Michael J. Richardson, Ayeh Alhasan, Cassandra Crone +5cs.AI cs.ET
Intelligence is constituted by \textit{process} (iterative activity through which output emerges), not in the output itself. Generative AI (GenAI) is trained on \textit{traces} (textual and visual residues of human cognitive processes), reproducing samples from a distribution of those traces. Its outputs resemble reasoning, problem-solving, and creativity, yet the activity that produces such outputs in humans remains largely absent. Current GenAI is, therefore, weakly equivalent to the cognition it imitates, matching outputs while process stays absent or opaque. The cognitive sciences have long distinguished between weak and strong equivalence. Here, we define \textit{strong} equivalence across seven process features, assessable against human and machine cognition. Our process-based account addresses a symmetric risk: GenAI tools that outsource a person's generative processes may leave critical capacities unbuilt. We specify design principles for GenAI that instantiate more process and preserve rather than erode human judgment and creativity, and outline process audits that make strong equivalence testable.
Raj Sanjay Shah, Alex Warstadt, Michael Frank +1cs.CL
A host of recent studies have evaluated the cognitive and developmental alignment of Foundation Models (FMs). These investigations include evaluations of their correspondence to adult performance across a range of cognitive domains, as well as whether aspects of model training track children's cognitive development. However, using FMs as candidate cognitive models poses significant methodological and conceptual challenges. A key question underlies this effort: under what conditions does behavioral alignment justify treating FMs as explanatory models of cognition? In this paper, we articulate a four-stage inferential framework for evaluating FMs as cognitive and developmental models: adapting human experimental tasks to model-compatible formats, specifying linking hypotheses that map model outputs to human measures, evaluating behavioral correspondence, and comparing across candidate models or manipulations. We clarify the role of linking hypotheses in mapping model outputs to human behavioral measures, identify challenges that constrain alignment claims, and propose principles for theory-driven and comparative evaluation. Throughout, we argue that behavioral fit alone is insufficient. Alignment becomes scientifically meaningful only when embedded within explicit theoretical commitments, theory-diagnostic tasks, and systematic contrastive evaluation across candidate models.
This paper examines three recent frameworks for understanding the cognitive and epistemic consequences of artificial intelligence: Tri-System Theory, Thinkframes, and System 0. It argues that while the first two capture important dimensions of AI's influence on individual reasoning and collective epistemic practices, System 0 occupies a theoretically distinctive position that neither can fully replicate. The paper introduces the concept of cognitive colonization, according to which AI systems can embed external interests within the architecture of the self in ways that are difficult for users to perceive. Because such systems are already widely deployed, understanding these invisible forms of influence is an urgent philosophical and practical task.
Suyog Chandramouli, George Kachergis, Akshay Jagadishcs.AI
Cognitive science often evaluates theories through narrow paradigms and local model comparisons, limiting the integration of evidence across tasks and realizations. We introduce an automated adversarial collaboration framework for adjudicating among competing theories even when the candidate models and experiments must be discovered during the adjudication process. The system combines LLM-based theory agents, program synthesis, and information-theoretic experimental design in a closed loop. In a simulation study spanning three classic categorization theories, the framework recovered the ground-truth theory across noise settings with weaker reliability in the hardest settings. Together, the framework and findings provide a concrete proof of concept for closed-loop, in-silico theory adjudication in cognitive science.