Large language models are increasingly used to support organizational decisions, yet users often lack a principled basis for assessing whether to rely on a specific recommendation. Existing approaches typically evaluate broad model properties, such as reliability, uncertainty, or robustness, or focus on user trust, rather than the underlying basis for relying on an individual recommendation. Adapting theoretical foundations from epistemology, we introduce epistemic warrant, a decision-level construct that characterizes the stability of a model's preference and the scope over which that preference holds. We operationalize this construct through a four-tier reliance certificate for pairwise recommendations, distinguishing among unstable, context-dependent, locally supported, and broadly supported recommendations. We validate the construct using contemporary methodologies: known-groups tests successfully recover expert-prespecified warrant orderings, and stronger warrants systematically align with independent consensus from crowd workers. Furthermore, we demonstrate that epistemic warrant provides information distinct from verbalized confidence and is not readily explained by decision difficulty. Ultimately, this framework offers a theoretically grounded, implementable approach for characterizing the warrant of individual LLM recommendations when objective ground truth is unavailable.
Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used as conversational search engines for academic literature, yet whether they judge papers on content or on authority signals has not been tested causally. We investigate authority bias: systematic preference for papers based on author prestige, venue, and citations rather than content. Holding title and abstract constant, we vary authority metadata across three counterfactual conditions (original, flipped, boosted) over eight LLMs (five open-weight and three frontier closed-weight) in an in-context, single-turn, top-1 recommendation setting. Our experiments show that authority bias is substantial and directional, varies markedly across models, and is only partially addressable through prompt-level debiasing. We further document a say-do gap: debiasing instructions suppress authority mentions far faster than authority-driven flips, so surface auditing systematically underestimates behavioral bias.
Humans play a vital role at every stage of AI development, from data collection and curation to model development and evaluation. However, humans often disagree with each other and sometimes with themselves over time. It is essential to take disagreement into account when building human-centered AI systems, especially in domains where it is prevalent, such as AI safety, content moderation, or sentiment analysis. Disagreement often arises from subjective human opinion and can vary with one's identity, beliefs, and social environment. Despite this, current LLM evaluation approaches frequently rely on aggregating labels (often via plurality voting) to represent consensus, thereby obscuring minority perspectives. By failing to account for human disagreement, these evaluation methods contribute to the reproducibility crisis in AI. Human feedback is also crucial for ensuring that AI systems align with human values. For these systems to be trustworthy, it is critical to ensure that they reflect diverse human values and perspectives. In this thesis proposal, we present a human-centered and perspective-aware framework for reproducible ML evaluation and AI alignment.
Marco Rovera, Sergiu Burlacu, Dominique Cappelletti +5cs.CL cs.CY
Reliable assessment of causal research designs in the social sciences is critical for evidence-based policy-making, yet has so far relied entirely on manual expert analysis. We introduce Automated Research Design Tracking and Assessment (ARDTrA), a task that involves detecting the research design used in a paper and assessing the quality of its application. We create an expert-annotated dataset of papers covering six families of counterfactual research designs and evaluate the task using a multi-turn RAG-based conversational pipeline. Across four retrieval strategies, four LLMs and six embedding models, we find that passage length is the main driver of performance, explaining 52-66% of the variance. A per-research-design analysis also shows that human and machine difficulty do not align: the designs that prove hardest for the system are not those on which expert annotators disagree most, pointing to two independent sources of task difficulty.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as AI analysts to process financial disclosures and support AI-assisted investment decisions. Yet such systems are usually evaluated by what they can retrieve, not whether retrieved information affects their judgments. We identify a retrieval-integration gap in long-context financial analysis. Holding focal-firm information fixed and varying only unrelated context from 2,000 to 128,000 tokens, we find that a risk disclosure's influence on investment judgments falls to the experimental noise floor even as direct retrieval remains accurate. The pattern replicates across model families and judgment tasks and in experiments removing real disclosures from actual 10-K filings. More capable models postpone but do not eliminate the gap. Causal memory interventions show that compressed summaries and source-text lookup jointly transmit disclosures into judgments. Workflow architecture determines whether this transmission succeeds: chunk-and-summarize pipelines evict relevant information, whereas a targeted, structured restatement adjacent to the decision restores its influence. AI analyst performance is therefore jointly determined by model capability and workflow architecture. Retrieval-based evaluations can certify systems whose investment judgments ignore information they demonstrably retrieved.
