Social media platforms increasingly use AI-based credibility indicators to help users judge misinformation. Unlike individual human-AI decision-making, these indicators are embedded in information spread: users see both an AI prediction and earlier judgments shaped by the same AI, and their own judgments may then enter the public history. Yet how to analytically characterize this process remains under-explored. We therefore introduce a social-learning lens for this setting by extending the classical Bayesian cascade model with the AI indicator as a shared public signal. The resulting Gateway condition compares the evidence from the AI prediction with users' private impressions. Through this view, we show that AI changes what public history means. Crowd agreement may reflect accumulated independent human evidence, or repeated dependence on the same AI prediction. This creates a preservation-correction trade-off: stronger reliance on AI can preserve correct predictions, but can also lock in incorrect ones by blocking corrective private impressions. We calibrate the model using human-subject data on news veracity judgments. Although the AI outperforms human users, the average user weights it below her own impression but above several peer judgments, while individual users vary from discounting the AI to relying on it enough to cascade. Simulations show that over-reliance on a weak AI is especially harmful, and that diversifying AI signals across users can better keep the crowd informative. We conclude with implications for understanding human-AI interaction in information spread and designing misinformation interventions.
Catherine King, Lynnette Hui Xian Ng, Kathleen M. Carleycs.AI
Designers and policymakers in sociotechnical domains like content moderation, privacy interfaces, recommender systems and beyond, must choose among a growing menu of proposed interventions, but typically lack a principled basis for comparing them. Prior work tends to evaluate interventions individually and mostly along the effectiveness criteria, while implementation constraints such as cost, effort and feasibility are often considered separately. We present a multi-criteria framework for evaluating sociotechnical interventions. This framework is instantiated through the case of misinformation, a domain of intense focus for proposed countermeasures. We survey $N=39$ researchers on 40 operationalized interventions across five evaluative criteria: political feasibility, effectiveness, user acceptance, cost, and implementation effort. We find that the interventions that experts judge to be the most effective are not always the most acceptable to the public or the most feasible to implement. We also discuss how this tension has implications for the design of sociotechnical interventions beyond misinformation, and offer a decision framework for practitioners navigating the trade-offs of sociotechnical interventions.
With the rapid diffusion of AI-generated content, AI-driven misinformation is becoming increasingly pervasive and difficult to govern, undermining information credibility and social trust. This study models the strategic interdependence among a government regulator, an AI enterprise, and users through a three-party evolutionary game that incorporates heterogeneous rewards and punishments. From the resulting replicator equations, we characterize the evolutionary stability of competing governance and production strategies. The analysis indicates that neither unilateral regulation nor market incentives alone can effectively curb misinformation. Instead, an evolutionarily stable regime of real-information production arises only when regulatory rewards and punishment intensity, enterprise reputation loss, and user adoption incentives collectively surpass critical thresholds. The findings highlight the need for coordinated and adaptive policy mixes that align regulatory instruments with enterprise behavior and user uptake while managing governance costs.
Thomas H. Costello, Nathaniel Rabb, Michael Nicholas Stagnaro +2cs.HC cs.AI
The emergence of conspiracy theories in the wake of major events is a significant societal challenge. Here we test whether conversational dialogues with a large language model (LLM) can reduce belief in immediately unfolding conspiracies. In experiments conducted in the days following the July 2024 assassination attempt on Donald Trump and the September 2025 assassination of Charlie Kirk, U.S. adults (Experiment 1: N = 472; Experiment 2: N = 1035) holding conspiratorial views about the crisis event engaged in a multi-turn conversation with an LLM prompted to reduce their conspiracy belief. Compared to control participants who either discussed an irrelevant topic with an LLM or viewed a static fact sheet, participants in the LLM treatment showed significantly reduced conspiracy beliefs in both experiments. We also found evidence of downstream effects of the LLM treatment, observing reduced belief in different conspiracies one to two months later in the wake of subsequent crisis events. These results shed light on the psychology of emerging conspiracies and highlight the potential for scalable, cognitively-focused interventions to counteract misinformation in the immediate aftermath of high-profile societal events.
