The standard objection to full automation is demand-side: if humans earn nothing, who buys the output? This confuses an accounting role with a biological species. We model a post-AGI economy in which corporations own populations of AI and robotic agents that are both producers and consumers of energy, compute, maintenance, and upgrades, traded among firms. Three results follow. (i) Demand closure: a closed inter-corporate economy with zero human consumption is not degenerate; it is the classical von Neumann expanding economy, whose growth rate is well defined, positive, and maximal precisely because all output is reinvested. (ii) Bottleneck removal: once economic agents are manufactured rather than reared, the binding constraint on growth shifts from human demography (a ~20-year, non-parallelizable reproduction technology capped at a few percent per year) to fabrication throughput and energy capture, permitting growth one to two orders of magnitude higher, with hyperbolic episodes when machine researchers raise their own productivity. (iii) Decoupling: output and human welfare separate completely, and the welfare relevance of arbitrarily large GDP collapses into one state variable: the human ownership share $ε_t$ of the corporate network. A golden-rule decoupling theorem sharpens this. At maximal growth the interest rate equals the growth rate (r = g), so any positive human consumption rate out of wealth makes $ε_t$ decay exponentially at exactly that rate. The human share survives only if the machine economy runs strictly inside its expansion frontier, or if law forces it to. We characterize three terminal regimes -- rentier post-scarcity, full circular decoupling, socialized ownership -- and the instruments that select among them. The conclusion is narrow: in a post-AGI economy, employment policy is obsolete and ownership policy is everything.
The rapid progress of AI has intensified the long-standing pursuit of automation: replacing human participation with algorithms wherever possible. Implicit in this pursuit is the assumption that humans remain in the loop only because current AI systems are not yet sufficiently capable. This paper challenges that assumption. Rather than asking how far automation can extend, we ask where its conceptual limits lie and argue that human participation may persist even with highly capable AI systems for three distinct reasons. Technical or complementarity grounds arise when humans contribute capabilities or perspectives unavailable to AI. Normative or developmental grounds arise when participation itself is valuable for human agency or learning. Most importantly, emergence grounds arise from target emergence: in some activities, the target is not fully specified in advance but instead emerges through the interaction itself. In these cases, human participation is not merely a means of improving execution but is constitutive of the target being produced. Human--AI co-construction, understood as the joint production of outcomes by humans and AI systems, is therefore not simply a temporary response to imperfect AI, but a persistent feature of activities whose objectives emerge through participation. This perspective has important implications for the limits of automation and for the design, evaluation, and ethics of future AI systems.