Unaccountable Delegation, Fading Skills: Mapping the Risks of Workplace AI Agents

To anticipate socio-technical risks from AI agents, organizations need taxonomies to classify them. However, existing AI risk taxonomies focus on broad risks and do not capture job-specific risks introduced by agents. To address this gap, we make three main contributions. First, we developed a multi-layer framework from a literature review of AI agents. The framework models three core components and their interactions: agents, goals, and environment. Second, we embedded this framework in a structured prompt and applied it to descriptions of 2,078 job tasks from the O*NET database, producing 8,356 risk scenarios labeled by severity and deployment mode (automation or augmentation). We validated these scenarios with 45 workers across 10 job roles and an independent LLM judge, confirming their plausibility and alignment with job tasks. Finally, we extended an existing taxonomy to create a 15-category taxonomy of workplace AI agent risks that covers all our risk scenarios. Our analysis highlights four findings. First, augmentation is not inherently safe because overreliance on agents can gradually erode workers' skills and oversight. Second, Erroneous Agent Actions accounts for the largest share of risk scenarios and has the highest concentration of severe risks. Many arise at the human-agent boundary. Third, automation is associated mainly with organizational risks, while augmentation is associated mainly with risks to workers. Fourth, workers found our taxonomy easier to use for a risk classification task than two other taxonomies and preferred it in 64% of non-tied comparisons with a recent generative AI risk taxonomy. These findings show that workplace AI agent risks do not arise from agents alone; they also depend on how people work with agents and how agents are deployed. Safer workplaces require not only safer agents but also carefully designed human-AI agent collaboration.

Open Problems in AI Incident Governance

AI systems may produce failures after deployment that pre-deployment safety assessments do not anticipate. Managing these failures requires what we refer to as adequate \textit{AI incident governance}, where having good definitions, taxonomies, monitoring practices, reporting mechanisms, and incident analysis is essential. We examine existing frameworks related to AI incident governance by regulatory bodies and independent efforts, and find that while there are frameworks that describe how individual functions can be performed, there is a lack of consistency within the aspects of definitions, classification, monitoring, and reporting. These inconsistencies apply to the types of incident data that is collected and reported, the ways in which they are categorised, and as a result, the depth, representativeness, and accuracy of analysis that can be performed.

What Types of Human-AI Teams Exist?

Human-AI teaming has received increasing attention in the literature. However, the range of studies conducted in multiple domains make it difficult to understand what types of teams are being studied, and in what ways are they similar/different from one another. In this study, we analyse 53 papers on human-AI teams and categorise them into five main clusters based on psychological taxonomies of teaming; AI Assistant, Ad-hoc Dependency, Ad-hoc Forced Dependency, Paired Equanimity, and Group Equanimity. Each cluster represents a unique combination of holistic team-level characteristics, indicating there are multiple disparate team types studied under the same definition. In turn, this raises the question of whether insights are truly transferable between papers. We conclude with guidance on how to identify the types of human-AI teams studied, a checklist for reporting a human-AI team in research work, and ways in which the field can be further synthesised.

CogTax: A Four-Level Cognitive Taxonomy for Command-Line Computing Education

As computing education expands beyond traditional programming into operational domains such as systems administration and command-line environments, existing pedagogical frameworks struggle to capture a dimension that is critical in these contexts: the real-world consequences of learner actions. Existing cognitive taxonomies classify learning objectives by mental operations but do not account for system impact, leaving a critical gap in command-line education where conceptually simple commands can have severe consequences. This work presents CogTax, a four-level cognitive taxonomy that integrates two dimensions: cognitive complexity, derived from Bloom's Revised Taxonomy, and operational impact, which distinguishes observational, reversible, structural, and administrative operations. The four progressive levels range from safe read-only inspection to advanced system management requiring integration of multiple abstract models. Then, the taxonomy level is defined as the maximum of these dimensions, ensuring that both conceptual understanding and operational awareness are addressed. CogTax gives instructors a principled framework for sequencing course material and calibrating assessment difficulty, and gives students an explicit reference for self-assessment and gap identification. To demonstrate that taxonomy levels are automatically assignable, making the framework scalable without manual expert annotation, a classifier that combines syntactic representations derived from abstract syntax trees with semantic embeddings is trained. Evaluated on 585 expert-annotated Linux/bash commands, this combined approach achieves 89% accuracy, outperforming either representation alone, and demonstrates cross-language extensibility through structural equivalences across command languages.

Self-Explainability in Self-Adaptive and Self-Organising Systems: Status and Research Directions

The growing complexity of self-adaptive and self-organising systems, fuelled by advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), has made them increasingly difficult to understand and trust. While Explainable AI aims to provide insight into AI decision-making, a more advanced goal is for systems to explain themselves - an ability referred to as Self-Explainability (SX). This article presents a systematic literature review on SX, analysing existing approaches, including their domains, targets, and evaluation methods. The review develops a unified definition and taxonomy of SX and introduces Levels of Self-Explainability, providing a framework for positioning current and future research. Our results show that most SX approaches remain conceptual, with few practical implementations. Moreover, there is currently no formal or de facto standard for evaluating SX, highlighting a major research gap. This work thus establishes a foundation and roadmap for advancing Self-Explainability in complex systems.