Reflection, the ability to revisit and revise prior reasoning, is central to how humans improve their answers. Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly prompted to "reflect," yet whether this resembles human revision remains unclear. We introduce the Human-LLM Reflection Framework (HRF), a controlled two-pass protocol comparing human and LLM revision under identical conditions across self-, peer-, and cross-agent settings. Using an information-theoretic analysis based on per-iteration cross-entropy reduction, we find two failure modes of LLM reflection. On objective tasks with finite answer spaces, reflection yields near-zero information gain (Delta I approx 0), behaving as neutral re-generation indistinguishable from re-sampling. On subjective tasks, it yields significant negative gain (Delta I < 0), moving predictions away from the target. Human revision, by contrast, yields positive gain in both settings. Cross-agent experiments localize the failure to the revision step, not input quality: LLMs degrade even high-quality human responses. Diagnostic analyses (revision conditioned on first-pass correctness, and oracle-guided revision against a random-reshuffle baseline) show that which sub-step dominates varies by task and by model rather than reducing to a single mechanism: self-error detection is present on objective multiple-choice tasks but weak on subjective ones, and recovery under an oracle error signal exceeds the baseline for some models and falls below it for others. The unifying account is structural: without external information, self-conditioned revision cannot reduce uncertainty about the target, so LLM reflection is better understood as conditioned re-generation than as genuine error-driven revision.
Large reasoning models (LRMs) take longer on harder problems, just as humans do. This surface similarity hides an opposite pattern within items. When an LRM gets a problem wrong, it spends more tokens than when it gets the same problem right; humans do the reverse, spending less time on the trials they get wrong. We separate two levels of deliberation: how response time tracks difficulty across items (registration), and, with item identity held fixed, whether an agent spends more on its own failures or successes (allocation). On a public matched human-LRM corpus, humans and all five thinking LRMs reproduce the known cross-item alignment (registration) but diverge within items (allocation): every LRM shows a large wrong-vs-right effect (Cohen's d = 1.47-3.13 on H-ARC) while humans show the opposite sign. The comparison stays inside each agent's own scale; we never put seconds and tokens on one axis. The dissociation holds under item fixed effects, replicates across datasets, and is absent in a non-thinking baseline. We read the human pattern as engagement versus abandonment: people stay on items they expect to solve and give up on the rest. We read the LRM pattern as length driven by uncertainty: chains grow when the model is unsure, which is exactly when it tends to fail. Both policies produce the same cross-item correlation with difficulty, so they look aligned on the measure prior work has used; the divergence shows up only once item identity is fixed. Under resource-rational metareasoning, the split is between two stopping policies that share a difficulty signal but implement opposite control; trace length captures the signal and misses the control.
When large language models (LLMs) fail to generalize or make haphazard errors in reasoning, it is often taken as evidence that LLMs are not truly reasoning, but rather performing a kind of pattern matching. The implication is that people's behavior does not exhibit the same types of failures because human reasoning uses principled and abstract world models. We evaluate human participants and 25 LLMs on their ability to engage in common-sense reasoning about a variety of everyday situations and observe similar patterns of errors in both people and models. We then identify the set of attention heads driving LLM responses and find that these heads implement a form of pattern-matching. These attention heads allow us to predict seemingly inexplicable reasoning errors in people caused by ostensibly irrelevant prompt details. Taken together, our results suggest that everyday causal reasoning in people and LLMs is more consistent with a form of pattern-matching than with abstract world models.
Understanding language requires tracking entities across discourse - i.e., knowing where things are and how they change, even when not explicitly stated. Whether language models perform such tracking in a human-like fashion remains unclear, in part because existing evaluations rely on artificial tasks, far removed from natural language comprehension, and lack comparisons to humans. Here, we evaluate entity tracking in both language models and humans (N = 48) using naturalistic narratives at multiple levels of complexity. In humans, we find that entity tracking degrades specifically with narrative complexity, not narrative length. In language models, we find that human-level entity tracking is already present at 410 million parameters - well below the multi-billion parameter, code-specialised models identified by prior work - and improves with scale, with contemporary models far exceeding human performance. Together, these results demonstrate that entity tracking, a core component of language understanding, emerges at model scales far smaller than previously thought.
Paolo Morosi, Nikoleta Pantelidou, Fritz Günther +2cs.CL cs.AI
Humans effortlessly go beyond literal meanings: If you mow the lawn, I will give you fifty dollars, is typically understood as implying that the speaker will pay only if the lawn is mowed, whereas If you are hungry, there is pizza in the oven implies that pizza is available regardless of the hearers hunger. Large Language Models - LLMs - show human-like performance on many tasks, yet it remains unclear whether they reason like humans. To address this, we conducted a population-matching experiment assessing how twentyfive LLMs compute conditional inferences across four languages, compared to an equal number of humans per language. We find that humans enrich logical reasoning through pragmatic inferences across languages. Model behavior is more variable. Some LLMs perfectly follow the truth-table of conditionals but they ignore pragmatic inferences, while others deviate from the truth-table, adhering to a single interpretation across the board, thus reflecting accurate rule-based processing but not human-like reasoning. Overall, LLMs are accurate semantic operators, but fail to capture the pragmatic enrichments characteristic of human reasoning. Crucially, LLM accuracy is neither predicted nor boosted by open vs. closed status, training orientation, or architecture type, suggesting that pragmatic reasoning is still an emerging ability in the cognitive toolkit of artificial systems.