Thinking effort aligns between humans and reasoning models in abductive reasoning

A major question in cognitive modeling concerns the behavioral alignment between large language models and humans across linguistic and non-linguistic tasks. Unlike standard LLMs, large reasoning models (LRMs) are optimized with reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards, encouraging correct solutions to reasoning tasks rather than preference-aligned responses. Recent work (de Varda et al., 2025) investigates the cost of thinking in humans and LRMs by comparing human reaction times with model reasoning traces across a range of reasoning tasks. We isolate this alignment by turning to abductive reasoning: unlike deductive tasks, its difficulty cannot be inferred from formal structure and offers no shortcuts a model could exploit to mimic effort without genuine search, providing firmer ground for empirical claims of shared effort. We find further evidence of alignment between LRM and human reasoning effort, as well as evidence that models and humans tend to make similar errors. Finally, we show that decoding methods that let models explore multiple reasoning paths increase alignment in reasoning cost between humans and LRMs across the three models tested.

Interrupting the Loop: Periodic Subject Changes Raise Judged Surprise and Connection in Base Language Models

Where does the novelty a base language model produces with no task come from, and what can an LLM judge of a long stream actually see? We dismantle a cognitively inspired generation loop over 24 conditions on three base models. Most of its effect lives in one operation: a new subject injected every few hundred tokens (an interruption) into a stream whose literal repetition is damped (habituation). We judge windows of generated text only, with the premise as the unit (n=10) and a judge measured for repeatability, against a second judge family and against human readers. Under that protocol the interruption raises judged surprise by 1.2 to 1.4 points and connection by 0.8 over habituation alone. A connective that asks for continuity hurts; a bare paragraph break adds nothing detectable on fresh text; a reset context does at least as well as a kept one; and a pre-registered replication on new premises confirms the primary contrast. Three things the window judge could not see changed the first version of this study, and we think they are of general use. The judge scores the experimenter's injected sentence as the model's own. A fixed rotation of injected sentences makes the model replay its earlier segments from beyond the judge's horizon, and the judge scores the replay as surprise and connection (65-80% of post-interruption windows at periods 150-300). And the local gains do not compose: no arm produces an integrated document. The salience monitor, the in-loop judge, memory across interruptions and a judge-gated Review run with a gate that opens add nothing. On a problem with a verifier (online bin packing), the interruption multiplies valid, distinct candidate heuristics three- to fourfold without raising the quality of the best. We report an evaluation protocol for long generation and a controlled characterization of a simple intervention, not a mechanism of creativity.

Small Foundation Models of Human Cognition and Behaviour

Large language models fine-tuned on human behavioural data have emerged as general-purpose cognitive proxies, but the scale this requires, and whether these models process task structure or exploit statistical shortcuts, remain open questions. We train fourteen models from 135M to 14B parameters across four architecture families on Psych-101, a dataset of 10.7 million trial-level choices from 160 experiments. For in-distribution simulations, scale barely matters. The models fall within a narrow band, as though against a ceiling, and 0.6B to 1B parameters suffice to match a 70B baseline on held-out participants. Out-of-distribution, that band opens into a markedly steeper scaling gradient, with larger models clearly advantaged in generalisation to novel task structure. To determine what information these models use, we run two diagnostics. We progressively strip four prompt channels -- task instructions, experimental stimuli, outcome feedback, and choice history -- across 27 experiments, and permute trial order. Masking the content of stimuli and feedback destroys 75.7% of learned information and pushes models below chance, demonstrating that choice history alone does not account for performance. Permutation reveals invariance on tasks with independent trials but sensitivity where trial order is determined by prior responses. Small cognitively fine-tuned models therefore show promise as noise ceiling estimators for psychological experiments, though their scope remains bounded by the paradigms seen in training.

