Amplified Does Not Mean Predictive: Reasoning Behaviors in Thinking Models

Which reasoning behaviors are associated with correct answers in reasoning models, and does reasoning-oriented training amplify those behaviors? This distinction is important because reasoning-oriented training can make traces look more deliberative without amplifying the behaviors most tied to model correctness. We quantify this mismatch with Behavioral Lift, a metric that measures how much correctness changes when a behavior is present versus absent in a model's reasoning trace. Across 15 models and 6 benchmarks spanning text-only and vision-language reasoning, we annotate 15,282 traces with a taxonomy whose core behaviors are defined for both LLM and VLM traces. We find evidence for an Amplification-Lift Gap, in which thinking models strongly amplify self-correction, hypothesis testing, and uncertainty acknowledgment, while the highest-lift behaviors are confidence calibration, knowledge alignment, and self-awareness. Confidence calibration is among the strongest positive signals of correctness in both modalities, yet is barely amplified; uncertainty acknowledgment is amplified by 3--7$\times$, yet is weakly or negatively associated with correctness. We find that reasoning-oriented training does not preferentially amplify the highest-Lift behaviors, motivating process-level objectives that reward calibrated and grounded reasoning rather than surface form alone.

Rethinking On-Policy Self-Distillation for Thinking Models

Self-distillation is a promising recipe for self-improvement in language models. In this setting, a model can serve as its own teacher when given privileged information, such as a solution to a math problem. This seems especially appealing for thinking models, which can use test-time reasoning to absorb the privileged information. Surprisingly, we show that privileged self-distillation degrades thinking models on long reasoning traces: across five Qwen3 and OLMo thinking models evaluated on AIME24, AIME25, and HMMT25, privileged-context distillation causes a relative drop of up to 17% in avg@16 accuracy. The degradation scales with the amount of privileged context withheld from the student and is most pronounced at long rollout budgets, where thinking models otherwise obtain their largest gains. This failure mode is not specific to self-distillation: on-policy distillation (OPD) improves thinking models, but privileged OPD reverses these gains. Our diagnostics link this failure mode to how privileged teacher context reshapes learning at high-entropy forking positions, where multiple continuations remain plausible and may lead to different reasoning paths. Privileged context lowers fork rates in thinking-model rollouts but not in instruction-model rollouts. This leads to an interesting dichotomy, where privileged context can help instruction-tuned models but hurts stronger thinking models. The effect is visible when the student begins a self-correction branch, where privileged OPD penalizes sampled reconsideration tokens that vanilla OPD supports. Thinking models trained with a privileged teacher produce fewer verification, backtracking, and hedging markers, even after length normalization. These findings indicate that self-distillation for strong thinking models requires attention to token-level signal, especially around correction and reasoning steps.