In noisy social dilemmas, intended actions are stochastically corrupted before execution, so an observed defection may reflect hostile intent or action error. Standard Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulations treat executed actions as states, structurally precluding this distinction and causing systematic over-retaliation. We introduce a Partially Observable MDP (POMDP) formulation encoding opponent intentions as latent states and executed actions as noisy observations, solved within the active inference (AIF) framework with a cost function that decomposes into epistemic and pragmatic components that jointly address inferring current intent and learning how intent evolves. In the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with symmetric noise, we derive a critical noise threshold governing cooperation collapse, connecting it to a fixed-point condition on learned priors. Experiments reveal that the value of intention inference is context-dependent: the POMDP provides consistent advantages against conditionally cooperative opponents, but mutual intention inference under sufficient noise produces correlated belief-driven collapse. The advantage is specific to games where intent attribution is decision-relevant.
Inducing cooperation among distributed agents is still a difficult problem in the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), particularly in social dilemma situations. There, individual interests are misaligned with the common good and individual rationality leads to suboptimal group outcomes. In contrast, humans are able to achieve cooperation with one another in such situations. A common explanation for such cooperative behavior is that individuals have social preferences. In order to achieve cooperation in MARL, we design a new utility function integrating altruistic preferences (incentive for other's reward) and fairness preferences (incentive for equality) from social psychology and behavioral economics, namely, Altruistic and Fairness Preference (AFP), a reward-sharing mechanism which converts one's own and other's rewards to incentives for cooperative behavior. We performed comparative experiments with standard RL and inequity aversion agents in two challenging sequential social dilemma games, and showed that AFP agents successfully achieved mutual cooperation with more collective rewards and higher equity than the baselines. To further understand the progression of AFP during training, we subsequently explore the effects of altruistic preferences and fairness preferences on agents' behavior. The results suggest that altruistic preferences encourage agents to contribute to the public goods, and fairness preferences induce mutual behavior between agents.