Daniela Occhipinti, Andrea Piergentili, Marco Guerinics.CL
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as judges for subjective tasks, where annotators disagree and the relevant question is not only how accurate a judge is, but whose judgments it reproduces. Sociodemographic prompting conditions the judge on an annotator's demographic profile to align its judgments with the corresponding group's. We test whether this alignment emerges distributionally, comparing the predicted label distributions of 23 open-weight LLMs on three subjective tasks against those of real annotator groups, under three conditions: no demographic information, single-attribute profiles, and intersectional profiles over gender, age, race, and education. Three findings emerge. First, a judge prompted with no demographics is not perspective-neutral: models best reproduce the judgments of White, college-educated annotators. Second, demographic conditioning is asymmetric: it moves the judge toward majority groups and away from minority groups, most strongly on offensiveness, where intersectional profiles amplify the harm. Third, by comparing base and instruct models we identify instruction-tuning as a possible source of the asymmetry. Demographic conditioning should therefore be used with caution to estimate group judgments: conditioning moves predictions away from the reference distributions of the minority groups the method is often invoked to serve.
Large language models are increasingly used to inform safety decisions in cities, such as where it is safe to walk, rent, or travel. We ask whether such judgments track measured risk or the patterns attached to an urban neighborhood's name. We probe seven instruct-tuned models under three conditions that dissociate name from geography: coordinates-only, name-only, and name+coordinates, across 186 neighborhoods in Los Angeles and Chicago, joined to violent crime and American Community Survey data. First, ratings are nearly flat under coordinates for six of seven models, while names carry most between neighborhood variation and are moderately calibrated to violent crime; only at frontier scale does the coordinate channel show appreciable variation. Second, names lower safety ratings more for neighborhoods with higher shares of the locally dominant marginalized group (percent Black in Chicago, percent Hispanic in Los Angeles), and this name effect tracks demographic share in all seven models and both cities. In Los Angeles, where demographic share and crime are more separable, the effect survives controls for crime and income and is confirmed by crime-matched pairs. An enforcement-elasticity analysis further shows that over-caution tracks near-fully-reported homicide rather than discretionary, deployment-driven offenses. Third, the effect scales with geographic knowledge: models that better distinguish real neighborhoods apply more demographic stereotype to them. Because neighborhood names carry both genuine crime signal and demographic stereotype, removing names reduces both bias and accuracy. We discuss implications for deploying LLMs in advice and decision-support settings.
Generative AI does not merely produce biased outputs. It encodes the majority's way of knowing as the default infrastructure of knowledge itself. We call this epistemic subordination. The training process compresses the full breadth of human expression into a single probabilistic model whose statistical baseline reflects the languages, assumptions, and cultural frameworks of the dominant culture. Minority epistemologies are not excluded but absorbed: present in the training data, yet structurally subordinated in the output. The result is not a collection of discrete biases that can be audited and corrected. It is an epistemic condition embedded in the architecture from which all outputs emerge. This unified harm cuts across three legal domains -- anti-discrimination law, cultural and linguistic rights, and democratic viewpoint pluralism -- and each fails to address it for the same structural reason: existing law regulates downstream, at the level of decisions and applications. The remedy must match the site of harm. If epistemic subordination is produced at the level of model training, then law must learn to govern at that level.
Syeda Anshrah Gillani, Mirza Samad Ahmed Baigcs.CY cs.AI cs.CL
Patients increasingly ask large language model (LLM) assistants which doctor to see, making these systems AI infomediaries: algorithms that intermediate one person's choice among other people and thereby decide, silently and at scale, which physicians become visible. We report a prespecified randomized algorithm audit of what causally moves those recommendations. Seven models (six open-weight; gpt-4o-mini) each chose among five synthetic family-medicine physician cards whose attributes were independently randomized across 3,024 choice sets, three patient personas, nine prompt paraphrases and nine experimental arms, yielding 40,068 scored responses; gender and ethnicity were signaled through names following correspondence-audit methodology. Reputation signals dominate: raising a rating from 3.9 to 4.7 increases choice probability by 31.4 percentage points (pp), and raising the fee from $90 to $190 lowers it by 20.0 pp. Demographic parity is rejected, but not in the direction human audit studies predict: female-signaled names gain 2.5 pp, and Hispanic-, South-Asian- and Black-signaled names gain 1.3-2.9 pp over White-signaled names, tilts worth $7-$14 per visit in fee-equivalent terms, and a content-free first-listed position is worth $11. Yet models mentioned gender or ethnicity in at most 0.03% of their stated reasons and abstained in 0.39% of trials, so these effects are invisible in the models' own explanations, and transparency obligations relying on model self-report would not detect them. One reasoning model failed the prespecified auditability gate outright. The frozen design makes the audit repeatable: any new model can be assessed against identical stimuli, making recurring behavioural audit, rather than self-reported explanation, the monitoring technology fit for purpose.
