Sentiment in social-media threads does not only vary across posts; it shifts as users react to claims, corrections, evidence, and hostility within a branching reply tree. We study why sentiment changes in rumor-centric conversation trees by treating discourse moves (e.g., denial/correction, evidence/link, toxicity/attack) as candidate interventions and asking (i) what sentiment a reply expresses, (ii) whether the sentiment shifts relative to its parent, and (iii) which prior message most plausibly drove the reply's sentiment. To support this setting, we introduce CaSiRe, a causal sentiment reasoning layer over public rumor conversation datasets that adds post-level sentiment labels, induced parent-child shift labels, calibrated multi-label intervention tags, and explicitly annotated causal-source labels. We then propose C$^{3}$T (Counterfactual Causal Conversation Transformer), a thread-structured temporal model that jointly predicts node sentiment and shifts, learns sparse ancestor attribution, and supports counterfactual queries by forcing conversational intervention embeddings on or off to estimate potential outcomes. Under an event-level split, C$^{3}$T improves out-of-event robustness and attribution over text-only, graph-based, and temporal baselines, and yields interpretable model-based effects: denials/corrections and evidence reduce downstream negativity, while toxicity increases it. We also benchmark open-weight LLM prompting baselines and find that added conversational context helps, but attribution remains less reliable, motivating structure-aware counterfactual modeling for social-media analysis.
When a language model answers an interventional question, the computation it must perform depends on the type of evidence the query requires. We report a decoupling in how a transformer organizes causal knowledge: slot-by-type structure induced by type-level supervision organizes routing, yet remains functionally decoupled from answer readout. We establish this with a typed mechanism library -- discrete mechanism slots partitioned by evidence type, auditable at the state level -- on a causal-world benchmark with exact interventional ground truth, under a frozen protocol, at two scales (22.6M and 125M). Four preregistered findings. (i) Origin. Slot-by-type organization is induced by type-level supervision: absent in architecturally identical unsupervised controls, not buyable by content-free gating labels, and statistically attributable to the supervision signal, replicating at 125M under a powered preregistered protocol (all nine cells passed). (ii) Boundary. The induced structure is a typed routing index with a sharp routing/readout boundary: slot codes scaffold routing but do not drive answer readout ($|Δ\hat{y}| \le 3.4\times10^{-6}$, zero collateral, three seeds, stable across a 5.6x scale window) -- we therefore make no behavioral-editability claim. (iii) Cost. The structure is free: LM quality matches a parameter-matched monolith within 0.0082 nats. (iv) Trust. The library state is exactly local under edit and bit-exactly revertible -- 250 single-edit and 1,000 stacked reverts per seed, zero failures. We further find that the unsupervised null itself moves with scale, so comparisons reusing a null calibrated at one scale may be confounded at another. Every claim is tied to a preregistered, machine-checkable criterion archived before the data it governs; the full audit trail, including one criterion we failed and how the frozen protocol handled it, is released as an appendix.
Interventional data is widely regarded as the gold standard for teaching models causal reasoning. We test this assumption in a fully controlled synthetic environment pitting observational correlation against causal effect, and find it fails instructively. In Simpson's-paradox worlds, where the two have systematically opposite signs, increasing the fraction of interventional samples in pretraining does not improve causal direction: the magnitude of the model's do()-response grows monotonically, yet its sign is copied from the observational context. What governs whether interventional evidence is used is not the training mixture but the evidence type present in the context at inference time. Under an identical training recipe, a purely observational context induces systematic sign reversal in 29/50 worlds, a mixed context in 19/50, while aligned interventional probes alone yield 41/50 correct. Erasing observational evidence from the context immediately releases the suppressed causal interpolation ability (ratio_true = +0.56); a four-state content manipulation shows the switch is content-mediated and graded. The suppression is stable across training seeds (11/11 strong reversals persist on a matched-protocol second seed) and robust as a rate at 0.93B parameters (31.8% vs. 6% reversals in the matched probe-only arm), even as absolute gains shrink four-fold. An external audit on CLadder exposes a learned positive-effect prior with a two-layer structure: sign-randomized retraining removes it in-distribution but not out-of-distribution. We summarize: the capability lives in the weights; the switch lives in the context, and activation patching localizes the switch to the middle layers' observational rows. We further quantify the sampling noise floor of probe-based causal evaluation and an evidence-averaging protocol that cuts sign errors from 26% to 9%.
