The Judgment-Consequence Gap: LLM Moral Reasoning in Healthcare Decisions

As large language models (LLMs) enter high-stakes domains such as healthcare, understanding their moral reasoning becomes essential. Decisions about scarce medical resources often hinge on judgments of responsibility, particularly when patients' own actions contribute to illness. We investigate how LLMs reason about responsibility and its consequences, tracing their judgments across successive levels, from the behavior, to the resulting illness, to the denial of care. We evaluate a wide range of LLMs, spanning different model families and capability levels, on various clinical vignettes adapted from prior studies. Our results identify a judgment-consequence gap: LLMs largely agree with humans that patients bear responsibility for health-harming behaviors, yet overwhelmingly refuse to let that judgment influence how they allocate scarce resources. Specifically, LLMs default to random allocation, whereas humans consistently favor the less-culpable patient. Compared to humans, LLMs also place greater emphasis on access to information, reducing responsibility judgments when health-risk knowledge is unavailable. These findings reveal that LLMs apply a systematically different moral framework than humans when responsibility and resource scarcity intersect, surprisingly often amplifying normative disagreement with humans as reasoning capability increases.

Using Large Language Models for Idea Generation in Innovation

This research evaluates the efficacy of large language models (LLMs) in generating new product ideas. To do so, we compare three pools of ideas for new products targeted toward college students and priced at 50 dollars or less. The first pool of ideas was created by university students in a product design course before the availability of LLMs. The second and third pools of ideas were generated by GPT-4 from OpenAI using zero-shot and few-shot prompting, respectively. We evaluated idea quality using standard market research techniques to predict average purchase intent probability. We used text mining to assess idea similarity and human raters to evaluate idea novelty. We find that AI-generated ideas outperform human-generated ideas in terms of average purchase intent, with few-shot prompting yielding slightly higher intent than zero-shot prompting. However, AI-generated ideas are perceived as less novel and exhibit higher pairwise similarity, particularly with few-shot prompting, indicating a less diverse solution landscape. When focusing on the quality of the best ideas rather than the average ideas, we find that AI-generated ideas are seven times more likely to rank among the top 10 percent of ideas, demonstrating a significant advantage over human-generated ideas. We propose that this seven-to-one advantage is a conservative estimate because it does not account for the greater productivity of AI. Our findings suggest that despite some drawbacks, AI creativity presents a substantial benefit in generating high-quality ideas for new product development.

AI's Capability in Assisting Scientific Research in Physics, Astrophysics, and Cosmology II: Project Planning and Proposal Evaluation

We investigate how well large language models (LLMs) can assist scientific project planning and proposal evaluation. One-page project plans were independently generated for eight expert-conceived research projects in physics, astrophysics, and cosmology by human researchers and three contemporary LLMs (ChatGPT, Claude, and DeepSeek; mid-2025 models, used with their default tool access). The resulting 32 proposals were blindly evaluated by four human reviewers and two newer frontier LLMs (Claude Opus 4.8 and ChatGPT Pro 5.5) using a four-aspect evaluation rubric. Reviewers were also asked to identify whether each proposal was written by a human or an AI. Human reviewers rated human- and AI-written proposals similarly overall, whereas both AI reviewers scored AI-written proposals about one point higher (on a five-point scale) than human-written proposals. Human reviewers correctly identified human- and AI-written proposals 72% and 79% of the time, respectively, while both AI reviewers correctly classified all 32 proposals (100%). These results suggest that current LLMs can produce project plans comparable to human-written ones in the eyes of human reviewers, but that AI reviewers show a systematic preference for AI-generated proposals. Our results suggest caution when deploying LLMs widely in proposal preparation and evaluation.

Plausible but Not Valid: A Psychometric Audit of LLMs as Synthetic Survey Respondents

