Can scientific abduction occur without continuous sensorimotor embodiment? Recent arguments in AI and philosophy of science hold that genuine hypothesis generation requires an agent continuously coupled to the physical world. We defend a narrower claim: online embodiment is not necessary for every abductive scientific act. Our focus is identity abduction: the inference that two independently developed structures are one object under an explicit correspondence, reached through representational grounding rather than bodily interaction. An agent may acquire new inferential affordances not through physical interaction but through transformations into representations that expose latent invariants. Scientific diagrams are a practical substrate because they embody independently evolved conventions that partially canonicalize symmetry, topology, and operator structure across disciplines - a property we develop as convention space, which answers a hard retrieval problem: finding mathematically related work when two fields share no discriminating vocabulary. We operationalize the mechanism as an architecture, the Abduction Loop: representation generation, motif extraction, convention-space canonicalization, cross-domain retrieval, identity-hypothesis generation, and adversarial verification, with abstention as the designed default. A documented episode, in which a multimodal model given a figure of a gravitational-memory transport model generated and then verified the hypothesis that its central differential complex is equivalent to the spherical Kaiser-Squires mass-mapping complex of weak-lensing cosmology, serves as a motivating possibility witness from which the architecture is abstracted, not as evidence of general capability. We close with a falsifiable evaluation program, the DAB-30 benchmark. The contribution is a mechanistic proposal, an architecture, and a test program.
Modern artificial intelligence excels at prediction but cannot explain. From large language models to AI-for-science systems, today's machines answer what by recombining patterns already present in the human literature, yet they cannot reason out why a phenomenon must arise from underlying principles even though explanation, not prediction, lies at the heart of scientific discovery. Here we ask whether the structure of scientific explanation can be operationalized to guide how a machine generates hypotheses. We introduce DN-Hypo-Pipeline, a hypothesis-generation framework that adopts a layered, explanation-theoretic scaffold: Hempel's deductive-nomological (DN) model supplies the output form and deductive validity of a hypothesis, Salmon's causal-process account supplies an organizing constraint on where to search for the governing laws, and Armstrong's view of laws as relations between universals supplies the bridge from a phenomenon's constituent processes to the laws that may be associated with it. Rather than searching the space of what has been written, the framework searches the space of what principles govern a phenomenon: given an explanandum, it abstracts the universals instantiated in the phenomenon's formation process, retrieves the laws relating those universals, and deductively reconstructs a new, testable explanation. Evaluated in data-science modeling and judged by both LLMs and human experts, hypotheses generated through this principled reasoning significantly outperform those from direct prompting. Crucially, we translated the two highest-scoring hypotheses into novel algorithms one that reduces the Transformer's theoretical complexity with only minimal performance loss, and another that achieves competitive accuracy with substantially fewer parameters.