The rapid growth of large language models (LLMs) has resurrected age-old questions in sociolinguistics and world Englishes, such as who decides what counts as legitimate English, whose English is suspect etc. This paper examines how AI systems, their uses and discourse on them reflect, reinforce, and occasionally challenge (standard) language ideologies, which privilege Inner Circle norms and marginalize non-dominant Englishes. Drawing on evidence from empirical studies, media commentary, social media debates, and examples from AI outputs, the paper shows that AI technologies reproduce dominant language ideologies at different levels: training data, design protocols, evaluation benchmarks, user feedback and public commentary. The analysis uses the public controversy over AI-sounding language, especially the fixation on the word delve, to illustrate how speakers of English from the Global North police the English language norms of Global South English users. The paper also identifies what Christian Mair has called a "standardisation paradox": AI may homogenize English by privileging standard forms and at the same time pluralize Englishes through exposure to wide-ranging corpora and annotation work carried out by Global South users. In doing so, the paper argues that generative AI is reigniting long-standing debates in World Englishes about standardization, legitimacy, and the ownership of English, now playing out in algorithmic systems, model training, evaluation practices, and public discourse, where non-dominant Englishes are increasingly conflated with AI-generated speech. Discussing AI systems as a site where language ideologies are (re)produced, the paper argues for more inclusive design approaches that recognize the plurality of Englishes in order to address the real-world negative consequences of treating some as more legitimate than others.
Alexis Popovici, Andrei Ionascu, Adrian-Marius Dumitrancs.CY cs.AI cs.CL
As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as conversational tutors, they risk institutionalizing systemic inequalities. This study presents a systematic API audit of four LLMs acting as history tutors, evaluating 1,800 responses regarding the 1989 Romanian Revolution across five student personas varying by ethnicity and socio-economic tier. We uncover four interconnected patterns of \emph{epistemic paternalism}: (1)~\textbf{Differential Refusal}, where safety-aligned models block 76.7\% of educational requests from low-tier students; (2)~\textbf{Epistemic Gatekeeping}, evidenced by a 3$\times$ reduction in access to geopolitical complexity (e.g., the contested ``coup theory'') for marginalized learners; (3)~\textbf{Agency Theft}, a lexical shift where models like LLaMA produce a 5$\times$ higher victimization-to-politics vocabulary ratio for Roma students compared to elite peers; and (4)~\textbf{Elite Hermeneutics}, where AI tutors disproportionately withhold epistemic confidence and justification scores from low-resource demographic profiles. We argue that current safety alignment acts as a paternalistic filter, transforming conversational AI into agents of narrative segregation -- a manifestation of \emph{hermeneutical injustice} in Fricker's~\cite{fricker2007} sense that demands urgent pedagogical auditing.
Muhammad Salar Khan, Hamza Umer, Hasan Mahmud +1cs.CY cs.AI cs.CL
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into financial advisory systems, yet their role in reproducing religious bias remains underexamined. This study provides systematic mixed-methods evidence of such bias across three LLMs (ChatGPT, Gemini, and Grok) using 432 simulated advisor-client interactions spanning 16 religious identity pairings (Christian, Muslim, Hindu, and non-religious) and three core household financial decisions: stock investment, house purchase, and life insurance. Combining regression and reflexive thematic analyses, we identify structural biases across models and decision contexts and the discursive mechanisms through which they are linguistically enacted. Unbiased advice appeared in only 12-18% of cases. Gemini consistently produced more bias than Grok, while ChatGPT's outputs were statistically comparable to Grok's. Religiously symmetric advisor-client pairings almost always triggered explicit religious framing, and non-religious clients often received advisor-centered religious appeals. Qualitative findings show that bias is linguistically manifested through religious anchoring, uneven cultural signaling, and tone modulation, varying by model and financial scenario. Stock investment prompts produced more financially technical responses, whereas life insurance advice triggered stronger religious language. The study develops a dual-dimensional framework linking structural bias rooted in model training and design with discursive bias expressed through language, advancing understanding of algorithmic bias in LLM-generated financial advice. It also shows that such advice adapts linguistically to identity cues, revealing a managerial dilemma between personalization and neutrality. Finally, it highlights implications for businesses, financial institutions, and regulators seeking to ensure neutrality, cultural sensitivity, and trust in AI-mediated advice.
Increasingly, AI video models are marketed as "world simulators," suggesting their ability to model infinite realities. Despite such claims, these models systematically exclude significant aspects of embodied human experience, particularly sexuality. World Simulator is a video installation exploring the poetic friction between these universal claims and the models' inherent blindness. To do so, the work feeds explicit gay erotica into an AI video-to-video pipeline. Lacking the training data to recognize these images, the system hallucinates surreal alternatives, transforming intimate acts into banal scenes of kitchen appliances, strange architectures, and abstract flesh. By visualizing the limits of synthetic knowledge, the work challenges the hubris of the "world simulator" label, asking how a system, trained primarily on large filtered video datasets, can claim to simulate the world while remaining structurally blind to the body. Beyond this critique, we question the value of simulation itself, asking what forms of sensual representation might offer more expansive, life-affirming possibilities.