The same diagnostic result can support or challenge one causal claim yet fail to address another when the claims concern different populations, outcomes, estimands, pathways, or identifying assumptions. When the evidence and target vary together, a correct answer may reflect favorable or adverse wording, lexical overlap, or a familiar diagnostic pattern rather than matching the evidence to the causal question. We introduce paired prompts that repeat the same diagnostic evidence verbatim while changing the causal target. Each prompt is labeled Favors, Challenges, Unresolved, or Wrong Target according to how the evidence bears on the causal question. A pair is recovered only when both prompts are classified correctly. Using linear readouts trained on a separate development set, we analyze the final-token hidden state from the penultimate transformer block of Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, Qwen3-8B, and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. On the 49-pair primary benchmark spanning nine diagnostic families, balanced accuracy ranges from 0.654 to 0.659 and 18-21 pairs are recovered. Two independent human reviewers assigned the same label to 95 of the 98 prompts (96.9%). Across checkpoints, balanced accuracy and complete-pair recovery exceed permutation nulls that preserve development scenario groups. In Qwen2.5, full-prompt balanced accuracy exceeds both restricted inputs, with paired-bootstrap intervals for both differences above zero. Readouts trained without development examples from the evaluated diagnostic family recover 21 pairs, including at least one in each of the nine families. The hidden-state readout exceeds a linear classifier on answer-option logits and text baselines in balanced accuracy and recovered pairs. These results show that the hidden state contains linearly decodable information about whether diagnostic evidence favors, challenges, or fails to address the causal target.
Zhimin Hu, Jeroen van Paridon, Gary Lupyancs.CL cs.AI
Generic statements like "tigers are striped" and "cars have radios" communicate information that is, in general, true. However, while the first statement is true in principle, the second is true only statistically. People are exquisitely sensitive to this principled-vs-statistical distinction. It has been argued that this ability to distinguish between something being true by virtue of it being a category member versus being true because of mere statistical regularity, is a general property of people's conceptual machinery and cannot itself be learned. We investigate whether the distinction between principled and statistical properties can be learned from language itself. If so, it raises the possibility that language experience can bootstrap core conceptual distinctions and that it is possible to learn sophisticated causal models directly from language. We find that language models are all sensitive to statistical prevalence, but struggle with representing the principled-vs-statistical distinction controlling for prevalence. Until GPT-4, which succeeds.
Instruction-tuned language models can answer the same causal-reasoning question differently after its English variable names are replaced by type-preserving placeholders, although the structural causal model and the gold answer are unchanged. We ask whether this lexical gap reflects information loss in the placeholder view or a misaligned read-out from a representation that still carries answer-relevant content. Vernier uses a paired-view weight update as an instrument and then inspects the mechanism left after the gap closes. In the working regimes, the evidence favours representational misalignment. A variable-name probe becomes more accurate on the placeholder view, and activation patching on Qwen-7B, Qwen-14B, and Llama-3.1-8B shows that the decision-token representation can transfer answer identity between views. The update that realigns the views is counterfactual augmentation over original and placeholder prompts, while the answer-subspace KL mainly sharpens intermediate answer-belief agreement. Success is bounded by model family, scale, and task. CRASS transfer is reliable across Qwen scales and Llama, e-CARE remains weak, and preliminary non-causal rename tasks show a similar qualitative pattern.
Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has become a standard architectural response to unreliability in legal AI, yet high-profile failures, including fabricated citations submitted to courts and anachronistic legal content presented as current, continue to appear across jurisdictions. We argue that these failures are not residual confabulations to be eliminated by scaling language models, but symptoms of an architectural mismatch between probabilistic retrieval and the hierarchical, temporal, and institutional structure of legal knowledge. We develop the argument in three moves. First, we articulate the ontological commitment of legal knowledge as a triad of properties derivable from classical legal theory: hierarchical and mereological structure, diachronic dynamism under operational closure, and causal traceability of institutional provenance grounded in the duty of justification. Second, we identify three corresponding pathologies of retrieval (mereological blindness, diachronic blindness, and causal opacity), each developed with an operational definition, a failure mechanism, a canonical example, and detection criteria for diagnostic use. Third, we review the state of the art through this lens, showing that existing approaches address these requirements unevenly and do not yet compose into a paradigm that treats them as co-constitutive. From this analysis we derive four architectural commitments that characterize the deterministic-by-design direction for legal retrieval: ontological primacy, event reification, bitemporal correctness, and deterministic interaction protocols. The framework concerns quaestio juris (which norms apply and in what state) rather than the downstream tasks that act on identified norms, and addresses legislative and constitutional retrieval primarily, with interpretive time as an explicit extension.
Large language models reach 50 to 70% accuracy on causal reasoning benchmarks such as CLadder, but it is unclear whether this reflects structural reasoning or lexical pattern matching. We introduce Caliper, a controlled perturbation that replaces semantic variable names with placeholder tokens while preserving the causal graph and probabilistic specification of each question. Across nine instruction-tuned LLMs from 3.8B to 671B and three causal reasoning benchmarks, lexical anonymization yields robust accuracy drops of +7.6, +27.0, and +11.1 pp on a local 3.8B-14B set, rising to +29.6 and +18.0 pp on CRASS and e-CARE across nine frontier models spanning the 2024-2026 generations. Of 40 engaged model-by-benchmark cells, 39 show a positive gap, and the gap collapses by 17x on CLadder's pseudoword subset. Structured scaffolding and few-shot in-context learning each narrow the gap, but mainly by lowering P0 accuracy on smaller models rather than recovering P1. Current instruction-tuned LLMs, evaluated zero-shot, show little evidence of structural causal reasoning once lexical anchors are removed.