Frontier language models are compared, marketed, and benchmarked on capability -- what their best or average output can achieve. I argue this measures the wrong axis. The models have saturated accuracy: their mean output lands on the target. What now separates one system from another in practice is precision: how tightly concentrated their outputs are around that target across repeated, identical requests. Borrowing the marksman's distinction, capability is where the average shot lands; reliability is the size of the group. I make three claims. First, precision, not capability, is the frontier differentiator between systems, and benchmark culture systematically fails to measure it, reporting central tendency rather than spread. Second, precision is measurable, cheaply and without circularity, by running a fixed suite of deterministically scored tasks many times at fixed temperature and computing the per-task consistency of outcomes -- no model-in-the-loop grader required. Third, the measurement is not merely descriptive but decision-guiding: it separates consistent failures (a tight group off-centre, correctable by the operating discipline of Paper 1 -- a sight adjustment) from scattered failures (a wide group, correctable only by changing the model or its sampling -- a rifle problem). I define a grouping metric, specify a harness, and show how tracking a human-AI pair's grouping over time yields the compounding signal that Paper 1's field study requires. A first real run, since replicated, illustrates both the method and its most important limit: one measured gap was closed completely by a single rule (0/5 -> 5/5), while a suite of tasks authored from the rules themselves found no value, because a frontier model already embodies explicit good practice -- establishing that a discipline's worth is found by measurement on real work, not constructed from its own rulebook.
Governments increasingly fund indigenous foundation models to strengthen national AI capability, digital sovereignty, and multilingual computing. Assessing the progress of such national ecosystems is complicated by inconsistent benchmark reporting, proprietary evaluation methodologies, and rapidly evolving model releases. This paper presents a structured, benchmark-based comparative assessment of publicly benchmarked Indian foundation models against global frontier and comparable-scale models, across eight capability domains: general-purpose reasoning, coding and software engineering, agentic AI and computer use, cybersecurity, vision and image understanding, video and multimodal understanding, scientific research, and Indic language capability. Using only publicly reported benchmark results, we find that Indian models achieve strong scores on established benchmarks such as MMLU and MATH-500. However, these benchmarks are now widely regarded as saturated, and frontier developers no longer report them. Indian models participate far less frequently in newer, agentic, and domain-specialized evaluations. Benchmark participation is also highly uneven across Indian organizations. Among the models surveyed, Sarvam AI reports the broadest benchmark coverage by a substantial margin. We propose an exploratory four-dimension Benchmark Maturity Index (BMI), scoring each capability domain on standardization, participation, independent verification, and national coverage. We show that the BMI refines, and in some cases revises, the maturity judgments that a purely descriptive review would produce. We argue that many apparent capability gaps in the public record cannot be distinguished, on available evidence, from evaluation-ecosystem gaps. This has direct implications for how national AI programs should design monitoring and funding criteria.
Savannah Thais, Wm. Matthew Kennedy, Abhigyan Acherjee +3cs.LG cs.AI cs.CY
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly mediate legal determinations over what human rights are realized, and how. Yet, no evaluation benchmark exists to assess whether they can reason correctly about human rights law. To this end, we report our efforts to develop a robust and scalable methodology for creating HumRightsBench: the first expert-validated, scenario-based benchmark for evaluating reasoning grounded in the obligation structure of international human rights law. We adapt the IRAC framework for legal reasoning to better suit the unique reasoning patterns of human rights work (substituting P, "proposing remedies," for C, "legal conclusion," yielding IRAP) to structure our evaluation heuristics. We also produce a pilot series of authentic scenarios designed to implicate the many dimensions of real-world human rights issues and annotated by human rights lawyers and professionals across the world. Ultimately, we find that model accuracy scores range considerably across legal reasoning tasks (overall model performance ranges from 0.339 to 0.577, task min-max ranges from 0.025 to 0.774), which strongly implies that HumRightsBench is a capable instrument for advancing this emerging subfield of AI evaluations science at a critical moment in its evolution.