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as synthetic survey respondents, but existing evaluations ask whether answers look plausible at the individual level. We argue the right question is psychometric: do LLMs preserve the joint distribution, latent structure, reliability, mediation pathways, and demographic effects of real human survey data? We introduce a Lithuanian organisational-psychology dataset (n=263 employees; Dunham Attitudes Toward Change, UWES-17, Koopmans IWPQ; 68 items, 12 subscales) and condition a 37-model lineup spanning OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, and twelve open-weight families on real respondent profiles under a five-level persona-disclosure ladder, presentation and reasoning-effort ablations, counterfactual demographic swaps (gender, role, education), a cross-language check, and a verbatim-recall memorization probe. The resulting Psychometric Similarity Score (PSS) is anchored against five non-LLM statistical baselines and a held-out human-vs-human ceiling, with respondent-bootstrap confidence intervals and an item-permutation null for Tucker's phi. LLMs reproduce the qualitative direction of human psychometric relationships, but a Gaussian-copula baseline beats every LLM on the sample-driven PSS components; the LLM "crowd" is more similar to itself (mean inter-LLM PSS 0.73) than to humans; and memorization does not drive the leaderboard (recall-PSS rank correlation 0.00). Counterfactual swaps reveal education-driven effects (mean |d|=0.56) that dwarf gender (0.12) and role (0.18); Tucker's phi on UWES falls inside the permutation null for 8 of 37 models. Downstream, every LLM shows a strong acquiescence shift (+0.84 SD), synthetic-trained regressors lose predictive validity on held-out humans (mean R^2 -0.18 vs 0.28), and models fabricate indirect effects on 3 of 10 placebo mediation paths. LLM samples are not a drop-in replacement for human survey data.

AI systems out-persuade expert humans

Many societal decisions are settled by contests of persuasion. Conversational AI is a powerful new entrant in these contests, but whether it can out-persuade skilled and highly incentivized humans has remained unclear. Here, in a series of four preregistered experiments (n = 18,978 conversations from 6,923 people), we pitted AI systems against a range of human persuaders, including laypeople, winners of a separately preregistered four-round online persuasion tournament, professional canvassers, and world championship debaters. We found that AI systems were reliably more persuasive than expert humans, even when expert humans chose their issues, researched in advance, underwent hours of live, structured practice, and were incentivized with £1,000 cash bonuses. In a follow-up study, AI's advantage persisted after experts received a coaching tool that let them practice against the AI that beat them, review their performance history, and see what AI would have said at key moments. We found converging evidence that AI's advantage stemmed from rapidly deploying larger quantities of information: after coaching, expert humans could tie an AI constrained to respond at human speeds and with human-length messages. In a final study, we show that AI's advantage extends to consequential real-world behavior: AI was nearly 3x more effective than professional canvassers from a UK fundraising firm at raising real-money donations to Save the Children. Together, these results establish that frontier AI systems out-persuade expert humans in conversation, with significant implications for political communication.

Flaws in the LLM Automation Narrative

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly described as performing at the level of human experts on knowledge economy tasks. These claims are primarily based on how LLMs perform on benchmarking tasks that measure average performance across standardized datasets. Primary limitations of many benchmarking tasks are that they often measure performance based on content directly included in LLM training data, and they frequently do not assess the reliability of LLM performance or the magnitude of LLM errors. However, in high stakes contexts, these qualities are critically important. Through a novel LLM benchmarking task that requires writing computer code to complete a data analysis task, we compare the performance of a frontier LLM against submissions from human experts and explicitly measure the variance of responses and the magnitude of errors. Our study reveals that the human experts perform better on average on a range of metrics and demonstrate less variability in performance. Our results provide evidence that LLMs do not consistently perform at the level of human experts and demonstrate the importance of measuring variance and assessing error magnitude in LLM benchmark evaluations.

Not Yet: Humans Outperform LLMs in a Colonel Blotto Tournament

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has spurred economists to study how humans and LLMs behave in strategic settings. We organized a series of round-robin tournaments in the Colonel Blotto game. This game attracts game theorists' attention due to high-dimensional action space and the absence of pure strategy Nash equilibria. In the first tournament, more than 200 human participants competed against one another. In the second tournament, several popular LLMs were invited to submit strategies. In the third tournament, we matched the number of LLM strategies to the number submitted by humans. We find that humans more often employ better-calibrated intermediate-level allocation heuristics and outperform the simpler, more stereotyped strategies submitted by LLMs. Strategic sophistication is key to success if and only if the necessary level of reasoning depth is reached, while lower and higher levels of reasoning offer no clear advantage over the primitive strategies. Among humans, field of study weakly predicts success: participants with STEM backgrounds perform better in the first tournament. Surprisingly, humans almost do not adjust their strategies across tournaments with different sets of opponents. This result suggests that humans base their choices primarily on the game's rules rather than on the identity of their opponents, treating LLMs much like human competitors.