Large language models (LLMs) are becoming routine instruments of scientific research, assisting with literature synthesis, hypothesis development, coding, and formal reasoning. Their use raises a central epistemic question: when parts of scientific reasoning are delegated to an artificial system, what conditions must remain under human control for the resulting knowledge claims to retain epistemic legitimacy and accountable authorship? This paper develops a normative and conceptual framework for analyzing such delegation. Scientific reasoning is treated as a distributed process in which the origin of a contribution may vary between human and machine, while responsibility for its acceptance into the scientific record remains human. The framework distinguishes content origin $O(g)$, completion of human verification $V(g)$, responsibility assignment $R(g)$, accountable human ownership $M(g)$, and epistemic outcome $E(g)$. These constructs separate the provenance of a claim from the process by which it is checked, the epistemic outcome of that checking, and the human responsibility attached to its disposition. The central proposition is that the ethical boundary of LLM-assisted research is determined primarily by adequate verification and accountable human ownership rather than by the degree of machine involvement itself. On this basis, the paper develops the notion of an \emph{epistemic audit}: a structured record of delegation, verification, provenance, and responsibility intended to make AI-assisted reasoning transparent and reviewable. The resulting framework provides a formal vocabulary for distinguishing responsible cognitive delegation from the transfer or neglect of epistemic responsibility in scientific research.
AI tools that help people judge online claims are usually evaluated while the tool is present. This paper asks a different question: after using such a tool, what can the user still do on their own? I call this epistemic transfer. It refers to the effect of prior AI-assisted verification on later unassisted performance on new claims. In this paper, I make three contributions. First, I distinguish epistemic transfer from nearby outcomes such as correction effects, trust, reliance, and human--AI team performance. Second, I introduce two simple quantities for studying it: the Epistemic Transfer Effect (ETE), which compares delayed unassisted performance across conditions, and Tool-Removal Cost (TRC), which measures the immediate drop in performance when the tool is taken away. Third, I turn these ideas into a practical evaluation protocol that can be used in online experiments or field studies. The protocol combines answer-first and evidence-first AI conditions with active-practice and no-practice controls, delayed tests on held-out claims, behavioral measures, and participant- and item-level analyses. Putting ETE and TRC together yields a diagnostic space that separates capability building, capability plus tool advantage, epistemic inertness or de-skilling, and verification on loan. The point is not that every AI tool must teach. The point is that when independent judgment matters, we should test not only whether a tool helps now, but also what it leaves behind.