The rapid development and growing deployment of large language models (LLMs) have made it increasingly important to understand their capabilities. A common approach is to evaluate LLMs using assessment instruments originally designed to measure skills and competencies in humans, such as standardized exams, and to use performance on these instruments as evidence for generalizable claims about LLMs' underlying abilities on the same skills the assessments are intended to measure in humans. However, from a validity perspective, such inferences require that the relationship between observed performance and underlying constructs established for humans also holds for LLMs. In particular, a necessary condition for transferring score interpretations is similarity in the latent structure of responses to the assessment. In this study, we examine whether this condition holds in two educational contexts: high-school chemistry and a quantitative reasoning section of a university entrance exam. Using a case study design, we compare human response data with responses generated by six multimodal LLMs. Our analytical approach combines exploratory factor analysis, factor congruence, and resampling to assess latent structure similarity across human learners and LLMs. Across both instruments, we find systematic differences between human and LLM factor structures, showing evidence that the analyzed assessments may not measure the same constructs for humans and LLMs. These findings call into question the validity of evaluation practices that use educational assessments to make claims about AI capabilities.
An AI benchmark result rarely reaches a consequential claim in one step. Evaluators generalize it to further cases, interpret it as evidence of capability, extrapolate it to new tasks, transport it to another system or site, and combine it with assumptions about human review and downstream consequences. Validity-centred approaches require evidence for each claim. This paper makes explicit and operationalizes a problem those approaches leave to the analyst: warranted links don't automatically make a warranted chain. The target of one study may not be the source of the next; system, population, outcome, or conditions may change at the interface; and shared data or model lineage may make apparently independent support dependent. Projectibility concerns whether a bounded extension from observed to unobserved cases is warranted. Goodman supplies the problem of rival extensions; argument-based validity supplies an architecture for testing them. The contribution is an interface audit for distributed AI evidence: typed source and target descriptions, and a procedure separating endpoints that never meet from endpoints that meet while warrant fails to cross. A legal-research case shows how benchmark evidence and a deployment study can each be sound while remaining parallel. A known-truth demonstration shows why aggregate stability can erase distinctions a later projection requires. The resulting projectibility audit diagnoses unsupported joins in benchmark-to-use arguments.