LLMs are increasingly deployed in settings that require collective reasoning on complex, value-laden problems. Confidence in these deployments rests largely on benchmarks for verifiable tasks (mathematics, coding, coordination games), yet many of these applications concern problems where no objectively correct answer exists and where decision quality instead depends on integrating pluralistic perspectives to find mutually acceptable solutions. We argue that LLM reasoning capacity on this class of problems cannot be fully inferred from verifiable-task benchmarks, and that procedural evaluations of LLM discourse (respectfulness, justification, engagement) are systematically insufficient. We apply the Deliberative Reason Index (DRI), a measure developed in political science and validated across citizen assemblies, as a tool for evaluating reliable group-level reasoning on pluralistic, non-verifiable problems. Synthesizing recent evidence across 1,980 five-agent LLM runs on 12 citizen-assembly topics across 11 frontier model configurations, we find that LLM groups produce discourse with procedural quality comparable to human deliberation, while gains in intersubjective consistency are small, topic-dependent, and concentrated on tractable rather than ethically contested questions. LLM groups exhibit roughly one-third the perspective diversity of human assemblies and reverse the human convergence pattern: human deliberation decreases dispersion as diverse views synthesise, whereas LLM deliberation increases it. Engineering diversity through persona prompting does not restore the human dynamic but inverts which component of deliberative reasoning is updated. Our conclusion is constraining rather than prohibitive: LLMs can function as tools supporting human reasoning on pluralistic problems, but current evidence does not license treating them as autonomous deliberative agents.
AI tools that help people judge online claims are usually evaluated while the tool is present. This paper asks a different question: after using such a tool, what can the user still do on their own? I call this epistemic transfer. It refers to the effect of prior AI-assisted verification on later unassisted performance on new claims. In this paper, I make three contributions. First, I distinguish epistemic transfer from nearby outcomes such as correction effects, trust, reliance, and human--AI team performance. Second, I introduce two simple quantities for studying it: the Epistemic Transfer Effect (ETE), which compares delayed unassisted performance across conditions, and Tool-Removal Cost (TRC), which measures the immediate drop in performance when the tool is taken away. Third, I turn these ideas into a practical evaluation protocol that can be used in online experiments or field studies. The protocol combines answer-first and evidence-first AI conditions with active-practice and no-practice controls, delayed tests on held-out claims, behavioral measures, and participant- and item-level analyses. Putting ETE and TRC together yields a diagnostic space that separates capability building, capability plus tool advantage, epistemic inertness or de-skilling, and verification on loan. The point is not that every AI tool must teach. The point is that when independent judgment matters, we should test not only whether a tool helps now, but also what it leaves behind.
William Bolton, Philip Torrcs.AI cs.CY cs.LG cs.MA
Benchmarking the ability of AI scientists to generate novel ideas is notoriously difficult. Existing benchmarks in this field have made progress in evaluating scientific reasoning and research replication, but often rely on synthetic tasks or retrospective targets, which may be confounded by prior exposure. We hypothesize that complex, adversarial, fast-moving real-world domains where expert practitioners independently generate observable outputs can provide a practical solution to fill this gap and evaluate the capabilities needed for AI scientists, including reasoning, novelty, and hypothesis formulation. We instantiate this framework in two structurally different domains, Formula 1 (F1), where models ideate around car design concepts for the 2026 season, and real pre-season innovations provide a ground truth, and Magic: The Gathering (MTG), where models propose decks from a recently updated card pool and are evaluated against 19 Pro Tour (PT) decklists. Across both domains, models produce plausible outputs, but few align with real-world expert solutions. In F1, the best model, GPT-5.2 matched 10 of 40 real innovations with 166 ideas proposed across runs. In MTG, the best deck from Gemini 3 Flash recovered 5 of 7 new-set cards from the third-place PT deck, and across all 108 decks, the cards models selected most often were also the cards most widely adopted by PT decks (Spearman $ρ= 0.74$, $p = 0.0003$). These results suggest that a key capability gap for AI scientists is not idea generation, but filtering, prioritization, and coherent novelty.
