Beyond Sally-Anne: Evaluating Theory of Mind in LLMs using Epistemic Schelling Points

Text-based evaluations of Theory of Mind (ToM) in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involve cognitive tests akin to the Sally-Anne task that can be gamed due to exposure to relevantly similar tasks in pre-training and do not obviously test models' functional ToM abilities in ways that generalize to naturalistic settings. To address these issues, we introduce the Epistemic Asymmetry Schelling Task (EAST), a two-player dialogue game designed to benchmark robust and generalizable ToM abilities. By requiring LLM-LLM dyads to independently converge on semantic Schelling points under varying states of epistemic transparency, we evaluate whether models can robustly apply ToM to achieve coordination. Our results reveal a significant capability gap in functional social reasoning, with only frontier models successfully navigating the varying epistemic demands of the tasks. Analysis of reasoning traces shows that coordination failures are primarily driven by epistemic tracking errors, such as conflating private knowledge with mutual knowledge. Despite high performance on traditional static benchmarks, our study shows that robust social reasoning and epistemic tracking remain a critical bottleneck, providing concrete targets for future LLM evaluation and development.

Capability Provenance in Language Models: A Case Study in Social Reasoning

We use training-data attribution as an interpretable tool for capability discovery, mapping which regions of the pretraining corpus support social-reasoning versus STEM-reasoning in OLMo3-7B. Training-data attribution measures how strongly each training document influences a model's predictions on a benchmark, but document-level scores are too noisy to identify which corpus regions support which capabilities. We compute gradient-based attribution (TrackStar via Bergson) over a working set drawn from the de-duplicated Dolma3 mix, aggregate influence across WebOrganizer's 24-format x 24-topic taxonomy (576 bins), and contrast benchmark pairs in a 2x2 design that varies domain (social vs. STEM) and capability type (reasoning vs. knowledge): SocialIQA and MMLU Social Sciences against ARC-Challenge and MMLU STEM. Social and STEM reasoning draw on qualitatively distinct corpus regions, and the contrast is sharper at the reasoning level than at the knowledge level. Targeted machine unlearning provides partial causal validation: forgetting high-attribution topics (e.g., Literature for SocialIQA) degrades the aligned benchmark more than within-topic random baselines. We validate on other open-data model, Comma v0.1 7B-2T (Common Pile) and DCLM-Baseline-7B (DataComp-LM): causal selectivity holds on both models, while the provenance map is ecosystem-specific. We open-source all code, data artifacts, influence scores, and checkpoints at https://github.com/eilab-gt/capabilibara and https://huggingface.co/HCAI-Lab.

What Did They Mean? How LLMs Resolve Ambiguous Social Situations across Perspectives and Roles

People increasingly turn to large language models (LLMs) to interpret ambiguous social situations: a delayed text reply, an unusually cold supervisor, a teacher's mixed signals, or a boundary-crossing friend. Yet in many such cases, no stable interpretation can be verified from the available evidence alone. We study how LLMs respond to these situations across four domains: early-stage romantic relationships, teacher--student dynamics, workplace hierarchies, and ambiguous friendships. Across 72 responses from GPT, Claude, and Gemini, only 9 (12.5\%) genuinely preserved uncertainty. The remaining 87.5% produced interpretive closure through recurring pathways including narrative alignment, narrative reversal, normative advice under uncertainty, and hedged language that still supported a single conclusion. We further find that narrator perspective shapes the path to closure: first-person accounts more often elicited alignment, while third-person accounts invited more detached interpretation, even when the underlying situation remained comparable. Together, these findings show that LLMs do not simply assist interpersonal sensemaking; they tend to resolve ambiguity into coherent and actionable narratives. These results suggest that the central risk is not only that LLMs may misinterpret social situations, but that they may make unresolved situations feel prematurely settled. We frame this tendency as a design challenge for uncertainty-preserving social AI.