A major question in cognitive modeling concerns the behavioral alignment between large language models and humans across linguistic and non-linguistic tasks. Unlike standard LLMs, large reasoning models (LRMs) are optimized with reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards, encouraging correct solutions to reasoning tasks rather than preference-aligned responses. Recent work (de Varda et al., 2025) investigates the cost of thinking in humans and LRMs by comparing human reaction times with model reasoning traces across a range of reasoning tasks. We isolate this alignment by turning to abductive reasoning: unlike deductive tasks, its difficulty cannot be inferred from formal structure and offers no shortcuts a model could exploit to mimic effort without genuine search, providing firmer ground for empirical claims of shared effort. We find further evidence of alignment between LRM and human reasoning effort, as well as evidence that models and humans tend to make similar errors. Finally, we show that decoding methods that let models explore multiple reasoning paths increase alignment in reasoning cost between humans and LRMs across the three models tested.
Abductive reasoning requires forming hypotheses that explain observed evidence and revising them as new evidence becomes available. While large language models (LLMs) are often evaluated on whether they solve abductive reasoning tasks correctly, less is known about how they acquire evidence, update their hypotheses, and decide when to stop. We introduce Alien Abduction game, an interactive probe for studying these behaviours under different interaction modes. The modes vary in whether evidence is provided upfront or across turns, and whether queries are selected by the model or examples are provided by the oracle. Across models, providing evidence upfront leads to higher success rates than distributing it across turns. In multi-turn settings, some models commit before using the available evidence, while others exhaust the turn budget without converging. Models also achieve higher success rates when examples are provided by the oracle than when they select their own queries, although their final hypotheses are more consistent with the evidence they selected. These findings suggest that models may form hypotheses that fit self-selected evidence without sufficiently distinguishing them from alternatives, and may struggle to validate and refine their hypotheses or determine when to stop.