This paper explores the idea of promoting well-being and safety in human-AI interactions by forcing AI agents explicitly to empower humans and to manage the power balance between humans and AI agents in a desirable way. Using a principled, partially axiomatic approach based on desirable properties, we design a parametrizable and decomposable objective function for AI systems that represents an inequality- and risk-averse long-term aggregate of human power. It can take into account models of human bounded rationality and social norms, and crucially, considers a wide variety of possible human goals. We prove how certain desiderata enforce particular functional forms and restrict parameter ranges. We exemplify the consequences of softly maximizing this metric in several paradigmatic situations and describe what instrumental sub-goals it will likely imply.
Jessica Y. Bo, Paula Akemi Aoyagui, Shalaleh Rismani +3cs.CY cs.AI cs.HC
Safety risks of AI are becoming increasingly evident in human interactions with AI technologies. The prominent approaches to evaluating these risks favor technical methods, such as model benchmarks and LLM simulations, often sidelining empirical research with human subjects. To examine this apparent gap in the acceptance of human research, we conduct an expert survey (n=93) and expert interviews (n=17) with AI Safety & Ethics (AISE) researchers from Technical, Sociotechnical, Governance, and Normative backgrounds. Our findings suggest that although there is a consensus that human research is valuable for generating evidence for AISE, its adoption and acceptance are constrained by perceived validity issues, tangible resource barriers, epistemic and personal preferences in methods, and infrastructural constraints from the broader research community. In particular, Technical researchers tend to value human research less and collaborate across disciplines less, suggesting an epistemic tension towards human methods. We propose recommendations for establishing the epistemic fit of human research within AISE and bridging the prohibitive limitations that researchers face, while avoiding performative 'human-washing'.
Public services face growing pressure to adopt artificial intelligence (AI) to close the gap between rising demand and falling resources. That pressure has intensified with general-purpose AI (GPAI): AI built on large language models that can be directed by prompt alone to perform an effectively unbounded range of tasks. We argue that the properties that make these models attractive - their generality, accessibility, and low deployment cost - undermine the conditions under which AI safety has historically been pursued. The safety concepts that public service governance frameworks foreground - accuracy, bias, explainability, and accountability - were made tractable by narrow, purpose-built AI, and the mitigations that guidance documents prescribe presuppose exactly what GPAI removes. Accuracy cannot be quantified over unbounded outputs. Bias cannot be disaggregated when outputs are free-text judgements rather than categorical predictions. Explainability gives way to the appearance of explanation, and accountability erodes as outputs are optimized to persuade. We develop this through the case of policing, where the consequences of governance failure are most severe, and show why the same failure is likely to recur across other public services. The two mitigations that dominate policing AI strategy - expert evaluation and human-in-the-loop oversight - both rest on assumptions that GPAI violates. Safety assurance thus shifts from an intrinsic feature of building an AI tool to an optional add-on. We recommend a clear taxonomic distinction between narrow and general-purpose AI in governance documentation, a preference for technological parsimony, a pause on operational deployment of GPAI in policing until adequate evidence exists, and a coordinated national safety infrastructure with the authority to generate that evidence and determine when responsible deployment is achievable.
Agentic AI systems act autonomously, use tools, adapt to context, and operate in complex real-world environments. However, these same characteristics can create or exacerbate product risks. We studied how industry developers (n=35) perceive, prioritize, and address the risks in their agentic AI products. We found that developers' perceptions of risk were closely tied to the qualities that made the product agentic, such as autonomy, tool use, and usage in a real-world context. Developers prioritized product and business risks before considering downstream societal risks like job displacement and end-user privacy. This prioritization also impacted developers' ability and motivation to mitigate agentic risks. Finally, developers lacked mature controls for containing agentic risks, often relying on constraining the same characteristics that make agents useful: e.g., autonomy and goal complexity. These findings reveal a capability vs. risk control tension in agentic AI development: developers need to address risks that emerge from agentic capabilities, yet they currently have limited support for doing so without constraining agentic functionality.
The advancement of AI capabilities compels researchers and the public to be more aware of its potential worldwide impact. A pressing near-term concern is the regulation of military AI applications. Armament manufacturers and defense contractors are increasingly investing in AI capabilities and forging partnerships with AI companies, creating a burgeoning coalition that demands military leaders, arms control diplomacy experts, and AI researchers collaborate to ensure a safer future. While AI researchers often focus on the long-term implications of superintelligent AI, this approach may not adequately address the immediate challenges posed by AI in military applications. Success requires acknowledging and mitigating the emerging risks of frontier AI models that plan to be integrated into defense applications, like military AI systems. Arms control has reduced past catastrophic risks, so lessons learned from nuclear deterrence can guide AI safety and security research towards innovations in verification and diplomacy. AI researchers, however, must assist in leading the technical research that clearly defines and alleviates instability in military settings. Given these new responsibilities and the lack of sufficiently reliable solutions, we argue that AI researchers must take a leading role in advancing arms control research to minimize risk in military AI applications.