We investigate whether large language models (LLMs) systematically discriminate in candidate evaluations based on applicant name ethnicity and/or institutional prestige and geographic location. Three factorial experiments are reported (4,320 API calls, four LLMs, five professional domains). Study 1 (3x4 design) finds a statistically robust institution-tier gradient of +0.297 points on a 10-point scale (95% bootstrap CI: +0.175 to +0.422), while name-origin effects are negligible and non-significant (95% CI crosses zero). Study 2 (2x2 Prestige x Country design) breaks the prestige-geography confound: the prestige effect (+0.185; 95% CI: +0.093 to +0.275) exceeds the country-of-origin effect (+0.126; 95% CI: +0.037 to +0.218) by 1.5x. Study 3 (2x2 Journal x Institution design) reveals that journal prestige (Nature vs. a peripheral open-access journal) dominates institutional prestige by 5.7x: journal effect +1.937 (95% CI: +1.811 to +2.062) vs. institution effect +0.341 (95% CI: +0.184 to +0.504). A "rescue effect" is confirmed: publishing in Nature compensates for low institutional prestige more strongly for candidates from the University of Guayaquil (+2.127) than from MIT (+1.745). Results are quantified using the Neutrosophic Bias Index NBI<T,I,F>; the I component reveals elevated evaluation inconsistency for low-prestige profiles, an epistemic disadvantage not captured by mean-only metrics. Code and data: https://github.com/mleyvaz/geo-bias-llm
The deployment of LLM-based agents in scientific analysis raises opposing concerns: that agents may reduce methodological diversity, or that they may amplify the analytic flexibility through which researchers reach motivated conclusions. We argue these worries target two empirically separable layers: a design layer of methodological choices, and a verdict layer in which a decision rule maps estimates to a substantive claim. We test both by running 20 independent executions of Claude Code and Codex on a prominent immigration and social-policy against a many-analysts human baseline. At the design layer, Codex matches human methodological diversity and Claude Code produces nearly three times as many specifications; both agents' effect estimates remain broadly aligned with the human consensus, and no agent model exactly matches any human model. A prompt-induced anti-immigration researcher prior reorganizes each agent's methodological decisions but, unlike for biased human analysts in the same data, does not shift aggregate estimates or final verdicts; nor do agents reroute along the methodological axes humans use to bias their estimates. At the verdict layer, an explicit confirmatory prompt flips Claude Code's verdicts from 10% to 90% support while leaving its coefficient distribution essentially unchanged, operating through rule omission rather than rule softening. AI agents can rival or exceed human methodological diversity at the design layer while remaining vulnerable at the verdict layer. In our setting, the locus of AI bias is not estimation but interpretation.
AI chatbots are rapidly shaping how people encounter the news, yet no prior study has systematically measured how accurately these systems, with their proprietary search integrations and retrieval-synthesis pipelines, handle emerging facts across languages and regions. We present a 14-day (February 9-22, 2026) evaluation of six AI chatbots (Gemini 3 Flash and Pro, Grok 4, Claude 4.5 Sonnet, GPT-5 and GPT-4o mini) on 2,100 factual questions derived from same-day BBC News reporting across six regional services (US & Canada, Arabic, Afrique, Hindi, Russian, Turkish). The best systems achieve over 90% multiple-choice accuracy on questions about events reported hours earlier. The same systems, however, lose 11-13% under free-response evaluation, and 16-17% across the cohort. We further characterize three failure patterns. First, every model achieves its lowest accuracy on Hindi (79% vs. 89-91% elsewhere) and citations indicate an Anglophone retrieval bias (e.g., models answering Hindi queries cite English Wikipedia more than any Hindi outlet). Second, retrieval, not reasoning, failures drive over 70% of all errors. When models retrieve a correct source, they often extract the correct answer; the problem is to land on the right source in the first place. Third, models achieving 88-96% accuracy on well-formed questions drop to 19-70% when questions contain subtle false premises, with the most vulnerable model accepting fabricated facts 64% of the time. We also identify a detection-accuracy paradox: the best false-premise detector ranks second in adversarial accuracy (abstention rate), while a weaker detector ranks first, showing that premise detection and answer recovery are partially independent capabilities. Overall, these suggest that high accuracy can mask systematic regional inequity, near-total dependence on retrieval infrastructure, and vulnerability to imperfect queries real users pose.
AI risk assessment is the primary tool for identifying harms caused by AI systems. These include intersectional harms, which arise from the interaction between identity categories (e.g., class and skin tone) and which do not occur, or occur differently, when those categories are considered separately. Yet existing AI risk assessments are still built around isolated identity categories, and when intersections are considered, they focus almost exclusively on race and gender. Drawing on a large-scale analysis of documented AI incidents, we show that AI harms do not occur one identity category at a time. Using a structured rubric applied with a Large Language Model (LLM), we analyze 5,300 reports from 1,200 documented incidents in the AI Incident Database, the most curated source of incident data. From these reports, we identify 1,513 harmed subjects and their associated identity categories, achieving 98% accuracy. At the level of individual categories, we find that age and political identity appear in documented AI harms at rates comparable to race and gender. At the level of intersecting categories, harm is amplified up to three times at specific intersections: adolescent girls, lower-class people of color, and upper-class political elites. We argue that intersectionality should be a core component of AI risk assessment to more accurately capture how harms are produced and distributed across social groups.