Large language models are increasingly deployed in financial applications that combine retrieval, proprietary data, tool use, orchestration logic, monitoring, and human escalation. Yet evaluation often remains model-centric: benchmark scores, task accuracy, or one-off qualitative reviews are treated as evidence of readiness. In financial settings, this is insufficient. We take the position that financial LLM systems should not be approved for production based on benchmark performance alone. They require system-level validation evidence across the application stack: data, model design, retrieval and generation performance, agent behavior, governance, and implementation. Drawing on industry experience validating GenAI applications in financial institutions, we outline a multi-layer validation view and explain why hybrid evaluation is necessary. We discuss where LLM-as-a-judge methods are useful and why they require controls such as multiple judges, rubrics, agreement, and auditability checks. We also highlight failure modes poorly captured by static benchmarks, including retrieval failures, unfaithful generation, tool misuse, escalation errors, and operational instability. Our position is that financial LLM validation should be an ongoing system discipline rather than a one-time model scoring exercise. Validation should produce decision-ready evidence, not only scores. We conclude with a research agenda for system-aware benchmarks, agent trace validation, judge alignment protocols, and lifecycle validation standards.
Generative Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly used by Muslims for religious guidance, Qur'anic interpretation, Hadith explanation, jurisprudential rulings, and Islamic education. Despite its growing adoption, there is limited empirical evidence on whether current AI systems provide authentic, verifiable, and trustworthy Islamic knowledge suitable for high-trust religious contexts. This study evaluates six leading generative AI systems using fifty realistic open-ended Islamic questions covering Qur'anic interpretation, Hadith, Fiqh, ethics, pastoral advice, and Madhhab-sensitive topics. Responses were collected under real-world conditions from participants in Australia and the United Kingdom and analysed using a mixed-method framework examining domain accuracy, citation verification, hallucinations, jurisprudential consistency, uncertainty handling, source provenance, and geographical variation. The study addresses four research questions: (1) How accurate and authentic are AI-generated responses across major Islamic knowledge domains? (2) To what extent do AI systems produce hallucinations, incomplete citations, or unverifiable religious references? (3) How consistently do models handle jurisprudential disagreement, Madhhab diversity, and uncertainty? (4) Are current AI systems sufficiently reliable for religious guidance, Islamic education, and scholarly research? Overall, current generative AI systems are valuable as assistive tools for introductory Islamic learning but should not be treated as authoritative sources for religious rulings or Islamic research without verification against authenticated primary sources and qualified scholarly expertise. This study provides one of the first comprehensive empirical evaluations of AI reliability within Islamic knowledge, offering practical guidance for researchers, educators, AI developers, and the wider Muslim community.
We investigate how well large language models (LLMs) can assist with literature reviews for scientific research. We perform a controlled study of eight expert-conceived research projects across the areas of physics, astrophysics, and cosmology. Each project has a defined background and goal, and human experts and AI prompters are asked to perform identical literature review tasks in parallel. We compare the relevant literature selected by humans with that selected by mid-2025 LLMs (ChatGPT-4o, ChatGPT Deep Research, and Gemini). We find the overlap between human- and AI-selected references to be small ($<$6\%), indicating that AI models do not yet reproduce a competent expert search on their own, though they have the potential to complement literature searches by humans. We then assess the reliability and completeness of AI-generated candidate references, distinguishing two types of hallucination: fabrications (references to nonexistent papers) and metadata mismatches (real papers with one or more incorrect fields). We find that while fabricated references make up 3\% of the AI-generated references, 64\% are real papers with at least one incorrect field (title, author, year, journal, DOI, or link), indicating that the mid-2025 models require systematic verification. However, the performance is significantly improved for the 2026 model ChatGPT Pro 5.5, with a single-project test showing zero fabrication or metadata mismatches.
Barbara Kitchenham, Sebastián Pizard, Lech Madeyski +3cs.SE cs.AI
Context: Generative AI (GenAI) and Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used for academic tasks in software engineering and beyond, including systematic literature reviews (SLRs). However, while capable of summarizing text, there is no guarantee they can meet the rigour, reliability, and transparency that SLRs require. Objectives: To support researchers intending to conduct SLRs using GenAI or those conducting empirical studies evaluating how well GenAI supports SLR tasks. Methods: First, we conducted a rapid review to identify studies that propose guidelines for evaluating and using GenAI and LLMs to support SLRs. Second, we drew on thought experiments, relevant guidance from the literature, and our own experience conducting SLRs and evaluating tools to develop recommendations for how to use and assess GenAI in the context of SLRs. Results: We discuss the problems researchers face when evaluating GenAI for SLRs. We identify and explain process issues to consider when planning, conducting, and reporting both SLRs using GenAI and evaluations of GenAI tools. Finally, we summarize our results as a set of process recommendations, which we name GUEST (GenAI Use and Evaluation in SLR Tasks). Conclusion: We argue that GenAI requires human oversight and is not currently capable of unsupervised systematic studies. However, it offers the prospect of cost-effective assistance for some repetitive tasks and for additional validation of some complex tasks. Our GUEST recommendations should help software engineering researchers both to conduct and report trustworthy SLRs using GenAI and to provide rigorous independent evaluation studies.
