Abstention as an Action Can Kill Both the Reward Gradient and the KL Anchor: Collapse Law and Repair for Error-Penalized Reinforcement Learning

Error-penalized scoring rules ($+1$ for a correct answer, $-λ$ for a wrong one, $0$ for abstaining) are increasingly prescribed against hallucination: a rational agent facing such a rule answers exactly when its correctness probability exceeds Chow's threshold $t^\ast=λ/(1+λ)$. We prove that a KL-anchored gradient learner can do the opposite. When abstention is a discrete action, the reward gradient and the anchor's restoring force are throttled by the same gate-saturation factor and die together: under explicit conditions (among them, blanket answering loses score in expectation and prompts share a bounded readout) the model drifts toward refusing everything, its mean training reward rising to zero like $1/t$ in training time $t$, so the curve reads as improvement while coverage collapses. The advantage estimator compounds the failure: in its sparse-answer regime, group normalization silently replaces every designed penalty with an effective penalty of one, moving the learned threshold from $t^\ast$ to $1/2$. The repair is structural: train a mandatory confidence report with a strictly proper score plus a correctness reward, and abstain only at deployment by thresholding the report. The always-emitted report has no gate to saturate, so no shared factor can kill its reward gradient and its anchor together, and its calibrated optimum is attracting. Simulations confirm every prediction, and experiments on language models at two scales confirm the mechanism live: the rule silences questions the models demonstrably still solve within ten optimizer steps, an ablation isolates the cause, and report-level training raises coverage, accuracy, and calibration together.

Bayesian Best-Arm Identification with Abstention: A Polynomial-to-Exponential Phase Transition

We study the Bayesian fixed-budget best-arm identification problem in which a learner can abstain from making a terminal recommendation. Subject to an abstention budget $α$, we analyze the probability of undetected error--the risk of recommending a suboptimal arm without abstaining. Our central finding is that abstention induces a phase transition: without abstention, the error probability decays polynomially in the sampling budget $T$; in contrast, introducing any small positive abstention budget shifts this to an exponential decay. For Gaussian priors and rewards, in the regime $T\to\infty$ followed by $α\downarrow0$, we establish exact matching information-theoretic lower bounds and algorithmic upper bounds on the optimal error exponent, which takes the form $\exp(-\frac{α^{2}T}{8κ_ν^{2}})$. The hardness parameter $κ_ν$ represents the prior density of the top-two gap at zero, highlighting that nearly tied instances drive the fundamental error. We introduce an adaptive algorithm, PGWS, that successfully achieves this optimal exponent by expending its abstention budget on statistically ambiguous instances. We further demonstrate that this polynomial-to-exponential improvement is exclusively a Bayesian phenomenon--in the frequentist setting, abstention only affects lower-order exponent terms. We also extend our results beyond the Gaussian model.