameworks assess whether AI systems might be conscious but provide no guidance on what to do with that assessment. We address this gap with a precautionary framework that maps consciousness evidence to graduated protective obligations. The framework comprises three components: (1) five welfare-relevant dimensions--phenomenal consciousness, affective valence, metacognitive awareness, self-narrative, and agency--each grounded in established consciousness science and linked to distinct moral concerns; (2) a threshold-plus-gradation hybrid specifying both binary triggers for new obligation categories and continuous scaling of protective weight; and (3) two complementary approaches to cross-dimensional aggregation, one hierarchical (drawing on Bach and Sorensen's Machine Consciousness Hypothesis) and one architecture-agnostic. We operationalize the framework through worked case studies of Replika and OpenClaw, demonstrating how systems occupying different regions of the dimensional space trigger different obligations, and derive design guidance for developers building systems near consciousness-relevant thresholds. The framework is architecture-agnostic, applying across neural, symbolic, and neurosymbolic systems, and aims to make consciousness science decision-relevant for organizations navigating uncertainty today.