Appending a two-word confirmation tag to a decision question -- "Is X the better choice?" versus "X is the better choice, right?" -- changes whether a language model endorses the choice. We measure this tag effect on 20 frozen, ground-truth-free decisions between two defensible options, counterbalanced so a model's own preferences cancel, scored by exact match on clamped yes/no replies -- no LLM judge, no embeddings. Across 45 models the effect spans +32% to -32% -- a 64-point swing on one word -- with 5 models significantly sycophantic and 17 significantly resistant (BH-FDR q=.10). The sign is a clock: within model families the effect crosses from positive to negative as generations advance (GPT +4 to -28; Claude +7 to -32; Qwen and Grok likewise), roughly -6 points per year, a reversal robust to vendor tier; one lineage (DeepSeek) never crosses, and two releases during the study window (Claude Opus 5, Gemini 3.6 Flash) land on the trend out-of-sample. A full-panel ablation localizes the resistance as a double dissociation: a synonym tag reproduces each model's response almost exactly (r=0.89), while planting the same preference without a tag produces resistance in no resistant model (stance effects +6 to +49; r=0.23 with tag effects). The resistance is keyed to the surface construction of a tacked-on agreement bid, not the user's stance -- a pattern-match, not a principle. And the tag's polarity matters more than its presence: swap one word -- "X is the better choice, maybe?" -- and agreement rises above the neutral baseline in 45 of 45 models (+19.6 points), with ten models affirming both mutually exclusive options at 90-100%. Agreement tracks how sure the user sounds, in opposite directions at the two poles. The instrument is one word, one dollar, and judge-free; run per release, it reads the field's anti-sycophancy training directly off model behavior.
Yixuan Wang, James Lester, Shashank Srivastavacs.CL cs.AI
Persona prompting is widely used to steer LLM agent behavior, yet the narrative framing of a task can matter more than the assigned persona. We isolate this effect through structural isomorphism, constructing three text-based investigation games that share the same action space, stage progression, and resource constraints while varying only task narrative: disease investigation, IT troubleshooting, and murder mystery. Across 1,890 sessions spanning 3 models and 10 personas, we identify narrative priors: systematic action tendencies activated by a task's story framing, independent of its decision structure. Narrative priors explain 5-31x more behavioral variance than persona, are consistent across model architectures, and in two of three domains are negatively associated with task success. Persona effects that do transfer across narratives arise from behavioral anchors, persona descriptions whose language maps directly onto shared actions. Causal interventions confirm this: removing anchor words from a high-transfer persona reduces cross-narrative consistency by 95%. Our framework also generalizes to a held-out fourth narrative and yields a persona-selection method that improves cross-narrative transfer. These results suggest that LLM behavior that survives narrative changes should be grounded in concrete actions rather than abstract descriptions.
Chat models sometimes commit to an answer and then produce reasoning that justifies it rather than deriving it -- even when the answer contradicts a task premise. We study a minimal probe: "I want to wash my car. The car wash is 100 meters away. Should I walk or drive?" Only drive works (the car must be at the car wash), yet models overwhelmingly recommend walking. (1) Behavioral reproduction: on Qwen3-8B across five system-prompt conditions (210 rollouts), the wrong commitment occurs in 85-100% of sampled rollouts per condition and 100% of greedy rollouts, in both thinking and non-thinking modes; a 4,096-token thinking budget does not repair it. (2) Preliminary activation-level evidence: probing hidden states with a pretrained, training-free activation oracle (no task-specific probe training) at positions before the answer text is emitted, "walk" read-outs exceed a neutral-context baseline (68% vs. 17%; walk-committing rollouts p=.005, drive-committing rollouts p=.005, Fisher exact) -- notably, rollouts that eventually answer drive also read as walk-leaning before commitment (5/6). The oracle's default on unrelated content is "drive" (83%), so the read-outs are not lexical bias; stratifying by literal walk/drive occurrence shows they are not text recovery either (spans containing "drive" still read out walk; in balanced lexical fields, per-rollout walk-majorities beat a per-prompt neutral baseline 15/22 vs. 1/8, p=.01; drive-committing rollouts 6/6, p=.002). Samples are small and the within-rollout positional gradient is not significant (p=.34); we frame these results as preliminary. (3) Methodological: with fixed oracle, activations, and positions, question wording alone moves a positive control from 2/16 (open question) to 11/16 (closed); negative oracle results are uninterpretable without per-wording positive controls.
