Soobin Cho, Mark Zachry, David W. McDonaldcs.HC cs.AI
AI tools that support collaborative discussion typically treat the discussion as a standalone task, focusing only on its content and setting aside the social context of the group having it. But it is groups with a shared history, with their own norms, hierarchies, and relationships, where the most tangled and complex discussions tend to arise. These discussions cannot be understood apart from that context, and AI that overlooks it risks failing to convey what a discussion means, or even misrepresenting it. Drawing on two studies of how experienced Wikipedia editors read and make sense of discussions, we propose an AI-Assisted Sensemaking Model for Collaborative Discussions, which captures not only a discussion's arguments but also the norms and participants behind it, along with the context that gives each meaning. In this model, the system supports the early stages of the sensemaking process, and the degree to which it performs interpretive work can range from low to high. We argue that higher interpretive work reduces the burden on users but increases their reliance on the system's judgment. We then discuss the risks of an insufficiently intelligible system, what it would take to make one more intelligible, and the safeguards it still requires.
Concept Bottleneck Models (CBMs) are interpretable-by-design neural networks that detect human-understandable concepts from the input and use them to generate predictions. By allowing users to inspect the concepts underlying a prediction and explore how predictions change under alternative concept configurations, CBMs have emerged as one of the most prominent approaches to supporting human-AI collaboration. However, user studies investigating their actual effectiveness as decision-support systems remain limited. We present two large-scale user studies (N participants = 705, N observations = 6,959) evaluating how concept-based explanations and user interventions on the model's concepts affect the performance of the human-AI team in two distinct binary classification tasks. Our results show that CBMs, and particularly their interactive component, can improve human-AI team accuracy relative to both unaided human performance and performance with non-interpretable AI support. However, these benefits emerge only under certain conditions: classification tasks perceived as difficult, easily identifiable concepts, and active interaction with the model. We also discuss how inaccurate concept detection may undermine users' trust in the model. Overall, this work provides practical guidance for the deployment of CBMs as effective decision-support tools.
Alfio Ferrara, Lorenzo Gatta, Sergio Picascia +1cs.SE cs.AI
Feature attribution is a central tool of model interpretability, yet the software through which it is applied remains fragmented: individual tools specialize along narrow axes, such as a single modality, a code API or a GUI, or a fixed rather than extensible method set, and rarely combine these strengths. Moreover, many explainability tools are designed primarily for domain experts, requiring programming skills or familiarity with attribution methods that can make them difficult for non-expert users to access. In this article, we present LumiXAI, a modular full-stack framework that consolidates attribution analysis into a single system. It couples classification and generative attribution with an interactive GUI supporting bidirectional exploration, a plug-in architecture for registering new models and methods, and three access tiers serving non-programmers, developers, and extenders from one backend. Its contribution is a system that operationalises established attribution methods under one interface, one interaction model, and one persistence layer, with containerised services and persistent results making analyses reproducible across machines.
What if judges already behave like algorithms? As artificial intelligence and algorithms are deployed in many settings, including the judicial system, many have debated whether judges should be allowed to rely on them. Instead, we ask whether judges follow predictable, algorithmic-like rules already. If judges already follow consistent, formula-like rules based on discrete and static factors such as criminal history, age, and charge type, then judicial behavior may be improved. However, if judges rely on individualized information that cannot be identified through court data, then standards-based decision-making may be more challenging to understand or improve. This work explores these questions by studying judicial decision-making in misdemeanor bail hearings in Harris County, Texas. Using available court data, we investigate whether magistrate judges follow what resembles an algorithm; whether they consider the same variables in their decision-making; and whether they are consistent with themselves and with each other. To do this, we train machine learning models for each judge, measure variable importance metrics to determine important variables for each judge's decision-making, and analyze outcomes of similar cases for judges. Our results reveal that these judges generally behave algorithmically: their decisions can be captured by small, interpretable formulas. However, in some cases, judges differ substantially, leading to surprising inconsistency and unequal treatment across similar defendants. Identifying cases where algorithms do not explain judicial decision-making can improve the justice system by focusing attention on decisions where individualized standards, rather than rules, better explains outcomes.
