Toward Meaningful Transparency for AI Chatbots: Disclosing Persuasive Intent Reduces Persuasion

The growing role of AI-generated content and AI-enabled systems in public communication has led regulators to demand clear disclosure of content provenance and AI involvement. But the effects of such disclosures remain uncertain. We test two disclosure approaches in their impact on an AI chatbot's persuasive appeal. In a preregistered experiment, 1,500 UK adults held a short conversation with a persuasive chatbot about one of 60 policy issues. The chatbot was identical for everyone. We randomized the disclosure that people received: nothing (control), a prominent disclosure that they were interacting with an AI (T1), or that disclosure plus the chatbot's persuasive intent and instructions (T2). The chatbot shifted attitudes by 12.6 points on a 100-point scale in the control group. The AI-identity disclosure was practically equivalent to no disclosure, with a 13.1-point shift, whereas the additional intent disclosure cut the persuasive effect roughly in half to 6.3 points. It also made participants view the campaign's methods as less acceptable and support stronger penalties against it. For direct chatbot interactions, transparency about AI identity alone does not meaningfully impact its influence. While current rules emphasize what a system is, our results show why the regulation of persuasive AI must also address what the system is trying to do.

The persuasive power of large language models does not depend on their perceived national origin

Conversational AI developed by geopolitical rivals reaches citizens worldwide, raising concerns that it could sway public opinion or be rejected as foreign propaganda, with consequences for democratic discourse and information sovereignty. Yet, whether an AI's perceived national origin shapes its persuasive power is unknown. In a preregistered randomized experiment, 403 adults from a nationally representative United States sample held a three-round debate with a chatbot introduced as either American ("DiscoveryAI") or Chinese ("ZhengheAI"), discussing a political or non-political topic. In all conditions, participants actually conversed with the same model (GPT-4o), instructed to argue against their initial position. We combined pre- and post-conversation self-reports of attitudes, trust, and collective narcissism with computational analyses of 1,209 participant turns, including LLM-coded stance and argumentative conduct, stance-sensitive embeddings, and keyword-masked emotion and toxicity classifiers. The conversations produced substantial attitude changes in every condition. Critically, the nationality label affected neither self-reported attitude change nor expressed stance, concessions, counterarguing, or affect, and equivalence tests and Bayes factors largely supported these null effects. The label's only reliable footprint was lower pre-conversation human-like trust in the Chinese model, whereas functionality trust was unaffected. Political topics slowed stance movement toward the AI's position, and collective narcissism predicted less attitude change regardless of origin, acting as a general barrier rather than an out-group filter. Users thus initially withhold social trust from a rival's AI yet still assimilate its arguments; origin labeling and transparency requirements alone may offer weak protection against foreign influence operations conducted through conversational AI.

(Human) Attention Is (Still) All You Need: Human oversight makes AI-assisted social science reliable

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for tasks once reserved for trained researchers, including hypothesis generation, specification choice, and drafting conclusions. We argue that the reliability of AI-assisted research depends not only on model capability, but also on how cognitive labour is structured between humans and machines. We study this problem through Human-in-the-Loop Economic Research (HLER), a decision architecture based on pre-commitment, decision sequencing, accountability, and attention allocation. In a pre-specified 2*4 factorial experiment with 280 complete research runs across four datasets, an unconstrained multi-agent baseline produced critical failures in 72% of runs. Using the same underlying model, the same agent decomposition, and identical prompts for the shared reasoning agents, HLER reduced the failure rate to 16% by imposing three architectural commitments: LLMs reason but do not execute data work, data and estimation are handled deterministically, and three human decision gates bind the workflow. Fisher's exact test rejects equality of failure rates at p<0.001. Reliability gains were largest on the least publicly represented dataset, a Qing-dynasty population register, consistent with a task-based production model with Frechet-distributed output quality. An 80-run ablation suggests that deterministic computation and human gates contribute independently, with exploratory evidence of complementarity. We interpret HLER as a research harness rather than an autonomous AI scientist: it sharply reduces failures, makes residual weaknesses more visible, and prevents unreliable claims from being advanced as publication-ready outputs.