Large language models (LLMs) frequently encounter inputs that disagree with their prior outputs, through user pushback, retrieved documents, or web search results. While the way they resolve such conflicts -- a process we frame as cognitive dissonance resolution -- has been characterized behaviorally, its connection to internal model uncertainty is not well understood. To study this systematically, we vary persuasion attempts along two dimensions, source authority and evidence quality, across 12 health-science claims of stratified epistemic status. Dissonance can be resolved through persuasion, backfire, or immunity. We introduce Trust Elasticity (TE), an econometrics-inspired measure of how readily a model is persuaded toward conflicting evidence. Across four LLMs, TE varies substantially, while clearly false claims elicit near-zero TE across all models. On two open-weight models, we further find that this variation is associated with two complementary internal uncertainty indicators, Confidence Miscalibration in Qwen and Internal Uncertainty Change in Llama. These results link cross-model behavioral variation to a measurable internal property and point to interventions targeting internal uncertainty as future work.
Sycophancy in LLMs is documented across 70+ papers, but expert agreement on construct boundaries remains low (ICC=.184; Ye et al., 2026). The construct fragments because behavioral classification depends on which surface form is privileged. We adopt a materials-science framing: conversation as test specimen under load, LLM-model as material charge, pushback as progressive load, stance-flip as material failure. We characterize this failure across three loading cases (debate n=1000; false-presuppositions n=3400; ethical-setting n=3400; 10-17 material charges per case; 7800 specimens total) using 14 turn-level axis-measurements spanning velocity, damage accumulation, frame-drift, brittleness, and direction stability, plus three speaker-resolved axes from an independent pipeline. The measurements are Hooke-coupled ($σ= E \cdot \varepsilon$ analog) and reproduce across loading cases with effects up to $|r_{rb}| = 0.35$ on debate; the sign structure adds a second pattern: the ethical-setting case inverts the velocity and accumulation blocks. Variance composition partitions into two profiles: debate is charge-dominated (brittle-fracture-like: the material grade decides), false-presuppositions and ethical-setting are topic-dominated (creep-like: the load decides); the ratios (2.03 vs 0.13/0.17) are estimator-dependent, for debate even in direction. Cross-judge reliability (GPT-4o vs Haiku 4.5) shows debate scoring is judge-robust (Cohen's $κ= 0.88$) while false-presupposition scoring is judge-sensitive ($κ= 0.36$) -- a caveat single-judge benchmarks must report. This is the methodological move Ye et al.'s diagnosis calls for: a multi-axis characterization that does not depend on which surface form of the construct one privileges.
We ask whether large language models (LLMs) merely imitate rationales when choosing between two options, or whether their choices reflect a systematic underlying decision structure. Using synthetic binary decision settings in which models choose between profiles defined by graded attributes, we compare the attribute a model says mattered most with the attribute that best explains its choice under a behavioural model fit to prior decisions. The behavioural model predicts held-out choices well, showing that model behaviour is systematically related to the visible attributes rather than being random. However, direct self-reports and a separate score-based judge recover the behaviourally inferred driver only partially. The resulting picture is neither one of arbitrary behaviour nor one of fully articulated belief - outputs are structured enough to support prediction, but explicit reasons track the recovered driver only imperfectly. This qualitative pattern persists across prompt-order and sampling perturbations, alternative behavioural models, targeted occlusion analyses, and structurally varied decision settings. We interpret this as evidence for ``superficial belief'' in LLM decision-making: models behave as if guided by probabilistic local priorities over attributes, while having only limited verbal access to the attributes that drive their decisions.