Across law, education, policy analysis, and public moral argumentation, LLM outputs are being used often for work that requires interpretations to be justified with textual evidence and explicit normative standards. Yet a recurrent failure mode -- what I call \textit{interpretive misplacement} -- is that model-generated readings get treated as settled meanings without an explicit interpretive frame (sources, scope constraints, normative commitments), without preserving defensible alternatives, and without provenance that lets readers find the supporting passages. In such settings, the risk is not only factual error but lost accountability: readers and institutions cannot reliably assess what an output commits them to, or on what basis. Drawing on philosophical hermeneutics, this paper discusses this risk and derives design principles for structuring human-AI co-interpretation. The paper also provides a structured synthesis of recent scholarship on hermeneutics and AI, organizing this emerging literature into a set of recurrent lines of argument and design-relevant gaps. LLM outputs are treated as candidate readings, whereas hermeneutic understanding is reserved for accountable human interpreters situated in disciplinary historical-linguistic traditions. Human-AI interaction is characterized as an AI-mediated interpretive loop. Hermeneutic understanding is distinguished from token-prediction--based text generation. On this basis, existing LLM techniques are reorganized into design patterns for hermeneutically responsible use in interpretive settings. Finally, the discussion turns to implications for legal practice, educational assessment and feedback, scholarly knowledge production, and public moral argumentation. It also treats digital hermeneutics as a literacy: the capacity to read AI-mediated texts by examining frames, provenance, and readings, and by contesting outputs.
Representation is a central concept in modern machine learning, where it usually refers to internal encodings that support learning and generalization. As models scale and their capabilities become increasingly human-level, this representational language sometimes shifts from an engineering context into the more philosophically loaded domain of mental representation. We argue that this is the case for recent claims about the convergence of representational properties across different AI models. In particular, we assess the arguments developed in The Platonic Representation Hypothesis, according to which this convergence is driven by a unified structure of reality. We examine this claim by introducing arguments and ideas from debates about mental representation in the philosophy of mind. We argue that these philosophical resources can clarify what is at stake in such claims, explain why alignment evidence alone is insufficient for strong metaphysical conclusions, and suggest directions for future research.
Post-hoc explanation methods are routinely used to interpret scientific machine learning models, with the deliverable understood to be insight into the phenomenon the model has been trained on. The transition may be taken to be secured once the model is reliable enough and the explanation faithful enough. We argue it is not. Reliability checks that the model's predictions match the phenomenon's outcomes, and faithfulness checks that the explanation matches the model, but neither checks whether the model works as the phenomenon works, which is what a claim about structure requires. The chain can support candidate hypotheses under external corroboration, but it cannot, on its own, support claims about how the phenomenon is in fact structured.
Eric Günther, Balázs Szabados, Kristof Meding +3cs.LG
Algorithmic explanations are intended to help stakeholders understand opaque algorithmic decisions, but in practice, they often fall short. First, the meaning of algorithmic explanations is often not what one might intuitively expect, so expert knowledge is required to interpret them correctly. Second, recent work has shown that popular explanation algorithms are uninformative about the behavior of complex decision functions. Together, these issues create a gap between what explanations appear to convey and what they actually provide. In this work, we propose Explanation Cards for Explanation Algorithms, which augment standard explanations with complementary information about robustness and validity, as well as clear instructions for interpretation. The complementary information can render otherwise uninformative explanations practically useful, while also helping to detect cases where they are not. Importantly, the interpretation instructions in explanation cards shift responsibility from users to providers: Rather than expecting users to recognize what can and cannot be concluded from an explanation, providers must make this explicit upfront. Using counterfactual explanations and SHAP as examples, we demonstrate how providers can construct explanation cards and that these cards provide users with the guidance needed for sound interpretation. We further argue that explanation cards offer a practical means of operationalising the explainability provisions of the EU AI Act. Overall, explanation cards are a significant step toward making explanation algorithms fit for real-world use cases.
