Active inference selects actions by minimising an expected free energy functional over predicted futures. However, adding an expectation over yet-unobserved outcomes means the free energy functional no longer has a Kullback-Leibler structure, which hinders message passing treatments of inference procedures. We propose an alternative formulation based on a Bethe free energy functional, fully supporting inference by message passing. The epistemic drive is maintained by imposing an information constraint, next to normalisation, marginalisation and form constraints, insisting that the mutual information between future observations, states and parameters given actions must be at least as large as the entropy of the goal prior. For a specific value of the corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker multiplier, the stationary point of this constrained Bethe Lagrangian recovers the expected free energy solution. We show that, as the information demand is varied, the solved multiplier moves through its inactive, interior, and saturated regimes. In the inactive regime the agent's epistemic drive switches off entirely, while in the saturated regime it is maximal. We compare the performance of the constrained Bethe agent on three tasks against EFE and Q-MDP.
St John Grimbly, Nicolas Kuske, Evert A. Boonstra +7cs.AI
Biological systems must regulate competing needs under limited perceptual bandwidth, where sharpening one estimate costs the capacity to sharpen the others. Any fixed-budget system therefore has to decide where to allocate its perceptual precision. We study this in a foraging agent that must keep several bodily needs satisfied to survive, modelled with active inference. At each step it reads its own body-state beliefs, identifies the most-needed channel, and reallocates a fixed budget of interoceptive precision toward it, so that the same precision-shaped likelihood feeds both belief update and planning. In AffectWorld, a four-channel foraging gridworld, this selective allocation more than doubles learning-phase survival at matched budget against a uniform-precision agent ($0.414$ vs $0.199$ across 11 layouts, $n{=}32$ seeds each, paired cluster-bootstrap $p \leq 10^{-4}$). Two further results sharpen the mechanism. The benefit runs through planning as well as perception, since denying the shaped likelihood to the planner alone removes about half of it. It is also need-aligned, since aiming precision at the least-needed channel does worse than spreading it evenly. The attended channel additionally learns its own dynamics about twice as fast, and stays ahead even at matched observation count, a behavioural trace of the same precision routing, visible in learning speed, not survival.
In noisy social dilemmas, intended actions are stochastically corrupted before execution, so an observed defection may reflect hostile intent or action error. Standard Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulations treat executed actions as states, structurally precluding this distinction and causing systematic over-retaliation. We introduce a Partially Observable MDP (POMDP) formulation encoding opponent intentions as latent states and executed actions as noisy observations, solved within the active inference (AIF) framework with a cost function that decomposes into epistemic and pragmatic components that jointly address inferring current intent and learning how intent evolves. In the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with symmetric noise, we derive a critical noise threshold governing cooperation collapse, connecting it to a fixed-point condition on learned priors. Experiments reveal that the value of intention inference is context-dependent: the POMDP provides consistent advantages against conditionally cooperative opponents, but mutual intention inference under sufficient noise produces correlated belief-driven collapse. The advantage is specific to games where intent attribution is decision-relevant.
A recent line of work measures causal emergence in reinforcement learning agents through Integrated Information Decomposition, reporting that $Φ_r$ grows with training and tracks reward improvement. For active inference, this raises the question of how reward-free predictive organization relates to such information-theoretic signatures. I test this within an active inference agent whose architecture separates a fast perception latent $z$ from a slow global latent $g$, where $g$ is driven by prediction error and structurally decoupled from policy gradients. In a reward-free environmental regime-switching protocol, $Φ_r$ concentrates in $g$; its aggregate magnitude is largely architectural and decreases with training. The substantive effect of learning becomes legible only at the atom-compositional level: decoupling flips sign from negative to positive and becomes regime-invariant under environmental change, while downward causation carries the regime-dependent adjustment. These results identify $g$ as the architectural locus of $Φ_r$-relevant temporal organization in an active inference agent, and argue against reading scalar $Φ_r$ as a direct index of learned integration.
