Belief update concerns changes in an agent's beliefs induced by changes in the underlying world. Standard Katsuno-Mendelzon update assumes that an epistemic input can be incorporated from every initially possible world, whereas credibility-limited belief update restricts, for each source world, the successor worlds regarded as credible or reachable. Nevertheless, existing credibility-limited approaches treat the epistemic input as an indivisible whole, and therefore cannot represent cases in which only part of a compound epistemic input can be realized. We introduce selective credibility-limited belief update, in which the epistemic input is transformed, relative to each source world, into a weaker proxy before the credibility-limited transition is performed. We provide semantic and axiomatic characterizations of the resulting class of update operators. We then identify two well-behaved sub-classes; namely, consistency-preserving update operators, which require every transformed epistemic input to be credible from its source world whenever the original epistemic input is consistent, and maximal consistency-preserving update operators, which additionally require the selected proxy to be maximally informative among the credible consequences of the original epistemic input. Finally, we establish the generality of the proposed framework by showing that credibility-limited belief update is recovered as a special case, while Katsuno--Mendelzon belief update emerges when credibility restrictions are removed and the transformation functions are taken to be identities. These results demonstrate that the framework provides a unified and strictly more expressive account of belief update, encompassing established approaches while supporting source-dependent selective acceptance.
In his 1996 doctoral thesis, Maurice Pagnucco created the first AGM-like abductive expansion operation. Taking his operation as a basis, as well as a taxonomy -- inspired by Atocha Aliseda -- responsible for highlighting and formalizing the main components of abductive reasoning, the main aim of this paper is to present a new paraconsistent AGM-like abductive expansion operation -- capable of assimilating contradictory explanatory hypotheses without trivialization and the consequent absurd epistemic state -- with its postulates and its transitively relational partial meet construction. To a large extent, the formal development presented in this paper was only made possible by the recent creation of the paraconsistent logic RCbr, an LFI (Logics of Formal Inconsistencies) that establishes properties especially relevant to belief revision contexts, in particular, the ability to be self-extensional -- i.e., to satisfy the replacement property. This is the first of two papers: the paraconsistent abductive expansion operation announced here -- which is part of a new system called AGMpabd -- despite bringing many interesting features, does not assign any relevant epistemic role to the paraconsistent operators of negation and consistency. Only in a second paper will an analogous paraconsistent abductive expansion operation -- which is part of another new system, AGMcircabd -- be enhanced in this direction. Nevertheless, to the best of my knowledge, the operation developed in this paper is the first of its kind in the AGM literature.
Belief revision is a process in which an agent begins to believe in something she previously did not. I begin the paper by presenting, based on (Gärdenfors, 1998; Hansson, 1999), postulates for belief revision that constitute the basis of the AGM theory. I will then briefly show the semantics of a modal logic introduced in (van Ditmarsch, 2005), which I call `$P$'. This logic formalizes static epistemic states and has greater expressive power than AGM in doing so because it captures the quantitative notion of "degrees of conviction". The third step is to introduce revision operators on $P$ and, mostly following (van Ditmarsch, 2005), obtain the Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) I call `$P*$'. It models processes of belief revision in several ways. Original results are presented in the following two sections. The first one of these sections revolves around a formalization of AGM postulates within $P*$ by proving some theorems related to the satisfaction of those postulates by revisions defined in $P*$. The last section features an analysis of $P*$'s revisions that go beyond the mere satisfaction of postulates. I compare their formal behavior with respect to some philosophical criteria. At last, I conclude that the functions presented in (van Ditmarsch, 2005) are not good formalizations of the philosophical intuition behind AGM. Instead, it is captured by the function $*^0$ originally defined in this paper (but highly inspired by (van Benthem, 2007)). An implementation of this function is also provided.
We propose ZX-Calculus (Knowledge Evolution Calculus), a conservative extension of Martin-Lof Dependent Type Theory (MLTT) integrating trace-indexed types, presheaf non-monotone semantics, and constructive AGM belief revision. A Coq mechanisation accompanies the paper (34 complete proofs; zero admits for the two central results). (I) Trace types. FinTrace(s0,sn) is an inductive family of typed execution traces. FinTrace and Star(Step) are isomorphic as path types but not judgementally equal; TraceElim exposes the event label e:Event explicitly, giving a more ergonomic interface for event-driven induction. We prove the Trace-Reachability Correspondence, Deterministic Replay, and a canonicity framework via reducibility candidates with a Transport Lemma (RC-elim deferred; all other Core results are Coq-verified). (II) Sheaf semantics. Trace-indexed propositions are contravariant sheaves over the free trace partial-order category Tf. A Separation Theorem (explicit countermodel) distinguishes proof-theoretic monotonicity from semantic non-monotonicity. The term model is an initial CwF (syntactic universal property, not classical completeness). (III) AGM belief revision. We give an explicit constructive partial meet contraction algorithm verified against (C1)-(C4). All eight AGM postulates (R1)-(R8) are theorems. Proofs of R7 and R8 use the Disjunctive Entrenchment Lemma, given a self-contained constructive derivation. (IV) Integration. B^AGM fails the sheaf composition law BP-comp for sequential revision (explicit countermodel, Coq-verified). We introduce Single-Step Revision Systems (SSRS), prove B^AGM is a valid SSRS (Coq-verified), and show this suffices for trace morphisms, retraction characterisation, and revision witnesses. The BP-comp failure reveals a fundamental tension between path-dependent belief revision and functor consistency, not previously identified.
We investigate the belief revision problem in epistemic planning, i.e., what will be the beliefs of all agents in a multi-agent system after an agent gains the belief in some state property. Based on the standard representation in epistemic planning of agents' beliefs via a single multi-agent Kripke model, we generalize the classical AGM belief revision postulates to the multi-agent setting, with the aim to provide a formal framework for evaluating dynamic epistemic reasoning frameworks in which the beliefs of all agents as the result of actions are computed. As an example of a simple operator that satisfies all of the generalized AGM postulates, we present generalized full-meet multi-agent belief revision. We moreover define a generalization of the standard postulates for iterated revision, present a more sophisticated, event model based revision operator, and discuss the potential issues in defining an epistemic operator on Kripke models that can satisfy all of the generalized postulates for iterated multi-agent belief revision.