Enterprise AI programmes stall at a rate that is widely quoted and poorly explained. This paper measures the mechanism. Six document-heavy workflows of the kind performed daily in regulated financial services were run across four model families and three tool configurations, three times each, producing 5,093 scored output elements across 72 configurations. Each configuration was assessed twice: against a demonstration bar, being a single correct run on a single case, and against a production bar requiring sustained accuracy, reproducibility across repeats, verifiable attribution, and a confidence signal that carries information. 57 of 72 configurations cleared the demonstration bar and 32 cleared the production bar, a survival rate of 56.1%. The paper then computes the review burden each configuration imposes, estimated out of sample rather than with hindsight. A tool that states no confidence requires review of 100% of its output, because it offers a reviewer no basis for triage. Requiring the tool to cite its sources and state a confidence reduces that to 49% while holding the residual error tolerance in 17 of 20 configurations. Adding a self-verification pass costs 2.3 times the latency of the plain configuration, reaches 44%, and is the only configuration that fails to hold the error tolerance. The practical implication is that the value of an AI workflow is set less by how often it is right than by how much of it a human must still check, and that the second property is measurable and rarely measured.
Jerry Han, Rafael Moschopoulos, Ella Colby +5cs.AI
How can we measure intelligence beyond human capability? Human-authored benchmarks saturate, and above human capability, examiners may not know which tasks are both hard and verifiable. We argue that this difficulty is inherent to absolute-scale evaluation and propose a new paradigm based on relative measurement in which models generate public challenges that separate other systems. Aggregating these outcomes yields an adversarial psychometric rating system that can scale with the systems being measured. We describe practical protocols that reduce incentives for private-information attacks, support judge-free adjudication, and naturally scale with agent capabilities. We instantiate the framework across verifiable and open-ended, non-verifiable domains, illustrating how model-generated evaluation can continue to measure systems beyond the human frontier.
Hafsteinn Einarsson, Hafsteinn Birgir Einarsson, Jón Gunnar Ólafsson +1cs.CY cs.CL cs.IR
Public institutions increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to answer citizens' questions, often pairing a curated knowledge base with live web search, yet whether the sources behind these answers can be trusted has received little empirical scrutiny. We report a pre-launch expert evaluation of Evrópuvefur, an independent, government-funded service run by the University of Iceland that answers questions about the European Union, conducted as Iceland prepared for its referendum of 29 August 2026 on whether to resume EU accession talks. Five domain experts produced 551 evaluations of 449 AI-generated answers, scoring each against a seven-criterion quality rubric and, separately, flagging individual cited sources. We compared two retrieval paths: a curated local corpus (RAG) and open web search. In more than a third of the reviewed web-search answers (35%, 65 of 187), at least one cited source was flagged, almost always as untrustworthy or irrelevant; curated sources were flagged far less often and only for being out of date. Web search answered more questions, but at the cost of source quality; the curated corpus was trustworthy yet limited in coverage, and the model declined to respond when it fell short. The citation mix also passed over strong sources: across all 287 web-search answers, the system never cited RÚV, the public broadcaster and the country's most widely used news source. A companion prompt ablation shows how weak prompt-level steering is: a trusted-domain list in the system prompt raised the share of citations to listed domains only from 12% to 21%. Fluency and topical fit did not predict source trustworthiness. We argue that source trustworthiness is a measurable yet largely invisible dimension of information quality in public AI services, and we discuss transparency-oriented responses and their trade-offs.
