Haining Zheng, Qian Dong, Rodolfo K. Depena +3cs.AI cs.CY cs.MA
As AI systems increasingly exhibit agentic behavior, discussions of autonomy often conflate what systems are technically capable of doing with what they should be permitted to do in practice. This paper introduces a governance framework that explicitly separates Allowed Autonomy Levels (AAL), which define the degree of autonomy an AI agent is authorized to exercise given risk, oversight, and accountability considerations, from Autonomous Capability Levels (ACL), which characterize an agent's inherent technical abilities. We present a structured set of autonomy levels spanning reactive execution, decision support, supervised action, goal-directed autonomy, and delegated operational authority, and describe how control, reversibility, and accountability change as autonomy increases. To operationalize this framework, we propose a risk-aware decision process for assigning allowed autonomy, analyze how risk and accountability evolve across autonomy levels, and demonstrate its application through a deployed enterprise data engineering agent, illustrating how a system assessed at a high capability level can be deliberately constrained to a lower allowed autonomy based on risk, reversibility, and organizational readiness. By distinguishing authorization from capability, this work provides practical guidance for the design, deployment, and governance of Agentic AI systems.
Enterprise strategic decision support requires AI systems that are not only accurate, but also uncertainty-aware, risk-calibrated, explainable, and governance-compliant. This paper proposes TRUST-ESD, a risk-calibrated and governance-aware framework for enterprise decision support under uncertainty. TRUST-ESD evaluates feasible counterfactual strategies through predictive utility estimation, conformal uncertainty calibration, CVaR-based downside-risk scoring, risk-memory retrieval, policy-as-code governance, explainability, and human oversight. Unlike prediction-only methods that select actions by maximum expected utility, TRUST-ESD recommends strategies that balance value, reliability, risk exposure, and compliance. Experimental results show that TRUST-ESD improves risk-adjusted utility by 7.95%, reduces risk exposure by 23.22%, reduces CVaR by 23.78%, lowers calibration error by 13.89%, improves explanation fidelity by 10.90%, and increases governance compliance by 9.76% compared with strong uncertainty-aware baselines, while maintaining competitive predictive accuracy. Ablation and case-study analyses further confirm that uncertainty calibration, downside-risk scoring, risk memory, explainability, and governance validation jointly improve trustworthy enterprise decision-making.
A specialist tolerates blind spots that a generalist does not. Usually this is treated as a cost to be minimized. We treat it as a design variable: a deficiency can be kept because it pays and removed on demand in the rare situation where it would be fatal, by routing to a compensation channel. We give three results. First, an advantage condition under which keeping the deficiency is a computable economic position; structurally it is the Ehrlich-Becker market-vs-self-insurance margin applied to a competence gap, with the detector as a Townsend costly-state-verification technology. Second, a two-sided characterization of removability. A coupling lemma shows that when the deficiency is a coarsening of perception, no switch can separate benefit from harm, yielding a converse (a confounded detector earns zero premium, and any within-defect policy insisting on positive premium is driven, under multiplicative dynamics, to negative long-run growth) and an achievability result (a detector outside the deficiency earns a positive premium). Together, over structured uncertainty classes with severity capped or miss rate O(1/L): a defect is profitably removable iff the detector-relevant distinction survives the restriction and the advantage condition holds; the premium is the support function of the class's ROC set at an economic price vector. Third, observation defects and capacity defects differ exactly on whether access to the deployment distribution rescues them; the gap decomposes as cross-leak plus a closure deficit, and per-task randomization buys back the latter, never the former. The detector can be learned from declared fatal categories at a training bill linear in loss severity (up to a log factor). The results synthesize Chow's reject option, Kelly growth under ruin, and selective prediction.