AI evaluation results are produced at scale but reported inconsistently across leaderboards, model cards, benchmark papers, and company blogs. The cost is interpretive: readers cannot reliably compare results across sources, identify what a report omits, or trace an aggregate claim to its underlying evidence. Recent efforts address isolated components but leave three gaps: they cover only narrow slices of the evaluation lifecycle and do not compose into a single interpretable record; they specify static representations that do not differentiate the questions different stakeholders bring to the same evidence; and they remain proposals on paper, lacking the extraction infrastructure required for adoption at scale. We present \EvalCards{}, an operational reporting layer that composes benchmark metadata, evaluation run data, and model metadata into a unified record. We (1) derive a reporting schema from a structured review of 52 papers and 10 stakeholder interviews, (2) implement four interpretive signals (reproducibility, documentation completeness, provenance and risk, and score comparability), rendered through reader modes calibrated to research and non-research audiences, and (3) deploy a monitoring tool that applies \EvalCards{} across 5,816 models, 635 benchmarks, and 101,843 results, surfacing systematic gaps in current reporting practice.
Stella Biderman, Mohammad Aflah Khan, Niloofar Mireshghallah +3cs.AI cs.CL
What would it mean to have a scientific understanding of AI? Models are not static objects: they are snapshots of time-evolving processes shaped by data, objectives, architectures, and optimization dynamics. Yet much of AI research treats models as fixed artifacts, analyzing behaviors after training rather than asking why they emerge. This position paper argues that a science of AI must move beyond post-hoc fixes and study the training dynamics that produce model behavior. Such a science should support progressively stronger forms of understanding: predicting outcomes from early training signals, intervening when trajectories go wrong, and ultimately designing training procedures that more reliably produce desired properties. Scaling laws have made prediction routine for loss; the challenge is extending this success to capabilities, biases, robustness, and safety-relevant behaviors. We articulate requirements for such theories grounded in the history and philosophy of science, examine progress in mechanistic interpretability, fairness, memorization, and simplicity bias, and identify concrete open problems.
Statistical decision algorithms are increasingly deployed in domains where ground-truth labels are hard to obtain, such as hiring, university admissions, and content moderation. In these settings, models are typically trained on historical human evaluations -- for example, using past hiring decisions as a proxy for true applicant quality. However, if past evaluations unjustly favor certain groups, models trained on these labels may inherit those biases. To address this problem, we propose basing predictions on rubric embeddings, a representation framework that replaces standard black-box embeddings with features derived from expert-defined criteria that align with the underlying construct of interest. By anchoring predictions to semantically meaningful dimensions, this approach guards against biased proxy signals. We provide both theoretical and empirical evidence that rubric embeddings mitigate label bias under plausible conditions. Empirically, we evaluate our method on a novel dataset of applications to a large master's program. We find that models trained on rubric embeddings reduce group disparities while improving measures of cohort quality. Our results suggest that basing predictions on interpretable, domain-grounded representations offers a practical approach to learning in the presence of biased labels.
The growing reliance of machine learning models in high-stakes, highly regulated domains such as finance and insurance has created a growing tension between predictive performance, interpretability, and regulatory fairness requirements. In these settings, models are expected not only to deliver reliable predictions but also to provide transparent decision rationales and comply with strict fairness requirements. Attention-based transformers offer powerful mechanisms for modeling complex data relationships as demonstrated in various language tasks, yet their attention mechanisms alone do not ensure counterfactually fair predictions, even when combined with fairness-aware techniques. To address these limitations, we propose the Feature Correlation Transformer (FCorrTransformer), an attention-light architecture tailored for tabular data. In this design, the attention matrix admits a direct statistical interpretation as pairwise feature dependencies, enhancing both interpretability and efficiency. Leveraging this structure, we introduce Counterfactual Attention Regularization (CAR), a framework that enforces group-invariant fair representations of sensitive features at the attention level, promoting counterfactually fair predictions without relying on explicit causal assumptions. Empirical evaluations on imbalanced classification and regression benchmarks demonstrate that FCorrTransformer combined with CAR achieves strong counterfactual fairness while maintaining competitive predictive performance and substantially reducing model complexity compared with standard transformer-based baselines. Overall, this work bridges a critical gap between fairness theory and machine learning models, offering a practical framework for responsible AI in regulatory-sensitive domains.