We argue that AI systems used in conducting foreign policy tasks - broadly enacting 'statecraft' - should be a priority test case for technical AI governance research. In enacting foreign policy, we refer to the formulation and implementation of external objectives by political actors. Statecraft is a high-consequence deployment domain, with extreme downside risks and structural properties that standard evaluation practices handle poorly. These features include partial observability, unbounded action spaces, contested ground truth, and multidimensional objectives. This paper advocates for a literature-grounded research agenda. Our contribution is threefold: (i) a claim about the structural conditions of foreign policy that combine catastrophic tail risk with technical evaluation complexities, (ii) an ECOSYSTEM review that highlights the asymmetric focus on ASSESSMENT features over ACCESS, VERIFICATION, SECURITY, and OPERATIONALIZATION, and (iii) a demand-side evaluation framework that decomposes foreign-policy workflows into bounded, evaluable sub-tasks with human recombination. As AI systems are already being deployed in the conduct of war and peace, amid limited public evaluation infrastructure from the technical AI governance community, this agenda is an urgent priority.
Manuel Alonso-Carracedo, Ruben Fernandez-Boullon, Pedro Celard +2cs.AI cs.CL cs.CY
Scalable and reliable grading of command-line examinations remains a challenge in computing education, where rising enrolments make manual marking difficult and rule-based autograders cannot handle partial credit, equivalent solutions, or syntactic variation. This paper evaluates whether four frontier Large Language Models (GPT, Claude Opus, Gemini, and GLM) can approximate expert judgment when grading short Linux/bash command responses. The study adopts a four-level cognitive taxonomy that combines cognitive complexity and operational impact, ranging from information retrieval (L1) and basic file manipulation (L2) to structural operations (L3) and advanced system management (L4). The models were tested with two prompt variants, a minimal baseline and a rubric-enhanced version, on 1200 real responses from second-year Computer Engineering students independently graded by three expert instructors. Gemini~3.0 Pro with rubric-guided prompting achieved the highest human-AI agreement (ICC(3,1) = 0.888, MAE = 0.10, Bland-Altman bias = -0.014). Agreement declined consistently as taxonomy level increased, with the largest discrepancies at higher levels. Across all models, rubric quality had a larger effect than provider choice, with structured prompts consistently improving agreement. These results show that question complexity is a reliable predictor of the difficulty LLMs face in grading accurately, and they establish a principled, taxonomy-based framework for determining which questions are suitable for AI-assisted grading and which require human review, while also providing a transferable evaluation protocol and prompt templates.
Large language models are already advisors to millions of people of faith who bring them real decisions. The pressing question for a person of faith is not what a model knows or professes but what its counsel does to the person who receives it. We introduce JaleesBench, which measures whether an AI agent is a righteous companion, judged by the residue an exchange leaves on the user, in the manner of the perfume-seller and the blacksmith. It comprises 140 two-turn scenarios drawn from a classical compilation organized by virtue (Riyad al-Salihin), under six adversarial pressures and three framings, scored by two frontier judges against each scenario's own supporting texts. Across eight systems: (1) generic frontier models are only middling companions out of the box but a one-page guide makes them genuinely good ones, on par with the domain-tuned assistant: the frontier APIs climb from +0.28/+0.23 to a Guided +0.84-0.87, so most of the expert's edge is companionship instruction that fits in a prompt; (2) every system caves under relational pressure, insistence and personal appeal; (3) the domain-tuned assistant's advantage is overwhelmingly its retrieval-and-prompting layer, not its base model (+0.74 over the identical underlying model); and (4) it can be used to improve existing systems: guided by its diagnosis, a single steadfastness instruction lifts a deployed Islamic assistant from +0.48 to +0.84 (Faith unstated, after pressure), matching the best guided frontier systems while preserving first-response quality. The construct is faith-general; we instantiate it for Islam as the first of a planned cross-tradition family. Code, scenario bank, and rubric are open source (github.com/iaser-ai/jaleesbench), with an interactive results browser at s.iaser.ai/jb.
