Accurate in space, unreliable in time: how LLMs represent national cultural change

Assessments of cultural alignment have become an important part of the development and improvement of large language models (LLMs). However, the majority of the evaluations treat culture as a single snapshot, investigating only whether a model represents a society accurately at the current time. Research in cultural psychology shows that cultural values change at different rates and directions over time. Therefore, a "culturally aware" model should capture not only where a culture is today but also how it has changed over time. We examine this missing dimension of cultural awareness using more than two decades of the World Values Survey data. We compare the cultural trajectories of 40 countries with the trajectories produced by four state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs on the Inglehart-Welzel cultural map. Our findings show that while models generally place countries close to their most recent surveyed positions, these representations tend to lag several years behind that position. They also capture only part of the magnitude of the observed change, introduce movement where little occurred, and rarely reproduce reversals in countries' trajectories. These findings point to temporal flattening and suggest that snapshot accuracy can give an incomplete picture of cultural awareness in LLMs and have implications for model evaluation, representational harms, and the governance of culturally aware AI systems.

The Price of Thinking: Reasoning Effort as a Model-Specific API Contract

API buyers purchase a dated contract, not a model name alone: the contract includes the requested and served model, reasoning-effort term or its omission, output rail, service product, prompt, and price schedule. We study the reasoning-effort term through a registered paired contrast of Sonnet 5 with explicit high effort against the same model with effort omitted, using 30 AIME 2026 items and five calls per item. Every paid attempt was assigned one frozen terminal category, and inference resampled items while retaining their repeated calls. Mean delivered cost was \$0.01031 per call higher under the explicit-high contract than under the omitted contract [+\$0.00204, +\$0.01974]. The corresponding accuracy contrast was +0.0133 [-0.0267, +0.0467]; we did not detect an accuracy difference, and the interval permits a gain of up to 4.67 percentage points that this design cannot rule out. Cost per correct answer was \$0.08665 under the high-effort contract and \$0.07662 under the omitted contract, as registered point estimates. A dated contract census, Models-API metadata, and preregistered raw-response probes further documented model-specific omission semantics, including within a provider; claims remained at documentation grade when raw structure was indeterminate. The request registry, parser, terminal taxonomy, statistical plan, and analysis pipeline were frozen before outcomes were examined; the resulting claims are bounded to the model, task, and collection date studied.

How Does Thinking Mode Change LLM Moral Judgments? A Controlled Instant-vs-Thinking Comparison Across Five Frontier Models

We evaluate whether enabling provider-exposed reasoning mode changes moral judgments within the same model checkpoint. Across 100 moral-judgment scenarios and five frontier reasoning-trained LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT 5.5, Gemini 3 Flash, DeepSeek V3.1, and Qwen3.5 397B), aggregate binary-verdict agreement remains high and statistically indistinguishable between instant and thinking modes (Krippendorff's alpha = 0.78 vs. 0.79). However, disagreement is concentrated in 21 model-disputed scenarios, where instant-mode agreement is near chance (alpha = 0.08). On these scenarios, reasoning directionally narrows cross-model disagreement, increasing mean pairwise agreement from 5.4 to 6.7 out of 10. Reasoning also reduces demographic-judgment inconsistency in three of five models and does not increase it for any model. Across all five model families, reasoning changes self-labeled ethical frameworks more often than binary verdicts.

Taming the Centaur(s) with LAPITHS: a framework for a theoretically grounded interpretation of AI performances

We introduce a framework called LAPITHS (Language model Analysis through Paradigm grounded Interpretations of Theses about Human likenesS) and use it to show that several major claims advanced by models such as CENTAUR, proposed as an artificial Unified Model of Cognition, are not theoretically or empirically justified. LAPITHS provides a principled reference point for counteracting the current behaviouristic tendency in AI research to interpret the human level performances of transformer based language models as evidence of human like underlying computation and, by extension, as signs of cognitive abilities. The novelty of LAPITHS lies in making explicit the arguments grounded in two quantitative assessments: (i) the Minimal Cognitive Grid, a theoretically motivated method for estimating the cognitive plausibility of artificial systems, and (ii) a behavioural comparison showing that results similar to those reported for CENTAUR like models can be reproduced by other systems that do not satisfy the structural constraints typically associated with cognitive plausibility, and whose outputs do not provide independent explanatory insight into human cognition.