This paper offers a toy framework for considering curiosity as an ecosystem. First, it suggests that a single agent's inquiry policy (how, when, and why an agent asks a question) depends on how the agent values immediate uncertainty reduction, costs, delayed return, and the value of keeping the question open. A key concept in the framework is that the weights on these decision-related terms can change with experience. For example, a period of cheap, quickly answered questions may change the cost of inquiry on a short timescale and change which kinds of questions the agent is drawn to answer over a longer timescale. Second, these ideas are extended to many agents exploring a shared knowledge landscape, and there the framework tracks inquiry volume, topic diversity, frontier-directed inquiry, redundancy, and reusable knowledge. The result is a conceptual toy framework for studying curiosity ecology and for future efforts towards designing multi-agent AI systems for discovery. It serves as a companion piece for a paper currently under review in Trends in Neurosciences.
A mesh of sovereign agents has no center: no shared clock, no shared model, and no coordinator to gather data or retrain. Its competence rests on each agent folding the projections its peers emit into a single internal state, online, from observations that arrive at irregular, unscheduled times, on a substrate whose weights it cannot retrain. Any one of these constraints is tractable on its own; folding optimally under all three at once is not. We ask what such a substrate must be, and prove two necessary conditions from one model of a self-evolving latent observed at irregular, exogenous times. Because the latent changes, its optimal estimator is time-varying: an adaptive timescale is necessary, and every fixed-gain filter is strictly suboptimal. And because arrivals are clock-free, the optimal estimate depends on the elapsed gap between them, which no gap-blind network recovers at any width or depth. This second condition is capacity-independent: scale cannot substitute for the missing dependence. The two conditions intersect in the continuous-time liquid class. An LSTM satisfies the first, a fixed continuous-time filter the second, and a multi-timescale liquid network both. Synthetic experiments confirm each: the network attains the timescale, and the separation is computed exactly. The characterization is necessary, not sufficient, and binds fixed-weight substrates: a network free to retrain reaches the class by other means. Proved per agent, the necessity binds every agent of a mesh, a structural condition on mesh intelligence.
This paper develops a multiscale model of coalition formation in which strategic exit-and-join decisions are coupled with tactical consensus dynamics inside coalitions. Coalition value is generated endogenously from within-coalition information aggregation, while Aumann-Dreze payoffs, switching frictions, and acceptance rules govern strategic reconfiguration. The framework introduces a fast-slow architecture in which transferable coalition value emerges from DeGroot-style consensus processes, while coalition structures evolve through incentive-driven exit-and-join dynamics. The analysis characterizes joint tactical-strategic equilibria, conditions for tactical and strategic unanimity, segregation, polarization, and cognitive barriers that sustain stable coalition structures. A fixed-point characterization and existence results are established for the coupled dynamics. Numerical experiments reveal an instability-consensus paradox: low or negative switching barriers may prevent strategic convergence while simultaneously promoting temporal mixing sufficient to achieve global tactical consensus. The results provide a unified perspective on coalition formation, consensus dynamics, information aggregation, and strategic stability in multi-agent systems.
This paper develops a general framework for analyzing multi-agent systems with feedback loops between agents actions and collective observations. The framework is built on two fundamental agent-level variables: power, which measures agent influence on collective outcomes, and response functions, which determine how agents react to observations. We derive how macroscopic properties, including total power, useful power, entropy, order, fragility, and mobility, emerge from these two variables of heterogeneous agents. To study the trade off between growth and resilience, we introduce a system-level utility function parameterized by a risk-appetite coefficient and derive an optimal degree of order that balances productivity, stability, and adaptability. The analysis suggests that stronger synchronization can increase collective output but may also increase systemic fragility and reduce mobility. We further argue that order, entropy, information, and useful energy are task-dependent and system-relative concepts whose meanings depend on the objectives of the system. By measuring and designing agent power distributions and response functions, it may be possible to better understand, predict, and optimize collective behavior and identify the conditions under which collective intelligence and optimal order emerge.