Graph Is the Verifier: Agentic Reinforcement Learning for Interprocedural Vulnerability Detection

Real-world vulnerabilities often span multiple functions, yet most learning-based detectors classify each function in isolation: on a sample of real CVEs, we find that 71.7% of vulnerable functions require evidence from outside the function to be classified correctly. Agentic reinforcement learning (RL) could close this gap by enabling a model to gather that evidence itself, but it lacks a reliable reward, since a reward defined on the final verdict alone can be obtained without performing any investigation. We propose VulAgentRL, an agentic RL framework for interprocedural vulnerability detection built on a Code Property Graph (CPG). The CPG serves two roles: at inference time the policy queries it for callers, callees, dataflow, and other queries, and at training time the same graph verifies the evidence the policy cites. Because every CPG node carries a persistent integer identifier, this verification is an exact comparison rather than a textual match, so the reward credits verdicts that are supported by evidence. We further initialize the policy by distilling teacher investigations, and show that this warm start is necessary, since RL cannot acquire tool-use behavior it never samples. Under a repository-level split that prevents leakage, VulAgentRL outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, including frontier models, on the strict pair-wise-correct metric while issuing fewer tool calls, and its advantage persists on an out-of-distribution corpus and under class imbalance.

Multi-Perspective Agentic Program Repair via Code Property Graphs and Temporal Execution Graphs

Large language models (LLMs) have improved automated program repair (APR), but two limitations remain. First, raw execution traces are often too large and repetitive to serve as effective model context. Second, repeated patch sampling may produce different implementations without yielding distinct root-cause hypotheses or repair strategies. We present CT-Repair, an agentic APR framework representing static and dynamic evidence as queryable Code Property Graph (CPG) and Temporal Execution Graph (TEG). CT-Repair applies a three-stage filtering pipeline to construct compact TEGs. Three finite-state-machine-guided agents analyze each bug from static, dynamic, and hybrid perspectives and independently produce evidence-grounded repair strategies. A strategy-guided generation procedure instantiates these strategies as candidate patches and uses validation feedback to refine the most promising strategy. We evaluate CT-Repair on 854 Java bugs from Defects4J v3.0. In the mixed-model configuration, CT-Repair correctly repairs 489 bugs. Under a controlled GPT-5.4-mini configuration, it repairs 388 bugs, 19 and 30 more than ReinFix and RepairAgent, respectively. The union of the three evidence perspectives repairs 99 more bugs than the strongest individual perspective. The filtering pipeline also compacts runtime evidence, with execution filtering narrowing the candidate method scope by 94.85% on average and behavior filtering further reducing retained runtime records by 55.97%. These results show that structured runtime evidence and multi-perspective reasoning can improve repair effectiveness without relying solely on a larger patch-generation budget.

AutoTrace: From Patches to Triggers via Agentic Interprocedural Exploration

Given a vulnerability-fixing commit, trigger localization asks which specific statement turns the vulnerable program state into a concrete unsafe operation. This question is harder than binary vulnerability detection because the answer demands interprocedural, causal reasoning: in a substantial fraction of real-world CVEs the triggering statement lies several call layers outside the patched function, beyond the reach of static rule sets and pattern-matching language models alike. We present AutoTrace, an agentic pipeline that localizes vulnerability triggers by exploring a code property graph layer by layer, with LLM agents deciding where to look next and deterministic admissibility gates deciding what evidence is required before a trigger can be reported. Agents never accept a trigger on their own authority; every reported trigger is backed by explicit evidence drawn from the graph, so the pipeline covers both intra- and interprocedural vulnerabilities without relying on ungrounded model judgment. On the full InterPVD benchmark, AutoTrace reaches 75.0% VulnHit and 80.8% FuncHit, surpassing the prior state of the art on the same corpus. Building on the same machinery, we construct SinkTrace-Bench, a dataset that exposes each vulnerability as a source-to-sink (S2S) causal chain from attacker-controlled input through propagation to the dangerous operation, drawn from matched vulnerable and patched program states. It comprises 1,542 verifier-confirmed, perfectly balanced vulnerable/safe samples whose label fidelity we audit against expert annotations. Benchmarking frontier LLMs on it, we find that even the strongest struggle to separate the matched pairs, exposing the causal-reasoning gap that trigger localization targets. Artifact available at https://github.com/Erroristotle/AutoTrace.