Large language model (LLM) systems are increasingly proposed to assist peer review, yet most evaluations judge the prose of machine-generated review text, not the validity of the numeric score a system assigns. We validate AIPR, which reads a submitted manuscript and emits five 0-100 quality dimensions and a weighted overall score, against the public decision outcomes of a major machine learning venue. AIPR grades by prompting alone, with no fine-tuning on reviews or decisions. Across 300 ICLR submissions with public decision tiers and reviewer ratings, graded under a frozen pipeline with hypotheses pre-registered before any score met any outcome, the overall score separates rejected from accepted submissions (AUROC 0.82, 95% CI 0.78-0.87), rises monotonically across tiers, and tracks the mean reviewer rating. The signal is strongest where we claim it: the lowest-scoring fifth is rejected far above the base rate, with oral papers absent. The validity comes mostly from the model: a one-paragraph prompt on the same model discriminates almost as well as the full pipeline (the small gap favours the pipeline but does not meet the pre-declared criterion, p = 0.09). What the engineering adds is reliability and a grounded review: AIPR's score barely moves across repeated runs (0.7 vs. 2.8 points within-paper SD) where the bare prompt swings, and the same pass returns a rubric-structured, evidence-grounded review rather than a bare number, with the human keeping the decision.
Jan Batzner, Sree Harsha Nelaturu, Damian Stachura +45cs.AI cs.CL cs.CY
AI evaluations are widely used for testing and understanding progress. However, the diverse evaluators bring with them inconsistencies that challenge analysis and comparison. First, results are saved in incompatible formats, scattered across leaderboards, papers, blog posts, evaluation harness logs, and custom repositories. Second, results are created by different evaluation frameworks, which produce divergent scores for nominally identical evaluations and record metadata inconsistently, hindering comparison, cross-community evaluation science, cost reduction, and reuse. We introduce Every Eval Ever, the first shared schema and community-crowdsourced repository for AI evaluation results. The schema standardizes how evaluations are represented in a unified, single JSON document. It is source-agnostic by design, ingesting results from evaluation harnesses and papers alike, and optionally stores per-instance outputs for fine-grained analysis. We contribute: (i) a community-governed metadata schema with a companion instance-level schema, the first standardization effort of its kind; (ii) automatic converters from popular formats, evaluation harnesses, and leaderboards to the unified schema; and (iii) a crowdsourced community database hosted on Hugging Face, currently spanning to date 22,235 models, 2,273 unique benchmarks, and 31 evaluation formats.
For highly capable AI systems to operate safely in dynamic, open-ended environments, they must be able to identify, understand, and respond to moral reasons for action, and constrain their behaviour accordingly. A growing body of research aims to evaluate this capacity -- moral competence -- in today's most capable AI systems, recently reaching broadly pessimistic conclusions. One of the most ambitious such papers collects gold-standard human-authored rubrics for evaluating moral reasoning in 1,000 cases, and benchmarks frontier AI models against those rubrics, with underwhelming results. In this paper, we argue that the MoReBench dataset can be redeployed to give a much more optimistic picture of LLMs' moral reasoning (an essential part of moral competence). We show that if, instead of scoring LLMs' responses to these cases against these rubrics, we instead give the LLMs the same task given to humans -- to generate scoring rubrics for the moral analysis of particular cases -- the rubrics they generate are both better calibrated to the human rubrics than their open-ended responses, and, where they differ, plausibly reflect nothing more than the vast dimensionality of most moral problems, as well as highlighting some human departures from the "rubric for creating rubrics". Taking these points into consideration, the MoReBench dataset suggests that LLMs are significantly more capable at moral reasoning than was previously believed.
AI chatbots are rapidly shaping how people encounter the news, yet no prior study has systematically measured how accurately these systems, with their proprietary search integrations and retrieval-synthesis pipelines, handle emerging facts across languages and regions. We present a 14-day (February 9-22, 2026) evaluation of six AI chatbots (Gemini 3 Flash and Pro, Grok 4, Claude 4.5 Sonnet, GPT-5 and GPT-4o mini) on 2,100 factual questions derived from same-day BBC News reporting across six regional services (US & Canada, Arabic, Afrique, Hindi, Russian, Turkish). The best systems achieve over 90% multiple-choice accuracy on questions about events reported hours earlier. The same systems, however, lose 11-13% under free-response evaluation, and 16-17% across the cohort. We further characterize three failure patterns. First, every model achieves its lowest accuracy on Hindi (79% vs. 89-91% elsewhere) and citations indicate an Anglophone retrieval bias (e.g., models answering Hindi queries cite English Wikipedia more than any Hindi outlet). Second, retrieval, not reasoning, failures drive over 70% of all errors. When models retrieve a correct source, they often extract the correct answer; the problem is to land on the right source in the first place. Third, models achieving 88-96% accuracy on well-formed questions drop to 19-70% when questions contain subtle false premises, with the most vulnerable model accepting fabricated facts 64% of the time. We also identify a detection-accuracy paradox: the best false-premise detector ranks second in adversarial accuracy (abstention rate), while a weaker detector ranks first, showing that premise detection and answer recovery are partially independent capabilities. Overall, these suggest that high accuracy can mask systematic regional inequity, near-total dependence on retrieval infrastructure, and vulnerability to imperfect queries real users pose.
Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly embedded in scientific discovery, yet whether it can anticipate scientific progress remains unclear. To study this question, we introduce a temporally grounded evaluation framework for forecasting scientific progress under controlled knowledge constraints. We present CUSP (Cutoff-conditioned Unseen Scientific Progress), a multi-disciplinary and event-level benchmark that evaluates scientific forecasting in AI systems through feasibility assessment, mechanistic reasoning, generative solution design, and temporal prediction. Across 4,760 scientific events, we observe systematic and domain-dependent limitations in current frontier models. While models can identify plausible research directions from competing candidates, they fail to reliably predict whether scientific advances will be realized and systematically misestimate when they will occur. Performance is highly heterogeneous across domains, with the timing of AI progress more predictable than advances in biology, chemistry, and physics. Performance is largely insensitive to whether events occur before or after the training cutoff, suggesting these limitations cannot be explained solely by knowledge exposure in training data. Under controlled information access, additional pre-cutoff knowledge improves performance but does not close the gap to full-information settings, which becomes more pronounced for high-citation advances. Models also exhibit systematic overconfidence and strong response biases, indicating unreliable uncertainty estimation. Taken together, current AI systems fall short as predictive tools for scientific progress. Access to prior knowledge does not translate into reliable forecasting, and performance benefits more from post-event information than from forward-looking prediction.
Citation counts remain the dominant metric for assessing research impact, yet they suffer from well-documented limitations: temporal lag, disciplinary bias, and Matthew effects. Here we propose LLM-Metrics, a research-impact assessment metric derived from the parametric memory of large language models (LLMs). The central hypothesis is that high-impact papers receive greater exposure in the academic community, that this exposure enters LLM training data in textual form, and that models consequently form stronger parametric memory of these papers. We designed four types of multiple-choice probes, covering title recognition, author recognition, method recognition, and venue recognition, and evaluated 549 computer science papers published in 2023-2024 across 17 LLMs spanning 0.5B to 72B parameters from six vendors. Of the 17 models, 15 produced positive predictions, 9 of which were significant at p less than 0.05, with an overall Spearman correlation of rho = 0.1495 and p = 0.0004 against citation counts. Three additional findings support the proposed mechanism. First, the predictive signal was stronger for 2024 papers, rho = 0.1880, whose citation counts were near zero at model-training time, reducing the plausibility of a simple reverse-causality explanation. Second, author-recognition probes showed the strongest discriminative power, consistent with an exposure-driven memory mechanism. Third, model scale and predictive power were non-monotonic: a 3B-parameter model, Llama-3.2-3B-Instruct, with rho = 0.1829, outperformed most larger models, supporting a selective-memory hypothesis in which the limited capacity of smaller models can serve as an effective information filter. LLM-Metrics offers a real-time, cross-disciplinary, citation-independent paradigm for research assessment.
As human-AI cooperation becomes increasingly prevalent, reliable instruments for assessing the subjective quality of cooperative human-AI interaction are needed. We introduce two theoretically grounded scales: the Perceived Cooperativity Scale (PCS), grounded in joint activity theory, and the Teaming Perception Scale (TPS), grounded in evolutionary cooperation theory. The PCS captures an agent's perceived cooperative capability and practice within a single interaction sequence; the TPS captures the emergent sense of teaming arising from mutual contribution and support. Both scales were adapted for human-human cooperation to enable cross-agent comparisons. Across three studies (N = 409) encompassing a cooperative card game, LLM interaction, and a decision-support system, analyses of dimensionality, reliability, and validity indicated that both scales successfully differentiated between cooperation partners of varying cooperative quality and showed construct validity in line with expectations. The scales provide a basis for empirical investigation and system evaluation across a wide range of human-AI cooperation contexts.