NashDreamer: Model-Based Reinforcement Learning for Zero-Sum Imperfect-Information Games

Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) has achieved remarkable results in single-agent domains, yet its extension to competitive imperfect information games (IIGs) remains underexplored. In multi-agent settings, opponent-induced non-stationarity complicates the learning process, and decentralized model learning faces severe identifiability barriers, which we argue make centralized model learning a mathematical necessity. Building on this analysis, we propose NashDreamer, a principled MBRL framework for two-player zero-sum IIGs. It introduces a centralized Multi-Agent Recurrent State-Space Model (MARSSM) that decouples environment dynamics from the effect of players' strategies on their individual observations. NashDreamer is designed to use arbitrary policy gradient algorithms and inherits their convergence guarantees towards Nash equilibria under an idealized model. Empirical evaluations across four benchmark games demonstrate that NashDreamer substantially improves sample efficiency over model-free baselines early in the training. Finally, we theoretically analyze the architecture's optimization landscape, identifying the vulnerability of the Dreamer family of algorithms to posterior collapse in stochastic environments. We leave it as an open challenge.

LeAct: Learning to Reason from Expert Actions

Modern reasoning models depend on reasoning data, today sourced from human annotations or distilled from stronger LLMs. However, a rich and largely untapped source of supervision lies in expert systems (e.g., game engines, classical planners, theorem provers), which routinely produce near-optimal actions across diverse domains. But these experts are silent: they commit to an action without writing down the chain of thought (CoT) behind it. Recovering that CoT as natural-language reasoning would distill expert knowledge into a student that generalizes beyond the demonstrated actions. We treat it as a latent variable and study how to recover it from the action alone. Our approach, LeAct (Learning to reason from Actions), optimizes this latent variable: the student samples candidate CoTs for each expert action, and we retain those that measurably improve its own probability of recovering the action. Across imperfect-information games at multiple scales and a simulated robotics benchmark, LeAct reaches the solver's numerical floor on small enumerable games. At larger scale, it is $5\times$ closer to the solver than the strongest expert-iteration baseline. At Flop Hold'em ($\sim 10^9$ infosets), LeAct wins head-to-head by $+60$ mbb/g, and on the robotics probe it is the only training recipe that improves on direct imitation. We present a principled framework and the result: expert systems become a categorically new source of reasoning teachers for foundation models.

A Gold-Standard Study of What Makes a Lightweight Game-Playing Agent Strong

Reinforcement learning agents for imperfect-information card games are only as strong as the opponents they train against, and they are hard to grade, since they beat a random opponent over 99 percent of the time and only tie copies of themselves. So we build a strong, fixed, rule-based expert for Gin Rummy and use it only as a yardstick, never for training. It beats every agent we trained 70 to 99 percent of the time. Across more than a hundred runs, we isolate what makes a lightweight agent stronger. Trust region updates, a well-aimed reward, a curriculum of tougher opponents, warm starting, and keeping the best checkpoint all help, and stacking them lifts a self-play champion from about 30 to 36 percent against the expert. Several ideas did not pay off. Short-term and longer-term reward shaping, learned state embeddings, imitation and DAgger, and a live large language model opponent were each unhelpful, too slow, or too heavy to train at scale. Comparing MLP, convolutional, set-based, attention, and recurrent encoders shows that extra capacity does little to break the ceiling, suggesting the limit is information rather than network size. We add standard baselines (neural fictitious self-play and information set Monte Carlo search) and confirm the approach carries over to Leduc Hold'em, where the optimum is computable. The result is a lightweight, game-agnostic recipe that trains competitive agents without training on the expert, for any game a small model can handle, reported with robust statistics and released as a reusable package.

FootsiesGym: A Fighting Game Benchmark for Two-Player Zero-Sum Imperfect-Information Games

We present FootsiesGym, an open-source environment for learning in a non-trivial two-player, zero-sum, imperfect-information game. Built on HiFight's minimalist 2D fighting game Footsies, it isolates the cyclic, non-transitive strategic interactions of fighting game neutral play while remaining simple enough for efficient analysis. We provide a vectorized simulator that enables high-throughput training on standard hardware, making the environment accessible and reproducible. We describe the design of the environment, benchmark several reinforcement learning algorithms, and discuss open research directions it enables. The code is available at https://github.com/como-research/FootsiesGym.

