Learning to Allocate Incentives for Incentivized Advertising via Offline Model-Based Reinforcement Learning

Complete your ad view and grab a 5-cent bonus! In incentivized advertising, a platform promises users a bonus before observing downstream ad revenue, encouraging them to click and complete ads. It must balance the incentive promised in advance against the revenue realized afterward: insufficient incentives forfeit monetization opportunities, whereas excessive incentives reduce net profit. Because current incentives may also shape user expectations and future engagement, incentive allocation is a sequential decision problem with delayed revenue, cost sensitivity, and carryover effects. Existing work has not studied decision-making algorithms for this setting. Auto-bidding assumes available ad opportunities, while targeted promotion optimizes incentives outside the ad monetization pipeline. We formulate the problem as an MDP and develop an offline model-based RL framework for cost-controllable sequential incentive allocation. It learns a world model of user feedback and ad revenue, then performs conservative policy optimization. An independent counterfactual scorer evaluates each learned policy on held-out logs, enabling pre-launch selection without costly online exposure. Experiments on large-scale industrial data and online A/B tests show that the scorer provides a stable offline signal. The deployment path from causal inference to offline RL and then Offline-MBRL further validates the framework: MB-IQL improves per-user net profit by 7.96\% over TD3+BC, whereas reverting to plain IQL reduces it by 6.56\% (both \(p<0.0001\)).

Dynamic multi-agent deep reinforcement learning-based pricing and incentivization approach in multimodal transportation networks

In multimodal transportation systems, shared mobility services (SMSs) are promoted for their potential to enhance flexibility and reduce congestion. However, SMS demand is often concentrated in high-density areas, which can limit the effectiveness and accessibility for various commuter groups. This uneven integration challenges transportation system efficiency, especially in terms of emissions and spatial equity. Addressing these issues requires coordination among multiple stakeholders whose objectives frequently conflict. Whereas authorities aim to ensure sustainable and equitable mobility, SMS providers focus on revenue maximization, and travelers seek to minimize personal travel costs. This paper proposes a multi-agent deep reinforcement learning framework that captures these interactions through dynamic pricing and incentivization strategies for SMSs and public transport. The framework integrates two reinforcement learning (RL) agents: (i) a public authority that allocates spatio-temporal public transport incentives to improve equity, emissions, and efficiency, and (ii) an SMS provider that dynamically adjusts fares to optimize revenue. The agents interact with the transportation system and adapt strategies in response to evolving demand, congestion, and network conditions. Numerical experiments conducted over a three-hour morning peak period show that dynamic incentivization effectively reduces congestion peaks, lowers commuters' costs by around 20% and emissions by approximately 10%, while nearly doubling public transport profit and supporting a more equitable distribution of benefits. When combined with dynamic SMS pricing, the two RL agents demonstrate the ability to balance conflicting objectives between private providers and public authorities. The proposed approach provides a decision-support tool for sustainable and equitable multimodal mobility planning.