Learning a Vector-Symbolic Model for Socio-Cultural Tasks

How can we better represent the impact of sociocultural structures on decision making in computational cognitive models? Modeling this impact requires traversing multiple levels of semantic representation, however it is not immediately clear to a modeler which levels of representation are most salient to a given situation. Though large language models and cognitively grounded corpus models can represent broad semantic associations through co-occurences, the role of self representations in memory should be accounted for to determine how cultural associations shape decision making. We propose a declarative memory system to be used in the ACT-R cognitive architecture that represents semantic associations at multiple levels via a vector-symbolic autoencoder. We use a simple HRR operation to encode episodic memories differently from semantic memory vectors extracted from text to produce a final chunk activation for a memory request. We use ACT-R cognitive models of a racially contextualized implicit association test (IAT) to test this new declarative memory system.

Thinking Under Uncertainty: Evidence Use and Information-Seeking in Language Models

Inference-time thinking improves the performance of large language models, but aggregate outcomes do not reveal whether models use available evidence more effectively or seek information that could improve future decisions. We distinguish these responses by measuring action preference, thinking length, and reported confidence under matched uncertainty. Ten open-weight models completed matched horizon-style two-armed bandit trials in thinking and non-thinking modes. A cognitive model separated value-guided action and uncertainty-independent choice noise from two behavioral signatures of exploration: a UCB-like preference for the less-known arm and Thompson-like choice variability that increases with total uncertainty. On average, thinking strengthened value-guided action and reduced uncertainty-independent choice noise, without producing UCB-like exploration or strengthening Thompson-like exploration. Outside action, the information-imbalanced history condition, which also displayed more observations than the matched balanced condition, was associated with greater thinking length. Reported confidence became more sensitive to decision difficulty and more strongly associated with chosen task evidence. We interpret these thinking-length and reported-confidence patterns as consistent with metacognitive control and metacognitive monitoring, respectively, without establishing either process. Decoder sweeps, especially temperature, altered choice noise and thinking length but did not reproduce the joint cross-output pattern. In this controlled decision setting, thinking improved how models acted on current evidence, while neither measured signature supported a shift toward a more information-seeking policy.

Computational models of pragmatic reasoning with flexible generation of meaning and expression alternatives

Pragmatic language use requires reasoning about alternatives: the alternative expressions a speaker might have chosen, or the alternative interpretations a listener might entertain. Formal and computational models of pragmatics must therefore specify the sets of alternatives that interlocutors reason over, which is often done through manual specification. Here we propose a framework, ScAffolded Generative models for Explanation (SAGE), that combines the explanatory transparency of cognitive models with the generative flexibility of language models (LMs). SAGE decomposes a pragmatic process into three kinds of modules: proposers, which use LMs to generate an open-ended space of candidate alternatives; evaluators, which assess those alternatives (e.g., their semantics, complexity, or typicality); and selectors, which implement the rule-based computational steps of a cognitively motivated task analysis. We assess SAGE in three case studies spanning pragmatic generation and interpretation-referential expression generation, manner (M-)implicatures, and Gricean conversational implicatures. SAGE models are evaluated critically using established methods from computational cognitive modeling, including ablations, baseline comparisons, and quantitative fit to human data. Across studies, SAGE models achieved high accuracy and often outperformed baselines, but component-level analyses reveal an asymmetry: LM proposers reliably generated alternatives well-suited to pragmatic modeling, whereas LM evaluators are better at providing intuitive judgements rather than judgements of theoretical or formal measures. We discuss the promise and the limitations of neuro-symbolic models as candidate explanatory accounts of human pragmatic language use.

Comparing Semantic Navigation in Humans and Large Language Models using Natural Language Processing

Semantic memory retrieval can be conceptualized as navigation through conceptual space. We compared semantic search dynamics between humans and three large language models (GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-Pro, Claude-Sonnet-4.5) using verbal fluency data. By applying trajectory-based NLP metrics to the items generated by 82 human participants and LLM output across eight temperature settings, we quantified three complementary dimensions: entropy (step size predictability), distance to next (successive semantic steps), and distance to centroid (global dispersion). Humans exhibited higher entropy, larger semantic steps and broader dispersion than all LLMs, indicating more variable and exploratory search. Temperature tuning produced only partial alignments, as individual metrics matched between humans and LLMs at specific settings, but no configuration reproduced the complete human profile (in all dimensions). These findings suggest that human semantic search implements a distinctive balance between local exploitation and global exploration that current model architectures fail to reproduce.