Sophisticated Inference is a variant of active inference often associated with recursive belief modeling and tree search. We argue that its central computational role is simpler: within a planning horizon, it makes active inference closed-loop by allowing future actions to depend on future states and observations. This closed-loop structure can be represented in the epistemic-prior variational free energy framework. Epistemic priors supply the active-inference objective, while a joint posterior over future states and actions supplies the state-contingent control structure. We evaluate this decomposition in the Reactivity Maze, a stochastic benchmark designed to separate epistemic incentive from inner-horizon closed-loop control. The comparison includes three variational objectives with the same state-action posterior family, an action-state factorized active inference objective, Sophisticated Inference, and standard Expected Free Energy planning. The results show that neither ingredient is sufficient on its own. Methods without an epistemic component do not seek information, while methods that prevent future actions from depending on future states cannot turn information into reliable goal-reaching. By contrast, both Sophisticated Inference and full-joint epistemic-prior active inference solve the environment by combining epistemic drive with closed-loop inference. These results show that the advantage associated with Sophisticated Inference need not be specific to tree search itself. It arises from the closed-loop form of active inference, and this form can be represented in epistemic-prior variational inference when the posterior keeps future actions dependent on future states.
An agent acting under partial observability must decide when to gather information and which observations are worth their cost. Standard POMDPs value information only through its eventual effect on reward. The $ρ$-POMDP framework instead rewards uncertainty reduction directly, through a belief-dependent utility $ρ$, but in practice both the choice of $ρ$ and the weight placed on it are tuned by hand for every task. We show that active inference removes this tuning entirely. Minimizing Expected Free Energy (EFE) is exactly equivalent to solving a $ρ$-POMDP whose utility is expected information gain, and the exploration weight is fixed at $w=1$ because the variational bound expresses pragmatic and epistemic value in the same units (nats). We prove this equivalence for observe-then-commit POMDPs and extend it to factored observation POMDPs, a broader class that covers interleaved observe-act problems such as non-destructive testing and mobile sensing, where gathering information leaves the hidden state unchanged. Experiments support the theory. Across environments ranging from the classic Tiger problem to RockSample and a new Structural Inspection benchmark with over 65,000 states, the untuned weight matches or outperforms reward-only planning at the same horizon, avoids the over-exploration of bonuses tuned per task, and sits near the reward-maximizing knee of the success-reward Pareto frontier. The practical payoff is an exploration objective that works out of the box. In applications such as fault detection and medical screening, where every test has a price and every missed fault has a cost, EFE supplies a belief-dependent utility that is derived rather than tuned.
Across environments with mixed sources of uncertainty, unsupervised reinforcement learning requires intrinsic motivation that does not precommit to a particular direction of surprise. Surprise minimization is scoped by design to ``unstable'' environments. Prediction-error curiosity rewards total expected surprise, including irreducible noise. Bandit or mixture switching between surprise-minimizing and surprise-maximizing rewards reintroduces non-stationarity by construction. We propose a single intrinsic reward, stationary within each window, derived from the novelty contribution of a preference-free Expected Free Energy objective, expressed in reward-maximization form. Our claim is that parameter information gain, the expected surprise of the next state minus its irreducible part, is the appropriate intrinsic signal in both high-entropy and low-entropy components of the state space. Maximizing it seeks exactly the surprise the model can explain away. In regions of unresolved dynamics, this epistemic term drives exploration. As dynamics become resolved, the epistemic term vanishes, while an aleatoric penalty favors lower-variance transitions, all without fitting an explicit next-state predictor. A pseudocount supplies epistemic value, a probe-based penalty captures aleatoric variance, and a short-horizon gate protects informative successors. A window-based freeze of all reward-defining objects yields a stationary Bellman operator, explicit bounds on learning targets, and a conditional uniform-concentration result for the nonparametric estimators under mixing, smoothness, bandwidth, and capacity assumptions. In active-inference terms, the agent is preference-free where novelty is retained, standard likelihood ambiguity vanishes under full observability, a nonstandard transition-entropy penalty is added, and surprise minimization emerges in resolved regions of the state space.