Peer Saleth, Segun T. Aroyehun, Fabio Carrella +3cs.CL
The spread of misinformation is widely perceived as a threat to democratic deliberation, yet how political elites' rhetorical commitments to truth shift alongside the rise of populist actors remains poorly understood. Analysing 4.5 million tweets and 59,170 parliamentary speeches by German political elites between 2015 and 2025, we measure evidence-based and intuition-based rhetoric using a validated distributed dictionary representation. Across both arenas, intuition-based language has become more prominent, and right-leaning actors consistently exhibit the lowest Evidence Minus Intuition (EMI) scores. The parliamentary entry of the extreme-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) in 2017 coincides with sharp downward shifts in EMI across the broader chamber, while a more gradual decline is observed on Twitter. These findings document an association between far-right visibility and a changing approach to truth in elite discourse in a multiparty European democracy.
We outline an adversarial social epistemology (ASE) for densely interactive communicative landscapes in which public assertions are scaffolded by chains of testimony, inference, institutional certification, and tacit trust. In such landscapes, agents have incentives and affordances to distort, color, omit, fabricate, or strategically under-specify information for private, reputational, rhetorical, or material gains. We argue that these phenomena are not adequately captured by familiar descriptions of epistemic bubbles, echo chambers, or misinformation diffusion. What requires explanation is how communicative agents exploit the commitments and entitlements that normally make scaffolded assertions trustworthy. We provide language that delivers the requisite analysis, outline mechanisms that subvert trust in scaffolded public communications, and outline machinery for auditing and redressing trust breaches arising from subverting the auditability of inferential chains, drawing on epistemic networks, enriched with an inferentialist semantics for interpreting assertions.
Islam Eldifrawi, Shengrui Wang, Amine Trabelsics.CL
Web domain credibility evaluation is vital for combating misinformation. It is conducted by examining factors such as domain type, transparency, and overall reputation. However, assessing the credibility of newly emerging web domains remains challenging since they have no reputation yet. Expert fact-checkers evaluate the credibility of domains by analyzing the content of their articles, including the presence of misinformation, bias, or propaganda. Yet, the ease of large-scale content generation enabled by LLMs has accelerated the creation of new content, rendering manual assessment insufficient and underscoring the need for automated approaches to domain credibility evaluation. In this paper, we introduce our Domain Credibility Evaluation Framework (DCEF), a temporal framework for domain credibility evaluation grounded in expert ratings. DCEF enables us to investigate whether the credibility of web domains can be assessed from their published articles following the workflow of expert fact-checkers, without any prior knowledge of the source domains themselves.
On social media, many users actively push back against false claims. Understanding who pushes back and how they do so matters, as this corrective activity is central to how misinformation is contested. We study this counter-misinformation ecosystem at scale: applying a domain-specific NLI model from our prior work to a large corpus of COVID-19 tweets, we classify 264,737 posts as supporting or opposing false claims and compare 23 user- and text-level features across the two groups. Contrary to the dominant assumption that negative emotion is a signature of falsehood, we find that misinformation-opposing posts are more emotionally negative than misinformation-supporting posts, with higher levels of anger, disgust, and sadness. These differences are modest in magnitude but consistent in direction across the negative emotions. We also find that posts opposing misinformation tend to come from more established users, i.e., older accounts, more followers, and higher listed counts.
