Self-refinement often fails to strengthen few-shot inductive reasoning in large language models. Prompting a model to explicitly state its inferred rule does little on its own. What actually matters is a structurally enforced isolation between reasoning stages, so that information can only pass between them as a compressed symbolic state. We introduce \textbf{Hourglass reasoning}, which enforces strict context isolation between reasoning stages. The frozen LLM acts as a meta-constructor, building for each task a symbolic encoder--decoder: an Induction module compresses the support examples into a schema $φ$ (encoder) and a transient scaffold $z$; a Deduction module derives rule $T$ (decoder) from these and discards $z$; an Implementer compiles $(φ, T)$ into artifacts; an error-driven Refiner revises $(φ, T)$ and regenerates artifacts from scratch. Only $(φ, T)$ crosses stage boundaries, so all refinement stays anchored to the rule. We evaluate Hourglass across three benchmarks spanning visual abstraction, hardware synthesis, and textual rule induction, using GPT-5.5 and Gemini 3.1 Pro. On ARC-AGI-2, it raises best-of-5 accuracy by up to 14 points over an iterative-refinement baseline. On ChipBench, it nearly doubles Verilog synthesis accuracy with GPT-5.5, from 31\% to 58\%. BBEH-Linguini draws on puzzles from the International Linguistics Olympiad, a setting where prior work has shown that explicit verbalization can hurt performance. Hourglass mitigates this tendency, and on Gemini 3.1 Pro, it reverses the effect entirely. Ablations confirm that these gains come from the isolation between stages and the quality of the initial induction, not from prompt wording or the particular symbolic form used. It is how information flows through the reasoning process, rather than the language used to express it, that drives inductive reasoning in frozen LLMs.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in scientific tasks. Yet whether these systems can effectively engage in forms of inductive reasoning relevant to scientific discovery remains an open question. In this work, we introduce FALSIFYBENCH, an evaluation framework for hypothesis-driven reasoning inspired by the classic Wason 2-4-6 task, in which agents must discover hidden semantic properties by iteratively proposing examples and receiving feedback. This task captures key elements of scientific reasoning: hypothesis generation, evidence gathering, and belief revision in response to both confirming and disconfirming evidence. Our evaluation of 12 LLMs across model families and scales shows that reasoning models are generally stronger scientific reasoners than instruction-tuned models, although no model comes close to optimal performance. The primary driver of success is the capacity for negative testing: models that actively seek to falsify their hypotheses consistently outperform those that primarily seek confirmation. Moreover, a fine-grained turn-level analysis, neglected in previous work, reveals that failure is tied to identifiable patterns in how models navigate the hypothesis space.