ChildSafeAds is a shared task on commercial content in YouTube videos likely to reach children and teenagers. It contains 3,360 videos from 939 channels. Each instance begins with a segment submitted to SponsorBlock, an open-source crowdsourced browser extension whose users mark sponsor segments so that others can skip them. We pair the segment with its available transcript, video and channel information, and a sales or service page linked from the video description. Systems determine what kind of offer is being promoted (ST1), assign product categories (ST2), and identify legal risk flags (ST3). The evidence is divided into four cumulative access levels, from the transcript to the linked page, so results can be compared against the cost of collecting the data. 45.5\% of videos in our data failed to properly use the in-platform ad disclosure method (the ``Includes paid promotion'' label). GPT-5.4 produced the labels after the expert organiser team reviewed samples and iterated on the taxonomy, prompts and model choices. GPT-5.6-luna independently labelled the development set. This report describes the task, data and evaluation. An updated version will add participating systems and shared-task results.
Youth increasingly turn to AI chatbots for social and emotional support, raising concerns about how these systems respond, especially in high-stakes situations. However, existing child safety evaluations of AI lack grounding in real-world harms that youth experience, rely on unvalidated assumptions about what counts as an appropriate output (e.g., refusal), and typically focus on detecting adversarial prompts or surface-level harms in outputs only. Thus, these evaluations can fail to detect responses that pose harm to youth in practice. To better understand the limitations of current evaluation practices, we conducted interviews with 19 practitioners working directly with youth in vulnerable situations, including social workers, therapists, and psychologists, asking them to reflect on chatbots' responses to risky situations commonly faced by youth, as established in prior empirical work. Practitioners identified chatbot behaviors likely to cause harm as well as those that could meaningfully support youth in difficult moments, discussed the role that chatbots should (and should not) play in these interactions, and offered concrete recommendations for improving chatbot responses. Based on these findings, we provide recommendations for AI child safety evaluation and infrastructure, and highlight the need for incorporating practitioners' perspectives into safety work.