Joseph R. Simons, David A. Broniatowskics.CY cs.AI cs.HC
AI governance frameworks can be known, used, and implemented in form without becoming governance in practice. This paper examines that problem through a role-based stress test of the NIST Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF) in consumer lending. We treat framework adoption as a governance translation problem: whether RMF language can become role-usable, cross-level, authority-connected governance over the AI system-in-use, rather than producing governance-looking artifacts. The study uses LLM-based role simulation as a structured analytic probe. We apply a 4 $\times$ 2 $\times$ 3 design across four organizational roles, two AI deployments, and three governance hard cases, producing 120 scored responses. Results show that local translation was not the main problem. Simulated actors generally understood their assigned roles and translated the RMF into local activity. The harder problem was whether that activity became governance value. Actor role was strongly associated with Cross-Level Governance Value, Authority Connection, Governance Translatability, and governance value. Deployment was strongly associated with Structural Fit: the RMF fit a bounded ML underwriting model more cleanly than a workflow-embedded LLM underwriting copilot. Risk reduction was harder still. It appeared only when governance value was present and Structural Fit was full, but neither condition was sufficient by itself. The paper contributes a diagnostic account of framework-based AI governance. Frameworks create value when they help organizations see, interpret, escalate, authorize, and correct risk in the AI system-in-use. They also create value when they reveal limits of governability under existing evidence paths, authority structures, and system boundaries.
Organizations deploying AI face two fundamental governance challenges: managing AI risk and sustaining AI value. Both depend on evidence whose sufficiency cannot be taken for granted. We call the shared underlying challenge the AI Evaluability Gap: the condition in which organizations lack sufficient evidence to support high-confidence governance decisions regarding either risk or value. We argue that this gap reflects a category error in current practice. Existing governance approaches focus primarily on properties of systems, such as safety, fairness, reliability, compliance, and value, while paying comparatively little attention to the evidentiary foundations required to justify decisions about those properties. We further argue that AI governance encompasses both operational decisions regarding whether a system may operate and investment decisions regarding whether it merits continued organizational resources. To address this problem, we introduce Evaluability, defined as the capability of a system to generate, maintain, and renew evidence sufficient to support high-confidence governance decisions over time. We formalize governance decisions as functions of calibrated confidence Conf(D|E) and identify six properties of evaluable evidence: observability, attributability, intervenability, verifiability, calibration, and temporal validity. The framework distinguishes Operational Certification, which relies primarily on structural evidence to justify deployment decisions, from Investment Certification, which relies primarily on causal evidence to justify continued resource allocation. We argue that evidence sufficiency is a missing layer of AI governance and that closing the AI Evaluability Gap is a prerequisite for both managing risk and sustaining value in AI-enabled organizations.
Agentic artificial intelligence (AI) systems are transforming the risk landscape by extending beyond information generation to autonomous planning, tool invocation, decision execution, and persistent modification of digital and physical environments. These capabilities introduce novel exposures that do not fit neatly within traditional insurance categories such as cyber, professional liability, product liability, or directors and officers coverage. This paper examines the emerging insurance market for agentic AI and develops a framework for understanding its underwriting, pricing, reinsurance, and product-design implications. We characterize agentic AI as a continuum of autonomy and delegated authority, emphasizing the distinction between informational outputs and systems capable of independently generating insured events through external actions. We analyze major risk pathways, including hallucinations, prompt-injection attacks, autonomous decision errors, model drift, dependency failures, and cyber-physical harms, and evaluate how existing insurance products are adapting to address these exposures. The paper further proposes an actuarial framework based on exposure assessment, scenario analysis, dependency mapping, and accumulation-risk management, drawing parallels to the evolution of cyber insurance. Finally, we present a coordinated insurance architecture that integrates cyber, technology errors and omissions, product liability, performance-warranty, and affirmative AI-liability coverages through explicit allocation mechanisms and dedicated AI aggregates. The analysis suggests that the future of agentic-AI insurance lies not in a single monoline product but in a layered ecosystem of complementary coverages supported by improved governance, transparency, telemetry, and regulatory clarity.