Human perception of time is subjective. Well-documented temporal illusions show that the brain relies on context and relational cues for judging duration instead of tracking elapsed time directly. Prior studies established these effects with visual and auditory stimuli. Existing LLM evaluations of temporal perception focus on estimating event durations or multi-step temporal reasoning. In this work, we investigate whether written narratives alone can evoke human temporal illusions, using a new benchmark of 6,684 narrative pairs spanning five illusions. We find that human readers (60 participants) prefer expected scenarios in only two of the five illusions, those where the manipulation is directly visible in text rather than requiring readers to internally simulate duration. We evaluate 14 LLMs on the same benchmark. Surprisingly, we find that models pick the literature-predicted scenario across four of the five illusions, diverging from human behavior. Reasoning traces show that ~70% of responses explicitly evoke psychology research, suggesting that this alignment is consistent with retrieval of published findings rather than human-like temporal biases.
Words recur constantly in natural language use, yet it remains unclear whether language models reactivate prior representations or re-evaluate repeated words afresh, and whether post-training changes this default behavior. We apply repetition priming (Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) to 15 models across five model families (1.5B-14B parameters) in two tasks, semantic categorization and cloze completion, with matched human experiments using identical stimuli. We find that base models exhibit automatic processing: they show immediate facilitation that remains stable across lags, partially survives context removal, and correlates with attention to prior occurrences. Instruct models exhibit controlled processing: their facilitation decays with lag, collapses without expected context, and reverses to interference at larger scales. Within the Qwen 2.5 family, this dissociation increases monotonically with model scale, suggesting that post-training progressively alters repetition processing. Humans show a hybrid profile, with lag-sensitive facilitation resembling instruct models but without interference, suggesting that neither model type fully captures human cognition. Our findings reveal a qualitative shift in how language models process repeated information after post-training and provide mechanistic evidence for the divergence between model behaviors.
Chandra Sripada, Richard Lewisq-bio.NC cs.AI cs.CL
LLMs are widely regarded as alien intelligences, systems whose cognitive operations are fundamentally unlike our own. Apparent similarities to human cognition are therefore often seen as the result of anthropomorphic projection. We argue that this framing is mistaken. LLMs clearly differ from humans in important respects, including their physical substrate, learning history, and the environments with which they interact. These differences make it all the more striking that contemporary LLM-based systems converge with human cognition on a number of principles of cognitive organization with longstanding support in cognitive science. We identify structural correspondences across five dimensions: inferential organization, computational architecture, representational structure, prediction-driven learning, and reinforcement-learning-like mechanisms supporting goal-directed action. These correspondences support a broader model of intelligent cognition in which core principles long used to explain human intelligence also characterize contemporary LLM-based systems.
Human adults can often perform a novel task correctly on the first attempt after only receiving verbal or written instructions. This rapid instructed task learning (RITL) is a hallmark of human cognitive flexibility, yet its mechanisms and parallels in artificial systems remain under-explored across disciplines. In this position paper, we argue that humans possess an evolved instruction-following bias -- an inductive bias shaped by evolution to interpret and execute linguistic instructions which critically enables fast generalization of behavior from language. This bias functions analogously to the way large language models (LLMs) leverage instruction tuning to achieve zero-shot task performance. We synthesize evidence from cognitive science, neuroscience, and machine learning research to support this hypothesis. While instruction-following in AI is currently achieved via specialized training protocols, we posit that in humans it arises as an innate cognitive architecture feature. We outline testable predictions and call for more interdisciplinary research to investigate Instruction-Following as a unifying mechanism enabling rapid task learning in both natural and artificial neural networks.
The recent successes of neural networks producing human-like language have caused significant stir in cognitive science, with many researchers arguing that classical puzzles about human cognition and challenges to artificial intelligence are being solved by neural networks. A notable case is the argument from systematicity due to Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn, argues that humans display systematic biconditional dependencies. For example, someone can understand the sentence "John saw Mary" just in case that they understand the sentence "Mary saw John." Symbolic systems explain this systematicity of language and thought, while neural networks offer no immediate explanation. Several recent articles argue that this challenge has now been met by neural networks. In particular, Brenden Lake and Marco Baroni argue that their meta-learning for compositionality protocol matches and perhaps explains human systematicity. We demonstrate that these conclusions are premature. Among other results, we found that their model struggles to learn rules that are even slightly out of distribution compared to their training data. Furthermore, the model behaves unsystematically even on many within-distribution problems. We conclude that Fodor and Pylyshyn's challenge to neural networks remains unmet.