A Contractualist Argumentation Framework for Moral Decision-Making

Autonomous agents operating in shared environments must make decisions that affect multiple individuals with potentially conflicting interests. We propose a formal framework for moral decision-making grounded in Scanlon's contractualism, an ethical theory that evaluates the permissibility of actions in terms of principles that no one could reasonably reject. To operationalise contractualist reasoning, we use ASPIC+, a structured argumentation framework, extended with value-based filtering to model how each agent's values determine which reasons are morally relevant in the first place. The result is a Contractualist Argumentation Framework in which agents' reasons are formally represented, compared, and evaluated through argumentation semantics. We illustrate the approach through a worked example in a domestic setting and discuss its relation to existing value-based argumentation approaches.

Whistleblowing and the machine -- towards a considered position

Artificial intelligent agents and autonomous systems are embedded in our environments. They are both a commercial product and a personal tool that generates a lot of data and can draw conclusions from it: machines generate and keep secrets. But should machines protect all secrets? It has been shown that artificial agents are able to whistleblow and it has been argued that digital multi-agent environments should allow for agents in them to whistleblow. We argue that machine whistleblowing must be normative and principled and routed in the existing understanding of whistleblowing as an important rule-breaking mechanism in society. We also argue that there is a need for government regulators to formulate an informed stance on both what machines should be allowed to whistleblow on and how to legally protect those who develop whistleblowing machines

The Age of AI Agents Demands A New Scientific Paradigm To Sustain Trustworthy Science

AI systems are becoming autonomous research agents that generate hypotheses, design experiments, and produce discoveries at scales beyond human oversight. As seen by increased submissions to ML venues, the verification gap between scientific output and our ability to check it is already widening, and autonomous agents make it worse by magnitudes given human-agent asymmetry. We argue that science must evolve its verification infrastructure, as it has before with peer review. However, while historical adaptations assumed human contributors who could be questioned and sanctioned, AI agents break this assumption. We propose criteria for an adapted verification infrastructure that emphasizes observable-by-default workflows, scalable verification, and clear attribution. We argue that without adaptation, ML and any scientific domain using agents face dangerous failures: experimental results that no person can verify, optimization for metrics over understanding, and accountability vacuums that erode scientific trust.