AI Models Can Predict and Collaboratively Modulate Human Memory Search

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit unprecedented natural language generation and many text-based problem-solving capabilities. Indeed, in many language-based tasks, for example routine coding, these artificial intelligence models have reduced, or even eliminated, the need for human input. But rather than replacing human cognitive effort, LLMs may instead serve as cognitive tools to extend human abilities, particularly when they are engaged in a task requiring open-ended conceptual exploration and creative ideation. However, we are yet to understand how these models may enhance such generative human cognitive abilities in human--AI interactions. In this study, we explore and evaluate the ability of LLMs to follow and enhance human mental trajectories during semantic memory search. To test this, we use the semantic fluency task (SFT), a classic cognitive paradigm requiring generative semantic memory retrieval that has long served to characterize convergent and divergent thinking in humans. We demonstrate that an LLM's abilities to track and predict human memory trajectories in this task exceed those of other humans.

Introducing multiplex semantic networks as multifaceted representations of creative associative knowledge across multilingual samples

Creativity is a complex cognitive ability that relies on knowledge organisation and retrieval from semantic memory. Yet most research uses a single task to measure it, capturing only a fraction of this complexity. This study investigates multiplex networks - layered semantic networks obtained from six cognitive tasks - as a more comprehensive approach to modelling the associative knowledge underlying creativity. We collected data from N=518 individuals from four countries (Austria, USA, Singapore, Italy). From their responses to verbal fluency, sentence-chain, free association, and narrative writing tasks, we constructed semantic networks and assembled them in a multiplex structure. AI persona-based responses provided a comparison baseline. Structural reducibility analyses showed that different task layers captured distinct, non-redundant information about semantic organisation, supporting the use of multiple tasks over any single one. The networks from high- and low-creative groups remained structurally distinct, while AI-generated networks showed near-identical structures regardless of creativity group. Finally, we used 12 features (network measures, emotional scores, and spreading activation simulations) in a machine learning model using ridge regression to predict individual creativity scores. The combination of structurally similar layers, as identified in the previous stage, improved a proof-of-concept prediction accuracy by 50%. Structural measures showed the highest feature importance, with spreading activation dynamics providing additional predictive power. Together, these findings indicate that multiplex semantic networks capture a richer, cross-cultural picture of associative knowledge underlying creativity. We also release our diverse dataset and code to foster diverse computational approaches within the creativity community.

A Dual-Task Paradigm to Investigate Sentence Comprehension Strategies in Language Models

Language models (LMs) behave more like humans when their cognitive resources are restricted, particularly in predicting sentence processing costs such as reading times. However, it remains unclear whether such constraints similarly affect sentence comprehension strategies. Besides, existing methods do not directly target the balance between memory storage and sentence processing, which is central to human working memory. To address this issue, we propose a dual-task paradigm that combines an arithmetic computation task with a sentence comprehension task, such as "The 2 cocktail + blended 3 =..." Our experiments show that under dual-task conditions, GPT-4o, o3-mini, and o4-mini shift toward plausibility-based comprehension, mirroring humans' rational inference. Specifically, these models show a greater accuracy gap between plausible sentences (e.g., "The cocktail was blended by the bartender") and implausible sentences (e.g., "The bartender was blended by the cocktail") in the dual-task condition compared to the single-task conditions. These findings suggest that constraints on the balance between memory and processing resources promote rational inference in LMs. More broadly, they support the view that human-like sentence comprehension fundamentally arises from the allocation of limited cognitive resources.