Defeasible reasoning is a type of reasoning where inferences are drawn from plausible current evidence, but can be retracted upon the introduction of newer evidence. Although recent studies have examined language-model behaviors in defeasible reasoning, the datasets have been static and lack wide coverage of non-monotonic reasoning categories. We introduce DeReLab, a generative framework that produces multi-turn belief-updating conversations from parameterized graph structures across default and inheritance reasoning, with formally verified ground truth at every turn, enabling controlled measurement of how models respond to confirming and disconfirming evidence. This controlled generation process creates a testbed for experimental designs that isolate specific reasoning demands. Applying this capability to the study of confirmation bias, we evaluate nine open and proprietary large language models and find that nearly all exhibit a systematic tendency to accept congruent evidence while resisting incongruent updates, with several models correctly identifying a weakening update yet failing to revise their conclusion. We believe our work and findings will facilitate future research on evaluating language models in defeasible reasoning.
Ankur Samanta, Akshayaa Magesh, Tal Lancewicki +7cs.AI
Large language models (LLMs) are typically deployed in multi-turn conversations, where each turn provides new evidence that should reduce epistemic uncertainty about their environment. Acting rationally then requires inferring the unobserved quantities that govern it and updating beliefs about them as evidence accumulates. Yet most evaluations only score the model's final-turn answer in a single-turn format, leaving this process unexamined. We ask how closely LLMs' belief updates match those of a rational Bayesian reasoner in multi-turn settings, and introduce BayesBench, a suite of simulation environments that probe this across three progressively complex tasks: (i) Bayesian estimation, where the model infers an unknown parameter from sequential evidence; (ii) Bayesian prediction, where the model turns inferred beliefs about a latent variable into outcome forecasts; and (iii) latent-framed Bayesian prediction, where observations are filtered through a user-persona framing, requiring joint inference over the latent state and the persona. Across seven LLMs (3B--70B), scaling improves latent inference and evidence accumulation, with updates occasionally matching the Bayesian posterior. However, these gains do not reliably carry over to downstream prediction, exposing a gap between inferring latent structure and using it to rationally update beliefs about the target outcome.