A major question in cognitive modeling concerns the behavioral alignment between large language models and humans across linguistic and non-linguistic tasks. Unlike standard LLMs, large reasoning models (LRMs) are optimized with reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards, encouraging correct solutions to reasoning tasks rather than preference-aligned responses. Recent work (de Varda et al., 2025) investigates the cost of thinking in humans and LRMs by comparing human reaction times with model reasoning traces across a range of reasoning tasks. We isolate this alignment by turning to abductive reasoning: unlike deductive tasks, its difficulty cannot be inferred from formal structure and offers no shortcuts a model could exploit to mimic effort without genuine search, providing firmer ground for empirical claims of shared effort. We find further evidence of alignment between LRM and human reasoning effort, as well as evidence that models and humans tend to make similar errors. Finally, we show that decoding methods that let models explore multiple reasoning paths increase alignment in reasoning cost between humans and LRMs across the three models tested.
LLM-based factuality judges provide scalable evaluation signals, but their metrics are often systematically biased relative to human judgments. We study human-anchored factuality evaluation under limited annotation budgets, where judge predictions on the full dataset are combined with human labels on a small selectively sampled subset to obtain statistically valid estimates. The efficiency of this approach depends critically on which examples receive human annotation: in factuality evaluation, judge-human misalignment is not driven solely by low confidence, but also by structured failure modes such as incomplete evidence, temporal mismatch, unverifiable claims, and rubric misalignment. To exploit this structure, we introduce a factuality-specific annotation policy design pipeline that uses failure-space analysis (FSA) to derive diverse predictive signals for modeling human-judge misalignment. On an internal reference-based factuality evaluation system (AutoFA) and RAGTruth, where judge-predicted estimates substantially underestimate human-annotated factual accuracy, our FSA-guided policy improves annotation efficiency over uniform sampling and uncertainty-driven baselines, achieving effective-sample-size gains of 40.3% on AutoFA and 27.1% on RAGTruth.
Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) has been widely adopted to improve LLM-based evaluation by prompting multiple agents to negotiate and reach a consensus. However, for subjective rubric-based scoring, inter-agent agreement does not guarantee alignment with human judgments. In this paper, we compare a single-judge baseline against a consensus-based MAD protocol on subjective evaluation tasks and design three ablations to isolate the impact of role prompting, multi-round interaction, and explicit score sharing. Evaluations across six LLMs show that the single-judge baseline achieves the strongest human alignment on average across six judge models, whereas MAD shows degradation in human alignment on both tasks. Our ablations demonstrate that this performance drop stems primarily from asymmetric role prompting rather than the interaction itself. Specifically, assigning a strict judge role introduces a systematic downward bias that the consensus process fails to correct. The central finding is that this bias reflects strict-stance dominance beyond averaging: the consensus score falls well beyond the arithmetic midpoint of the standalone strict and lenient conditions, rather than averaging them out. Removing role asymmetry (Symmetric MAD) largely recovers baseline performance, while masking peer scores widens inter-agent disagreement on average and worsens average human alignment. These findings demonstrate that multi-agent consensus can enforce artificial agreement at the expense of true human alignment, revealing a structural limitation in consensus-style, role-specialized MAD protocols for subjective scoring.
Literature reviews are essential to scientific progress, but rigorously evaluating automatically generated reviews remains difficult because many aspects of research utility depend on expert judgment rather than reference-overlap metrics. We introduce LitReview Arena, a battle-style evaluation platform with a structured protocol tailored to literature review quality: domain experts with AI paper-writing experience compare anonymized drafts, are matched to topics within their expertise, and provide dimension-wise outcomes over five literature-review-specific criteria. From this protocol, we collect approximately 3k expert judgments, each containing five dimension-wise outcomes, and show that even the strongest current systems win only 23.0% of decisive matches against human drafts on overall utility, while agentic LLMs such as Sonar Deep Research substantially outperform base language models by over 60%. We further find that existing LLM-as-a-judge methods are substantially misaligned with human experts (Spearman's rho=0.467), especially on synthesis-heavy criteria such as paper structure and research suggestions. Using the collected preference data, we provide an expert-calibrated evaluator, LitJudge, which improves alignment to Spearman's rho=0.78, comparable to inter-expert consistency; code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/VanellopeAsher/LitReview-Arena.
Danica Dillion, Chen Cecilia Liu, Baihui Wang +5cs.CL cs.AI
Are large language models (LLMs) bad at capturing human judgment? Two commonly stated limitations are that LLMs fail to capture full distributions of responses, and that their judgments are unstable across wording variations. We demonstrate simple prompting strategies that mitigate these limitations. Across two datasets--a U.S.-representative set of 144 moral scenarios and 38 moral beliefs from the International Social Survey Programme's Family and Changing Gender Roles module covering 32 countries--we show how simple elicitation techniques help improve AI-human alignment. First, prompting models to report standard deviations and response proportions recovers the full range of human responses better than common strategies. Second, ensuring scenarios are clear to human participants--as reflected in human confusion ratings--boosts model alignment, and LLMs can track human confusion ratings. At the same time, we find that LLMs' estimates of their own error are poorly calibrated, though they can predict human variability relatively well. These results suggest that asking better questions to LLMs can yield better answers.