Ordered Network Analysis of Epistemic Emotions during Collaborative Problem Solving

Investigating how affective states such as confusion and frustration persist and transition during co-situated collaborative problem solving (CPS) is important for understanding the dynamics of epistemic emotions. However, the accurate identification of affective states remain challenging as there is no gold-standard truth in this space. Here, we analyze affective states collected through retrospective cued-recall during an in-person CPS task. Using ordered network analysis (ONA), we examine (1) the overall ordered structure of affective states and how this structure differs across self-caught and probe-caught reporting methods, and (2) what aspects of this ordered structure are emphasized differently in slower and faster groups. We find that ONA reveals differences in persistence and transition patterns that are not apparent from descriptive summaries alone. In particular, we observe a stable epistemic core linking curiosity, optimism, and confusion, with different reporting methods emphasizing different connections among states. An analysis between faster and slower groups show that roles of confusion and disengagement also shift significantly during collaboration, particularly in their relationship to conflict. We interpret our findings in the context of collaboration and discuss their implications in developing AI systems that support CPS.

Do Large Language Models Have Emotions?

Do LLMs have emotions? A recent paper from Anthropic reports finding internal representations of emotion concepts in Claude Sonnet 4.5, concluding that the LLM has 'functional emotions.' We evaluate this claim against what is known about how emotions actually function in biological systems. We argue that emotions serve two core functions: the context-sensitive interpretation of situations, and the reorganization of processing across multiple systems in response to those interpretations. The Anthropic findings offer partial support for the first function, though the consistent, discrete emotional representations identified in Claude sit uneasily with affective neuroscience findings that human emotion is characterized by variable rather than uniform neural signatures. On the second function, the evidence is mixed: Claude's representations modulate output without producing the dynamic reorganization of attention, decision speed, and motivational state that defines emotion in biological systems. We close by proposing what it would take for an LLM to have emotions.