Modern AI is no longer a single model but an ecosystem: classical ML predictors, deep and multimodal models, large language models, and agents, each trained and tuned over different data sources and each producing outputs at scale that become inputs to the others. Operating such an ecosystem is fundamentally a data integration problem - the knowledge it depends on is fragmented across dozens of heterogeneous, independently governed sources that must be reconciled and continually maintained. Yet integration alone is not enough. The predictions these systems make are shaped by many interacting factors, and the events, decisions, and variables that drive an outcome are routinely entangled with the ones that merely accompany it; treated as a basis for action, such correlational signals invite confounded decisions. This becomes acute once agents act autonomously: to be trustworthy and reliable, an agent must anticipate the consequences of its actions, not merely extrapolate from what has co-occurred before. Causal reasoning is what closes this gap, distinguishing the drivers of an outcome from its correlates, and enabling prescriptive and counterfactual analysis over the ecosystem's data. We therefore argue that the integrated ecosystem needs an explicit causal layer, and we propose to build it as a shared, persistent, queryable Causal World System (CWS).
Causal perception occurs when agents with competing Structural Causal Models (SCMs) of the same system infer different probability distributions, including the hypothetical distributions implied by each agent's SCM under the same set of interventions. It shapes how agents reason about the system and how they perceive its fairness. Causal perception is a promising probabilistic framework, but it has remained purely theoretical. This work provides the first implementation of the causal perception framework of Álvarez and Ruggieri (2025). We operationalize structural (agents disagree on the causal graph) and parametrical (agents agree on the causal graph but disagree on its weights) causal perception. We design algorithms for computing interventional and counterfactual distributions and propose suitable distance measures to quantify the disagreement. Using the German Credit dataset, we illustrate how causal perception affects accuracy and fairness in a multi-expert decision setting. We show that the perception verdict is sensitive to the choice of distance metric and threshold. We also show that causal perception changes fairness assessments and threshold-based decisions. Bias proves situated with respect to the agent's SCM, demonstrating that competing worldviews in fairness problems cannot be ignored.
Chiara Marcoccia, Walter Quattrociocchi, Valerio Caprarocs.AI cs.CY cs.HC
Knowing when to say "I don't know" is fundamental to human judgment, yet AI assistants offer a fluent answer to almost any question. In five experiments (N = 3,132; four preregistered, one direct replication), participants answered difficult questions and could always decline to respond. We engineered the questions so that AI advice was wrong, separating AI use from its accuracy. Merely having access to AI nearly eliminated participants' willingness to suspend judgment, and this held whether the advice was actively requested or simply displayed. Consequently, participants answered more questions but were correct about a third as often as when AI was unavailable-yet their confidence nearly doubled. Incentivizing accuracy and penalizing inaccuracy led participants to seek and follow AI advice less, answer more accurately, and suspend judgment more often, though still far less than when AI was unavailable. As AI suggestions grow ubiquitous and unsolicited, they may not simply affect answer accuracy; they may even alter the metacognitive threshold at which people decide whether they know enough to answer.
Machine learning models are often intended to augment rather than replace human decision makers, by providing information that is complementary to human judgement. Yet, in practice, human decision makers routinely fail to realize such complementary gains, even when models provide useful signal. In this work, we study how asymmetric information about the quality of information available to a human decision maker vs. an AI impacts the ability of a decision maker to extract complementary value from AI predictions. We show that a key factor is the error correlation structure between human and AI predictions. In particular, when the AI's prediction errors are \textit{negatively correlated} with those of the human, the decision maker can construct robust strategies which guarantee improvements in expected utility. We empirically investigate whether these conditions for complementarity arise in practice, using real-world forecasting benchmarks.
Appropriate reliance on AI advice has become a central research theme in human-AI collaboration. Existing frameworks have focused exclusively on point predictions as AI advice. However, set-valued AI advice (e.g., discrete sets or continuous intervals) is increasingly being used to communicate uncertainty and improve human decision making. In this paper, we develop the first formal framework for measuring appropriate reliance on set-valued AI advice within the sequential judge-advisor paradigm, spanning both classification and regression tasks. For classification, we first introduce the dimensions that are necessary for evaluating set-valued AI advice. We then define two metrics: correct reliance rate on AI and correct reliance rate on self, which jointly characterize appropriate reliance in this setting. For regression, we introduce quantity of AI reliance and quality of AI reliance, which respectively measure whether a decision maker utilized the AI advice and whether their reliance helped them get closer to the ground truth relative to their initial estimate. Through the application of our framework, we demonstrate how these metrics capture important nuances in human-AI collaboration that existing measures overlook.