The Shared Discovery Paradox: How a One-Answer Rule Turns Better Information into Worse Search

Organizations often pool dispersed information into one ranking and then allow many agents to act on that shared view. In a discovery problem, this can improve beliefs while reducing coverage. We develop an exactly solvable benchmark with sixteen boxes, one target, eight searchers, and noisy private clues. Pooling raises the accuracy of the best single recommendation from 0.20 to 0.3835, but repeating that recommendation lowers group discovery from 0.8322 under decentralized clue-following to 0.3835. A coordinated eight-action portfolio using the same pooled reports reaches 0.8594, and seven coordinated actions recover the decentralized benchmark. The paradox is a protocol failure, not an information failure: a one-answer rule compresses a portfolio of available actions into one repeated choice. We then replace the planner with self-interested searchers who split a prize. The equal-split game is a potential game. Its anonymous symmetric equilibrium obeys a water-filling rule. In the canonical instance it achieves 0.5991: strictly above consensus, but below both private search and the planner. The exact mixed price of anarchy is 2 - 1/N. A sole-rescue reward, which pays only an agent who covers the target alone, makes every pure Nash equilibrium first-best. Finally, a latent common-cue model shows how correlated reports collapse effective discovery channels. The centralized planner gain rises strictly with copying, and in the canonical environment the symmetric market overtakes decentralized report-following at copying probability c = 0.788462. In a proportional large-market limit the five-protocol ordering survives exactly: consensus discovery vanishes while blind, market, private, and portfolio search converge to 0.500, 0.547, 0.847, and 0.874. The contribution is a compact benchmark that separates information, allocation, incentives, and dependence into exact, reusable quantities.

Geometry-Aware MCTS for Extremal Problems in Combinatorial Geometry

We study certain extremal problems in combinatorial geometry that ask about configurations of points in an $n \times n$ grid that satisfy strict, global geometric constraints. Classical exact solvers suffer from combinatorial explosion for these types of problems, and standard reinforcement learning and transformer-based models struggle with the sparse reward "validity cliff" and quadratic token-consumption limits. To overcome these bottlenecks, we propose a Geometry-Aware Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) framework. Our approach strictly enforces geometric constraints through incremental updates to the feasible action space. For constraints about collections of collinear points, like those that occur in the classic No-Three-in-Line problem (Max-N3IL), this mechanism reduces the constraint checking complexity from $O(n^3)$ to $O(n^2)$. To improve search efficiency, we exploit geometric symmetries in two ways: canonical pruning during node expansion to reduce the branching factor, and symmetric batch transitions to accelerate the discovery of promising configurations. We perform extensive experiments and establish new best-known computational results on five out of six of the problems that we considered. Notably, for Max-N3IL we find configurations of size roughly $1.8 n$ for grids of size $82 \le n \le 119$. For the Smallest Complete Set problem, we find configurations of size roughly $0.95 n$, providing new upper bounds within the tested grids. This work establishes Geometry-Aware MCTS as a highly adaptable framework for discovering novel configurations in combinatorial geometry.

Matilda: Engine-Agnostic Search with Human Policy Guidance

Chess engines have evolved from search-based systems optimized for strength to neural policies optimized for predicting human decisions. Existing approaches largely separate these goals: search engines achieve superhuman strength but poorly model humans, while models such as Maia-3 capture rating-conditioned behavior yet degrade at elite levels. We present Matilda, a modular residual re-ranking architecture that decouples behavioral priors from tactical search, combining a frozen human policy with an engine-agnostic search backend through a lightweight residual model. Matilda learns residual corrections over the full legal-move distribution from frozen policy context, time control, player-style embeddings, and search-derived candidate features. A zero-initialized residual head exactly recovers the frozen policy before training while optimization minimizes negative log-likelihood (NLL). Instantiated with Maia-3 and Stockfish, Matilda reduces human-move prediction NLL by 18.5% and raises top-1 accuracy from 60.1% to 66.1% on temporally held-out verified-human 3000+ Elo Lichess blitz games, with player-style embeddings contributing a further 1.8% and +0.2 percentage points (pp) respectively. Seed-paired ablations attribute these gains to search rather than additional data; the findings are replicated in Go -- decomposing expert play into recognition and verified calculation. Below 2500 Elo, where search annotations are unavailable, Matilda preserves Maia-3's performance.