Can a listener recover what a speaker means from the form of an utterance alone? We answer this question information-theoretically, and for a listener given by any featurizer of text, including the hidden states of contemporary large language models. Modeling language use as a joint distribution over meanings, contexts, and utterances, we derive upper bounds on the probability that a decoder recovers a speaker's intended meaning from a representation of the utterance. The bounds are governed by the uncertainty that form leaves about meaning, which splits into an irreducible part and a part that only (extralinguistic) context, but never the utterance alone, can resolve. Because these quantities are intrinsic to language, no representation, however much text or supervision produced it, can surpass them; the bounds hold whether the space of meanings is discrete or continuous. Experiments on artificial languages, Mandarin zero-pronoun resolution, and color reference provide empirical evidence in support of the theory.
As people adopt transformer-based language models (e.g., ChatGPT and Gemini) for an increasing number of use-cases, it is important to know how such models learn and represent the meaning of the language, and to be more informed about what language is. This document is an attempt to help the reader understand how linguistic meaning (i.e., semantics) is approached from different fields of scientific and philosophical examination. I also explain three primary semantic theories: formal semantics, grounded semantics, and distributional semantics then compare how transformer-based language models differ from how humans learn language.
Focus particles such as "even" and "only" are central to formal semantic theories that posit structured representations over sets of alternatives. "Even" highlights unexpected or extreme alternatives, while "only" enforces exclusivity. If such scalar representations are robust and generalizable, they should give rise to consistent judgments across contexts and systems. In this work, we test whether humans and large language models (LLMs) construct stable scalar representations from sentences containing these particles. Using a dataset of approximately 100 items, participants and models were asked to make scalar judgments. Preliminary results suggest that similar outputs across humans and LLMs may arise from different underlying mechanisms.