Towards Learning Representations of Policies in Two-Player Zero-Sum Imperfect-Information Games

We investigate the problem of learning useful policy representations (embeddings) in two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games. We make three contributions: First, we introduce methods of creating datasets of policies for a given game. Second, we propose methods to learn policy representations. Third, we introduce downstream tasks to evaluate the effectiveness of such representations. We evaluate each dataset method, embedding method, and downstream task on Kuhn and Leduc Poker. Although our methods are very basic, we demonstrate that useful behavioral representations are present in the learned embeddings. To our knowledge, this work is among the first to systematically compare self-supervised learning techniques for learning policy representations in games. Our code is available at https://github.com/VitamintK/ssl-project for others to extend.

Projected Exploitability Descent for Nash Equilibrium Computation in Multiplayer Imperfect-Information Games

Many important games have more than two players and imperfect information. Existing approaches for computing Nash equilibrium, the central game-theoretic solution concept, in such games either lack scalability or obtain poor performance. In this paper we introduce a new algorithm called projected exploitability descent (PED) for approximating Nash equilibria in multiplayer games of imperfect information. The algorithm works by running projected subgradient descent minimizing a proxy for the multiplayer generalized exploitability function. The objective is nonconvex and nonsmooth, but can be represented as the sum of the maxima of linear functions, for which a subgradient can easily be computed and projected to the polytope of feasible sequence-form strategies. We explore performance of PED on a generalized version of the well-studied benchmark game three-player Kuhn poker. No prior exact algorithms scale to the version of the game with deck size larger than 4, and we compare performance to the popular algorithms of fictitious play (FP) and counterfactual regret minimization (CFR). We find that PED obtains a consistent near-monotonic improvement throughout all runs, though both FP and CFR perform significantly better in the initial iterations. This inspires a hybrid algorithm FP-PED that runs FP for an initial burn-in period before switching to PED for stable long-run refinement. We can alternatively view this as a multi-step algorithm that runs FP as a pre-processing step to obtain a strong initialization for PED.

EMAgnet: Parameter-Space EMA Regularization for Policy Gradient Self-Play in Large Games

Recent work has established that regularized policy gradient methods such as PPO, when used in self-play, can match or exceed specialized game-theoretic algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum imperfect-information games. The uniform distribution has emerged as a strong policy regularization target for this purpose, but it regularizes equally toward all actions regardless of their viability. We introduce EMAgnet, which instead regularizes toward an exponential moving average (EMA) of the last-iterate policy's parameters, providing an adaptive regularization target that evolves with the agent's improving strategy. We evaluate EMAgnet on both standard two-player zero-sum benchmarks and modified benchmarks with exploration challenges and large numbers of strictly dominated strategies. Relative to PPO self-play with uniform-magnet regularization under both linear and power-law annealing schedules, EMAgnet achieves lower exploitability in the majority of tested environments, with consistent performance gains across games containing strictly dominated strategies.

StratFormer: Adaptive Opponent Modeling and Exploitation in Imperfect-Information Games

We present StratFormer, a transformer-based meta-agent that learns to simultaneously model and exploit opponents in imperfect-information games through a two-phase curriculum. The first phase trains an opponent modeling head to identify behavioral patterns from action histories while the agent plays a game-theoretic optimal (GTO) policy. The second phase progressively shifts the policy toward best-response (BR) exploitation, guided by a per-opponent regularization schedule tied to exploitability. Our architecture introduces dual-turn tokens -- feature vectors constructed at both agent and opponent decision points -- coupled with bucket-rate features that encode opponent tendencies across five strategic contexts. On Leduc Hold'em, a small poker variant with six cards and two betting rounds, we test against six opponent archetypes at two strength levels each, with exploitability ranging from 0.15 to 1.26 Big Blinds (BB) per hand. StratFormer achieves an average exploitation gain of +0.106 BB per hand over GTO, with peak gains of +0.821 against highly exploitable opponents, while maintaining near-equilibrium safety.