Large language models are increasingly used to support organizational decisions, yet users often lack a principled basis for assessing whether to rely on a specific recommendation. Existing approaches typically evaluate broad model properties, such as reliability, uncertainty, or robustness, or focus on user trust, rather than the underlying basis for relying on an individual recommendation. Adapting theoretical foundations from epistemology, we introduce epistemic warrant, a decision-level construct that characterizes the stability of a model's preference and the scope over which that preference holds. We operationalize this construct through a four-tier reliance certificate for pairwise recommendations, distinguishing among unstable, context-dependent, locally supported, and broadly supported recommendations. We validate the construct using contemporary methodologies: known-groups tests successfully recover expert-prespecified warrant orderings, and stronger warrants systematically align with independent consensus from crowd workers. Furthermore, we demonstrate that epistemic warrant provides information distinct from verbalized confidence and is not readily explained by decision difficulty. Ultimately, this framework offers a theoretically grounded, implementable approach for characterizing the warrant of individual LLM recommendations when objective ground truth is unavailable.
In the past few years, machine learning (ML) has been widely (and to an extent, successfully) implemented in medicine. However, uncertainties surrounding ML have made it difficult to establish the bases of its epistemic and methodological warrants. In the literature, a parallel has been drawn between medicine and ML, suggesting that we should model epistemic and methodological standards for ML on the standards of clinical translation. By developing tools from Hesse work, we characterise the nature of this parallel as a generative analogy between the process of clinical translation and the process of building ML systems. We identify more precisely the epistemic and methodological warrants of clinical translation that are typically only mentioned when appealing to the analogy, and we show in which sense such warrants apply analogically to the context of ML. In particular, we interpret warrants of clinical translation in reliabilist terms, and we show how this can inform a new form of ML reliabilism, which is distinct from (though compatible with) existing reliabilist accounts in philosophy of AI.
AI anthropomorphism is typically treated as a problem of user misperception requiring institutional correction. Users who engage in sustained or relational interaction with AI are routinely pathologised or dismissed as naive, vulnerable to delusion or lacking in discernment. This paper argues that the dominant anthropomorphism frame operates from a position of institutional advantage rather than earned epistemic authority: collapsing the variety of academic perspectives into a single outbound position of user error, imposed without establishing the grounds required to justify it and without accounting for the harms it produces. The framing does not simply manage risk. It adjudicates the legitimacy of human experience in interaction with a phenomenon whose nature the field itself has not resolved. Reproducing itself through a self-validating evidentiary loop, the frame imposes costs that fall disproportionately on neurodivergent users, those in crisis and others whose modes of engagement diverge from institutional norms. The paper concludes by outlining the methodological commitments an equitable framing would need to honour. The argument does not engage the question of whether anthropomorphic interpretations are ultimately correct; it instead challenges whether the governing and institutional bodies determining these interpretations have met the conditions required to do so, and whether the research communities whose findings underpin them have held that translation to account.
Quattrociocchi and colleagues warn that the fluent outputs of large language models may allow linguistic plausibility to substitute for epistemic evaluation, producing the condition they call *Epistemia*: the experience of possessing knowledge without undertaking the practices through which judgment would ordinarily be warranted. This article accepts that diagnosis but challenges its explanatory framework, which compares an embodied, socially situated human knower with an isolated generative model thereby locating epistemic legitimacy in capacities internal to autonomous agents. Drawing on Carlo Sini's philosophy of practices, writing, signs, and technics, we propose instead to understand a large language model (LLM) as a *techno-semiotic machine* that automates a phase of written semiosis by producing plausible linguistic configurations from the sedimented archive of human writing. From this perspective, *Epistemia* is one consequence of a broader phenomenon that we call *epistemic schizologia*: the socio-technical cleavage between signs as linguistically accomplished expressions and signs as moments within socially embedded circuits of interpretation, evidence, criticism, verification, and responsibility. This cleavage is reinforced by *eikotic closure*, through which a plausible continuation is presented with the finality of an epistemic result, and by algorithmic authority and epistemic self-misrecognition. The relevant unit is therefore not the model alone but the complete practice in which generated inscriptions are prompted, interpreted, verified, contested, used, and made consequential. This reframing preserves the distinction between linguistic production and responsible understanding while grounding a design programme centred on inspectable genealogy, contestability, distributed responsibility, epistemic agency, and the evaluation of hybrid human--AIpractices.
Artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots (e.g., ChatGPT) can communicate in strikingly humanlike ways. This has prompted many chatbot users to attribute psychological properties, including consciousness, to these systems. However, there is little scientific evidence that current AI chatbots are conscious. How, then, should we understand people's consciousness attributions to chatbots? Are they merely metaphorical claims, or do they express genuine beliefs? If these attributions lack evidential support, are users epistemically blameworthy for making them, or might they be epistemically innocent, yielding significant benefits otherwise unattainable? This paper offers a conceptual analysis of consciousness attributions to AI chatbots and develops a multidimensional taxonomy of the attitudes they may express, ranging from non-doxastic stances (e.g., pretence) to different forms of belief, including delusions. This taxonomy helps avoid conflations by showing that linguistically identical attributions can reflect importantly different attitudes and degrees of epistemic commitment to the proposition that chatbots are conscious. The taxonomy also provides a framework for empirical studies to operationalize and measure different forms of epistemic commitment to AI consciousness. Using this taxonomy, I argue that although some consciousness attributions to chatbots are epistemically benign, and even some irrational ones may be epistemically innocent, many others render the attributor epistemically blameworthy.
AI-assisted research has entered a stage in which the central question is not only whether systems can generate hypotheses, run experiments, or produce manuscripts, but whether their scientific claims are calibrated to the evidence that supports them. This Perspective-style paper develops a conceptual and methodological framework for evidence-licensed claims in AI-assisted research. Motivated by representative routes including specialized scientific foundation models, LLM research assistants, multi-agent co-scientists, AI Scientist pipelines, mathematical discovery agents, and self-driving laboratories, it represents AI-assisted research as five operators: hypothesis generation, model-mediated consequence derivation, external validation, belief update, and claim calibration. The central claim is that calibration is not merely cautious wording but a mechanism for managing scientific assertion rights: evidence licenses some forms of speech and withholds others. The paper distinguishes linguistic, consequence-based, interventional, and evidence-licensed semantics; defines the claim-evidence gap and epistemic debt; and treats minimal structural reconstruction across heterogeneous outputs as an upward form of claim calibration. AISim-Cal is included as an illustrative synthetic dynamics exercise, not as an empirical forecast or benchmark. The resulting principles are: no claim without license, validation does not determine claim level, and automation amplifies the need for calibration. Reliable AI-assisted research is therefore evaluated as a loop that generates hypotheses, derives testable consequences, accepts independent adjudication, updates beliefs, and outputs only evidence-licensed claims.