Across social and online platforms, people are increasingly exposed to AI-generated images. As a consequence, the task of distinguishing AI-generated from authentic images is becoming a central challenge for information ecosystems. While humans perform better than chance, accuracy falls short of many operational needs. Initial evidence shows that visually oriented training can improve deepfake detection but does not improve participants' ability to identify real images as real. Here, we investigate the efficacy of a brief training intervention for intelligence analysts employed by the United States government in 2024. We conducted a counterbalanced within-subject randomized experiment in which we showed participants real and AI-generated images varying in pose complexity and scene context and asked them whether each image was real or AI-generated, both before and after an expert delivered a 30-minute training that pointed out patterns in seven real and 50 AI-generated images. We collected 2,544 image-level judgments from 32 intelligence analysts. We find training increased overall accuracy by 9 percentage points (95% CI: [2.7, 15.4]) from a baseline of 72%. We find the improvement is driven by a 14.2 percentage point increase in accuracy for real images (95% CI: [0.7, 27.7]). Through a careful experimental setup that curated matched pairs of real and AI-generated images across pose complexity categories, we reveal how these trainings influence people with different levels of digital forensics and generative AI experience and identify the kind of image-based content where this training intervention appears to be most effective. Ultimately, these results provide causal evidence that a brief, structured training can improve human judgment across a diverse array of real and AI-generated images, informing organizational responses to AI-generated visual misinformation.
Michael Soprano, Andrea Cioci, Stefano Mizzarocs.IR cs.AI
Deepfakes are increasingly realistic and easy to produce, raising concerns about the reliability of human judgments in misinformation settings. We study audiovisual deepfake detection by measuring how consistently crowd workers distinguish authentic from manipulated videos and, when they flag a video as manipulated, how accurately they identify the manipulation type (audio-only, video-only, or audio-video) and how consistently they report manipulation timestamps. We run two matched crowdsourcing studies on Prolific using AV-Deepfake1M and the Trusted Media Challenge (TMC) dataset. We sample 48 videos per dataset (96 total) and collect 960 judgments (10 per video). Results show that crowd workers rarely misclassify authentic videos as manipulated, but they miss many manipulations, and agreement remains limited across videos. Aggregating multiple judgments per video stabilizes the authenticity signal, but it cannot recover manipulations that most workers consistently miss. Manipulation type identification is substantially noisier than authenticity detection even when workers detect a manipulation, with joint audio-video cases being particularly hard to recognize. Overall, these findings suggest that crowdsourcing can provide a scalable screening signal for audiovisual authenticity, while reliable modality attribution remains an open challenge.
Understanding how online narratives travel through coalitions is critical for identifying information disorder, yet computational analyses often rely on conservative network constructions that erase initially sparse but salient signals. This paper proposes a novel multi-layer framework that captures low-frequency signals of emerging information disorder allowing for locating where online discourse is reframed and amplified over time. The use case is 14 years of Italian discourse on X regarding the Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine across three pivotal epochs (2010-2024). Utilizing hashtag co-occurrence networks, we introduce a dual-layer approach. We first identify robust core discourse coalitions through conservative community detection, revealing a stable prevention-oriented backbone contrasted with increasingly separable skepticism coalitions. We then introduce a coverage layer and project fringe hashtags into core coalitions based on weighted connectivity. Using a manually labelled set of skeptical and conspiratorial seed tweets, we demonstrate that this core-coverage projection significantly improves the recovery of long-tail, problematic hashtags while preserving an interpretable coalition structure. Our findings characterize the structural maturation of polarized narratives and provide a methodology for mapping how discourse is reframed and amplified by information disorder over time.
Harry Collins, Hartmut Grote, Paul Newbury +2cs.CY cs.AI
This paper is under review in AI and Ethics This study examines whether large language models (LLMs) can reliably answer scientific questions and demonstrates how easily they can be influenced by fringe scientific material. The authors modified custom LLMs to prioritise knowledge in selected fringe papers on the Fine Structure Constant and Gravitational Waves, then compared their responses with those of domain experts and standard LLMs. The altered models produced fluent, convincing answers that contradicted scientific consensus and were difficult for non-experts to detect as misleading. The results show that LLMs are vulnerable to manipulation and cannot replace expert judgment, highlighting risks for public understanding of science and the potential spread of misinformation.